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Ezra KleinA modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
Evinced by his title, Why We’re Polarized, Klein identifies polarization as the key to understanding contemporary US politics. He explains the causes of polarization, including the human propensity to treat non-group members with hostility, the ideological sorting of the major parties, the fusing of political identities with others, and demographic changes. Because of the relationship between a polarized public and polarized political institutions, Klein expects polarization to continue and get worse. The interaction between the public and institutions reinforces and strengthens polarization.
While Americans have affiliated with political parties since the 19th century, partisan identification did not align with other identities, and political parties were ideologically diverse. Klein highlights the American Political Science Association’s criticism of the major parties in the 1950s. The organization lamented the fact that the parties were so ideologically muddled, as voters were deprived of clear choices at the polls. The entrance of civil rights to the political agenda triggered a long-term sorting process at the end of which the parties would be ideologically distinct. Conservative, white, Southern Democrats ultimately left the Democratic Party for the Republican Party. Liberal, Northern Republicans likewise switched to the Democratic Party. While this realignment took decades, by 2000, the political parties were not only ideologically sorted but also aligned on the basis of race, religion, and geography. Partisan identity thus became a mega-identity for these other identities.
Klein cites research about the human instinct to treat outsiders, or those not in their group, with hostility. As partisanship has become an entrenched identity, it has become increasingly unlikely that members of one party would entertain voting for the other. Instead, every time any of their identities—racial, religious, or geographic—is threatened, they attach more strongly to their chosen party. Given the changing demographics in the US, such threats are perceived often. With the political parties sorted, independents have chosen sides. The percentage of undecided voters shrunk to 7% by the turn of the century. Even those individuals who pay little attention to politics know the differences between the parties and have aligned with one side or the other.
Klein also emphasizes that an already polarized public becomes more so as it interacts with polarized institutions. The media, for example, have changed their business model to accommodate a polarized public, with certain media venues, such as Fox News, catering specifically to one party. Since the media seek to increase ratings, they cover the most polarizing figures in each party, thus leaving the impression that the parties are more extreme than they are. At the same time, the public concludes that the other party is more threatening than it is and becomes even more polarized. Within this system, candidates thus adopt strategies of political mobilization rather than persuasion: To motivate their base, candidates therefore demonize the other party and trigger hostility to it. Fundraising incentives operate similarly. To encourage a polarized public to contribute to a campaign, the candidate must cater to the extreme or insult the other party. In all these cases, Klein identifies a feedback cycle that worsens polarization.
One of Klein’s key themes is that it is not polarization itself but the consequences of polarization in the US system of governance that create a crisis. The US political system is somewhat unique, with major party nominees selected in primaries and an 18th-century Constitution that separates institutional powers and has multiple safeguards against tyranny of the majority. Historically, the political parties navigated this system via informal norms of cooperation. With the parties polarized in the 21st century, Klein argues that there are grounds to worry about the functionality and legitimacy of the governmental system.
Because nominees from the major parties are selected in primaries, voters who care the most about politics turn out. While primary participation is low, those who do participate tend to be the most conservative in the Republican Party and most liberal in the Democratic Party. It is therefore likely that they will be inclined to select divisive candidates. Klein highlights why this method of selection is problematic at the Congressional level: Those candidates in “safe” seats, with lopsided majorities, have no fear of losing to the other party. Instead, they are afraid of a primary challenge within their party if they compromise with the other. As a result, they are disincentivized to work with the other party to make Congress functional.
The system established within the Constitution depends on cooperation and has been described as a system of separate institutions that share powers. Because the legislature and executive are chosen separately by distinct constituencies, it is possible that a different party will be in control of each. In that case, the leaders must work together. Instead, the age of polarization has created a politics of brinksmanship. Klein cites the Republicans holding the debt ceiling hostage and notes the financial disaster that would ensue if the government did not meet its debts. Government shutdowns are also a threat with polarization. More routinely, however, popular bills fail to pass. Historically, the American political system has tended to have one party dominant for periods of time, providing an incentive to the minority party in Congress to cooperate with the majority, as it was the only means of gaining some influence. With the parties fairly evenly divided in the 21st century, the minority party seeks to displace the majority party and therefore has no incentive to cooperate. Without such cooperation, the system is challenged to function properly.
The Constitution and political system arm the numerical minority with tools to frustrate the majority’s will. For example, a bicameral legislature requires all bills to be approved by both the House and the Senate. Representing each state equally, the Senate significantly overrepresents rural areas, which lean Republican. In addition, the filibuster allows the minority party in the Senate to derail the majority’s agenda. The electoral college further reflects the bias toward land representation instead of people, a fact that has caused discrepancies between that vote and the popular vote twice since 2000. Given that the parties are split along geographic lines, the Republicans, who are strong in rural areas, have an advantage. That party has a primarily white and Christian coalition. As this gap in representation grows to the Republicans’ advantage, Klein worries that it could lead to a legitimacy crisis.
