Why We're Polarized

Because Klein is seeking to explain the increase in polarization, he must chronicle the historical evolution, coalition, and behavior of the major parties. Partisan identity, which is now fused with other identities, is the driver of polarization. In the 1950s, the Republican Party had its greatest strength in the northeastern US. With the injection of civil rights into the political agenda in the 1960s, the Democratic Party fractured. That left an opportunity for the Republicans to appeal to Southern, white conservatives who were irate at the Democrats for their support of civil rights. Using coded language, the Republicans touted states’ rights and called for a smaller national government, as the national government was enforcing civil rights laws in the South. Later, President Ronald Reagan added other social issues, such as abortion, to the Republican platform and touted traditional and conservative positions. Those opposed to the women’s rights movement could accordingly find a home in the Republican Party. Over time, the party cultivated a homogeneous coalition, consisting primarily of white, Christian, rural, and older voters. With the large wave of Hispanic immigration in the late 20th century, George W. Bush attempted to broaden the Republican Party’s appeal. However, by 2004, the country was polarized with few undecided voters. Candidates therefore adopted strategies of mobilization, which aim to excite the base.

The election of Barack Obama in 2008 made the Republican Party more strident in its opposition to the Democrats. Congressional Republicans made the conscious decision to oppose all of Obama’s policies. They would not compromise but simply refused to pass them. Klein cites the Affordable Care Act as an example of this position. The goal of the Republicans was to make the administration fail so that they could win back power. In 2010, the Republicans were able to regain control of Congress. They then threatened to not raise the debt ceiling and shut the government down. Klein highlights this behavior to expose the consequences of polarization in the US system of governance, which requires cooperation to function. While Klein stresses that the Republican Party was already well on its way to its refusal to respect constitutional norms, when Trump entered the political arena, he brought these tendencies to their logical conclusions by declining to expand the party’s base and instead playing to fears among white voters and Christians about losing power and status. Demonizing the Democrats, he cemented partisan identity in the Republican base.

Noting the Differences Between Republicans and Democrats, Klein considers the Republican Party a much greater threat to democracy. The Republicans’ hold on political power is facilitated by a constitutional system that favors the representation of land over people and therefore overrepresents rural areas. Furthermore, he notes that the party has increasingly chosen the path of limiting democracy, via efforts to suppress voting or the gerrymandering of legislative seats, over any attempt to diversify and expand its coalition. Klein fears a looming legitimacy crisis as the trend of overrepresenting the numerical minority becomes more pronounced. In appealing to fears and threats to identity, its leaders have strengthened partisan identity to the point that it threatens democracy. Republican voters do not evaluate the qualities of candidates but are willing to vote for any candidate, even a demagogue who threatens the rule of law, if that candidate wins the Republican nomination. Thus, Klein argues, the party poses a threat to democracy.

As one of two major parties in the US, the Democrats are critical to an understanding of the increase in political polarization. In the 1950s, Klein explains, the national Democratic Party relied on the votes of both white Southerners and African Americans in the Northern US to deliver it a majority. Once civil rights were placed on the agenda, this coalition was in trouble. Over a period of decades, Southern white voters fled the Democratic Party for the Republican Party. In contrast to the Republican Party, Democrats built a diverse coalition comprised of liberal white voters, African American voters, Latino/Latina voters, and the LGBTQ+ community, and they had an edge among women as well. As demographic changes increased the share of the electorate of these groups, the Democrats gained a political advantage and a national majority. However, constitutional rules and gerrymandering at the state level have disadvantaged this coalition, which is based in urban and densely populated areas. For example, the Democrats have lost in the electoral college—which favors rural areas—twice since 2000 despite winning the popular vote. Prior to 2000, the last time that happened was in 1888.

Because of its makeup, the Democratic Party is more ideologically diverse. Bill Clinton, Barack Obama, and Joe Biden all hailed from the centrist wing of the Democratic Party. While Bernie Sanders, who is on the left, came close to taking the nomination in 2016, he did not prevail. His loss demonstrated that the liberal wing of the Democratic Party does not have the same amount of power as the conservatives wield in the Republican Party. Yet despite the moderate nature of these Democratic presidents, Republicans have portrayed them as liberal extremists. While the left wing of the Democratic Party is represented in Congress and garners attention from the press, this media focus—particularly on networks catering to Republicans—leaves voters with the impression that Democrats in general are extremists.

