Why We're Polarized

In 1950, the American Political Science Association called for a more polarized political system. At that time, the two parties did not offer clear policy choices. Considering themselves big tents, the Democrats and Republicans reflected one another and had divisions within themselves. In other words, being a Republican did not translate into being a conservative, nor did being a Democrat equate to being a liberal. Internal party divisions were addressed with compromise, while divisions between parties led to conflict. In 1964, Barry Goldwater won the Republican nomination for the presidency and ran an ideologically conservative campaign. When he lost by a large margin, the parties assumed that ideologues lost elections.

Given the variety of ideologies within the parties, it was common for voters to split their tickets or vote for one party for the presidency and another for Congress. That behavior has “virtually disappeared” in the 21st century. Since the 1980s, Republicans’ positive feelings toward Democrats—and vice versa—“have dropped off a cliff” (9). Voters are driven by negative partisanship or negative feelings toward the party they oppose. Even independents now vote more predictably for one party than partisans did in the 20th century.

Americans have a long history of condemning political parties and labeling themselves as independent. However, as the political parties have become more different, voters have become more partisan in response. For example, in 1994, “32 percent of Democrats and 30 percent of Republicans agreed that immigrants strengthened the country. By 2017, that had jumped to 84 percent of Democrats but only 42 percent of Republicans” (12). Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Herbert Walker Bush signed bills raising taxes, while President Bill Clinton reduced the deficit. By the time President Barack Obama was in office, not one Republican voted for a healthcare bill that was based on compromise. In short, the parties are clearly ideologically distinct by 2020. Even voters who ignore politics are aware of their differences. Klein points out that this is something new.

Prior to the Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s, the Democratic Party monopolized political power in the South. Southern Democrats, or Dixiecrats, were conservative on many issues. The national Democratic Party needed Southern votes to ensure a national majority. In turn, the Democrats allowed the Dixiecrats to enforce segregation and prevent African Americans from voting. Because of seniority rules in Congress, Dixiecrats were in positions of power and dominated the Party. Until 1936, presidential nominations required two thirds of the delegates to win. This rule gave Southern Democrats a veto over the party’s nominees.

Once the Democratic Party began to advocate for civil rights, this system began to change. President Harry Truman’s order to integrate the troops prompted Strom Thurmond, a Southerner, to run a third-party campaign in 1948. The passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964 was attributed to Democratic efforts, as President Lyndon Johnson signed the bill. In reality, 80% of Republicans and 60% of Democrats supported the law. In 1964, the parties were internally diverse. In that same year, Barry Goldwater, the Republican nominee for President, ran a campaign emphasizing states’ rights and mistrust of the federal government, which he associated with the enforcement of civil rights laws in the South. As the Democratic Party increasingly embraced civil rights, Southern conservatives joined the Republican party. Goldwater won five Southern states, in addition to his home state of Arizona, demonstrating that the Democratic lock on the South was breaking.

Klein distinguishes sorting from polarization. In the 1960s, the political parties were not sorted because people held diverse views within them. Over time, with Southern conservatives leaving the Democratic Party and liberal Republicans joining it, the parties became sorted. No minds needed to be changed for this to happen. Polarization occurs when independents choose sides, leaving no one or few in the middle. Such issue-based polarization leads to identity-based polarization. While “polarization begets polarization […] it doesn’t beget extremism” (33). Obama’s healthcare policy, for example, was a centrist policy, though deeply polarizing. In contrast, the era of McCarthyism, Vietnam War protests, and political assassinations did not have polarized political parties.

In the 21st century, Democrats and Republicans are not only sorted but also divided over race and religion. Diversity is concentrated in the Democratic Party, as are the “nones” or religiously unaffiliated. Given the significance of race and religion to identity, the sorted parties are likely to generate “intolerance and hostility” (38). The parties are sorted by geography into an urban-rural divide as well.

Klein also notes that personality traits and psychology are shaping politics. While people can be categorized differently, “openness to experience […] is associated with liberalism, while conscientiousness, a preference for order and tradition that breeds a skepticism toward disruptive change, connects to conservatism” (44). Klein notes how Whole Foods and Cracker Barrel cater to liberal and conservative personalities, respectively. As so many dimensions align, they strengthen, and people participate to express their identity, not to make deliberative policy choices.