Partisan identity has merged with other powerful identities, such as race, religion, geography, and culture. As a result, for many voters, voting has become a form of self-expression, rather than a deliberative choice based on the character of candidates or strengths of the policies they propose. Klein argues that this dynamic is not only new—stemming from the increase in polarization—but also poses threats to the health of democracy in the US.
Citing social psychology research demonstrating the hostility that members of ingroups feel toward outsiders, Klein explains how such feelings have exploded around partisanship given its alignment with other identities. Since party now stands in for race, religion, and one’s home, it is constantly activated as an identity. A threat to one of these identities, therefore, is a threat to all. Given the changing demographics in the US and the media’s coverage of politicians who stoke outrage, such threats are perceived frequently, sparking hostile feelings toward the other party. Candidates are demonized as criminals, as Donald Trump suggested of Hillary Clinton, or as out to get the other party. In such a system, it becomes almost inconceivable to support a candidate from the other party. Those who cross such lines pay a high price. Klein cites the example of David Brooks, a conservative journalist and commentator who condemned Trump publicly and was ostracized from his social circle. If voting is a reflexive expression of identity, then reason is taken out of the equation. Voters are not weighing policy proposals or their interests; they are voting instead on the basis of emotional attachment. As a result, Klein argues, they will support any candidate with the correct partisan label, even one who is a demagogue or threatens democracy and the rule of law.
As a political journalist, Klein seeks to inform voters and thereby empower them to make choices in their interests. Research shows, however, that exposure to factual information and the arguments of the other party do not persuade partisans. Instead, it entrenches them in their own positions, a concept known as “identity-protective cognition.” Klein explains that partisans act as “press secretaries” who defend the position of their party no matter what. This dynamic plays out in the media as well, wherein public relations take precedence over political journalism. Fundamentally, according to Klein, partisans are not interested in debating, listening to others, or discovering the truth: They want to win the argument and defeat their partisan enemy. This lack of deliberation presents a threat to democracy because there is no search for a common good or even for a viable compromise since compromise is considered a betrayal of party principles. Democracy requires that citizens respect one another to some degree, so it becomes fragile when one party considers those outside of it enemies.
While the parties are polarized, Klein stresses that there are significant differences between Republicans and Democrats. He considers the Republicans to be the greater threat to democracy and the more ideologically focused of the two parties. This state of the Republican Party did not originate with Trump, but Klein argues that he took the party to its logical conclusion. Klein traces the differences in the parties to the makeup of their coalitions.
After the injection of civil rights into the national political agenda, the Republican Party appealed to Southern, conservative, white voters via its mistrust of the federal government and advocacy for states’ rights. In time, the Republican Party had a primarily white coalition. It developed the support of conservative Christians via its stances on issues such as abortion and its favor of “tradition,” which often means the preservation of historically oppressive systems. This homogeneous coalition of white Christians, centered in the South and Rocky Mountain West, became increasingly conservative, and its members have expressed a desire for the party to become even more conservative. In primaries, the voters select candidates who are hostile toward Democrats. The coalition feels threatened by demographic changes that it fears will reduce its political power and status.
Instead of expanding the Republican Party’s appeal to other groups, Trump sought to excite the base. Using a confrontational approach, he appealed to fears of demographic change and demonized the Democratic Party. He took relish in attacking Hillary Clinton, a woman, and Obama, an African American, in particular. As Klein explains via the findings of academic researchers, even the slightest reminder of diversity motivates white voters to adopt more conservative positions and to be more likely to support Republicans. In opting for this strategy of mobilization over expansion, Klein argues, the Republican Party has chosen an antidemocratic path. As its numbers diminish as a percentage of the population, the party defends unrepresentative institutions, such as the Senate and electoral college; seeks to make voting more difficult, rather than easier; and questions the outcome of legitimate elections. Careful to note that Trump did not initiate these trends, Klein describes Republicans before him denying factual evidence, such as data on climate change, and assuming a reckless approach to legislation. Trump, however, pushed all these strategies to their limits.
The Democrats, in contrast, are a diverse coalition, which includes white progressives, African Americans, Latinos/Latinas, the LGBTQ+ community, religious minorities, the growing number of religiously unaffiliated “nones,” and a majority of women voters. As a result, the Democrats have an ideologically diverse party, a majority of whom want their party to moderate and have selected moderate presidential candidates, such as Clinton and Joe Biden, over more liberal candidates, such as Bernie Sanders. The Democratic leadership in Congress is stable and is “tethered to traditional institutions and behaviors” (228). Democrats are more likely to compromise to pass bills and to make the system work. For these reasons, Klein considers the Republican Party a threat to democracy and calls for democratic reforms to prevent a crisis of legitimacy and force the Republicans to expand their coalition.
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