Klein stresses the differences between the Republicans and Democrats: The majority of Democrats want their party to move toward the center, while the majority of Republicans want their party to become more conservative. Committed to constitutional norms, Democrats express a willingness to compromise. The members of the Democratic coalition seek fair representation for their numbers, however. Klein worries about the increasing likelihood of a legitimacy crisis if a numerical minority continues to frustrate the majority.

Once a faction within the Democratic Party, the Dixiecrats were white, Southern conservatives. They supported the national Democratic Party in return for that party ignoring the violation of the rights of African Americans. Klein highlights the Dixiecrats’ presence in the Democratic coalition as an example of the parties’ previous ideological diversity and “big tent” coalitions. In the 1950s, political scientists lamented this state of affairs because voters were not presented with clear ideological choices at the polls. When civil rights became a prominent issue on the political agenda, the Democratic Party shifted its positions to support the voting rights of African Americans in the South, integration, and ultimately the rights of other groups, such as women. That shift triggered a long-term political realignment in the South, with white conservatives becoming Republicans. Klein provides the example of Strom Thurmond, a Senator from South Carolina, who ran on a third-party ticket, called the Dixiecrats, in 1948 to protest President Truman’s order to integrate the troops. Later, he changed his party affiliation to Republican. As he went, so too did other white voters. The exodus of Dixiecrats, who were conservative, from the Democratic Party made that party more liberal. Klein traces how this group’s movement set the stage for the sorting of parties and their eventual polarization.

Former President Donald Trump serves as the symbol of the new Republican coalition and party. That coalition, which consists of white voters, Christians, and a preponderance of men, fears losing its power and status given changing demographics. Fusing attacks on religious, racial, and ethnic minorities with those on women and liberals, Trump appealed to this fear and cultivated a partisan mega-identity. Demonizing his opponents, Trump characterized them as dangerous outsiders to be treated with hostility, often suggesting they were not true Americans. Klein argues that Partisan Identity Threatens Democracy precisely because voters do not consider policy or the characteristics of candidates when making their choices at the polls. Trump is a prime exhibit for Klein’s argument because Trump broke all conventions of civility in his campaign. In office, he expressed support for neo-Nazis, opposed the use of masks during the COVID-19 pandemic, and refused to accept the results of an election that he lost. Klein argues that Trump is the logical extension of Republican practices that pre-dated him.

Seeking to unify the country, Barack Obama appealed to the hopes of a diverse coalition. His victory offered the promise of political empowerment to demographic groups previously excluded from power and strengthening in number. Yet because of his own identity as an African American, Obama became a polarizing and divisive figure. Citing the findings of academic researchers, Klein notes that any reminders of increasing diversity can activate fears among white voters. As president, Obama reminded particularly Republican voters of the increasing diversity of the US, which they already deemed threatening to their identity and power. Obama thus energized not only his diverse base in the Democratic Party but the Republican base as well. Indeed, the Tea Party, which was a faction formed within the Republican Party in 2010, was a precursor to Trump. In their rallies, Obama was portrayed negatively and compared to Hitler. Trump entered the political arena during Obama’s presidency by questioning whether Obama, who was born in Hawaii, was born in the US. Klein explains that Obama and Trump led two very different coalitions, and each contributed to polarization, though it was unintended on Obama’s part.

Klein cites Biden’s capture of the Democratic nomination in 2020 as evidence of the differences between Republicans and Democrats. Biden was not the choice of the progressive wing of the Democratic party, as that wing preferred Bernie Sanders. However, African American voters, who tend to be more moderate and conservative than white Democrats, secured his frontrunner status in the South Carolina primary. To ensure that they did not split the moderate vote and abet Sanders’s victory, Amy Klobuchar and Pete Buttigieg ended their campaigns ahead of Super Tuesday. Klein uses Joe Biden’s nomination and presidency to highlight the ideological diversity and moderation within the Democratic Party.