Why We're Polarized

“That logic, put simply, is this: to appeal to a more polarized public, political institutions and political actors behave in more polarized ways.”

Emphasizing the worsening nature of the crisis, Klein observes that there is a feedback cycle that intensifies the level of polarization. The behavior of political institutions and actors, in turn, further polarizes the public, and onward the cycle goes.

“When a division exists within a party, it gets addressed through suppression or compromise. Parties don’t want to fight among themselves. But when a division exists between the parties, it gets addressed through conflict.”

For much of US history, there was ideological diversity within the political parties. In the 21st century, the parties have sorted ideologically. This change has caused the conflict between them to be more intense and partisan identity to become stronger.

“To put that more simply, a voter who mostly ignores American politics today is clearer on the differences between the two parties than political junkies and partisan loyalists were in 1980. That is an incredible finding.”

Emphasizing the increase in polarization, Klein explains that the parties have grown so apart that even those who pay little attention to politics know the differences between them. He contrasts this state of affairs to 1980, when the political parties were not as ideologically sorted. At that time, it was harder for the most informed to discern the differences. Notably, media coverage of politics via 24/7 cable news and the internet has increased drastically since the 1980s, making political information more accessible. However, as Klein notes later in the book, the media also plays a role in polarizing the public.

“Thurmond’s politics and path are America’s twentieth-century political realignment in miniature.”

Strom Thurmond was a conservative Democrat from the South who ran as a third-party presidential candidate in 1948. Objecting to President Truman’s order to integrate the military, he ran on a Dixiecrat ticket. Later, he joined the Republican Party. Klein notes that the shift among Southern white conservatives from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party in the 1950s was a major driver of partisan sorting and increased political polarization.

“The irony is that the American political system was most calm and least polarized when America itself seemed to be on the verge of cracking apart.”

Referring to the 1950s and 1960s, Klein points to the Communist Scare, political assassinations, and protests over the Vietnam War and civil rights as sources of national stress. Yet, because the political parties were not sorted or aligned on these issues, the political system itself was not stressed. Klein makes the argument here that extremism is a value judgment and not the same thing as polarization. In the 21st century, the parties are polarized over moderate policies, such as healthcare, and the political system is stressed.

“Human beings evolved to exist in groups. To be part of a group, and to see that group thrive, meant survival. To be exiled from a group, or to see your group crushed by its enemies, could mean death.”

Klein explains the underlying psychological reasons for the tendency to favor one’s own group and act with hostility to outsiders. It is almost instinctual and based on self-preservation. For this reason, once people associate their identity with a political party, it is very difficult to change their views, even if a demagogue is on the ticket. In this way, Klein argues, Partisan Identity Threatens Democracy.

“The insight here makes sense: the more your identities converge on a single point, the more your identities can be threatened simultaneously, and that makes conflict much more threatening.”

With “sorted” political parties, identity encompasses several other important identities, such as race, religion, and geography. Given this merger, people react more negatively to political opponents. They are not considered just a political threat, but almost an existential one.

“The smarter the person is, the dumber politics can make them.”

In an experiment in which people were given mathematical brainteasers, some of which were political and others not, the people who did the best mathematically on the non-political problems did worse when the correct answers contradicted their ideology. Klein thus exposes how partisan identity threatens democracy, as even intelligent people with strong identities are not open to facts and reason. They seek to defend their positions, not debate.

“Just as a press secretary is motivated to defend his or her boss’s positions, so, too, is our mind motivated to defend our group’s positions or the conclusion we need to reach for other reasons.”

Klein notes that exposing those with strong partisan identities to the perspectives and arguments of the other party does not change their minds. Instead, it solidifies their own position. They are not interested in deliberative discourse, but in winning or advancing their own party. In this way, he compares partisans to press secretaries, such as that of the White House.

“The result is that the Left feels a cultural and demographic power that it can only occasionally translate into political power, and the Right wields political power but feels increasingly dismissed and offended culturally.”

Because brands and entertainment media cater to the young, they reflect the direction of changing demographics. In short, they appeal to a diverse, primarily Democratic coalition. Republicans thus detect threats to their power in popular culture, which hardens their partisan identities. Republicans retain a hold on political power given the participation of older voters and the advantages given to rural areas in the US system of government, to the frustration of Democrats.

“The simplest way to activate someone’s identity is to threaten it, to tell them they don’t deserve what they have, to make them consider that it might be taken away.”

Because the Republican coalition is predominantly white, its members are threatened by predictions of white people becoming a minority in the United States by 2045. Trump and other Republicans play to that fear to motivate people to vote for them. Klein cautions Democrats to refrain from rhetoric that reinforces these fears, as it works against them.

“Groups that are rising in power want their needs reflected in politics and culture, groups that feel themselves losing power want to protect the status and privileges they’ve had, and this conflict is sorting itself neatly into two parties.”

Partisan sorting dovetails with race and religion. Barack Obama’s coalition represented the rising groups and was diverse, while Trump’s coalition was homogeneous and represented those who perceived themselves as losing power and status. The fear of such loss is a strong motivator to participate politically, as denoted by trends such as comparatively stronger primary turnouts among Republican voters.

“We talk a lot about the left-right polarization in the political news. We don’t talk enough about the divide that preceded it: the chasm separating the interested from the uninterested. But you can’t understand one without the other.”

Prior to the explosion of cable channels and the internet, most people could not avoid hearing some news. Now, the vast array of channels and choices—such as entertainment media—means it is easily avoided. The news media thus caters to those who are highly interested in politics. Because such people tend to be more partisan, the media has developed highly partisan news programming that serves to reinforce identity and polarization.

“This is a damning result: the more political media you consume, the more warped your perspective of the other side becomes.”

After presenting statistics showing the misperceptions partisans have about the other party, Klein notes that a source of this misinformation is the media. Because media outlets are trying to attract an audience, they focus on the outrageous and confrontational. They highlight the most extreme members of each party and leave viewers with the impression that these individuals represent the bulk of the party.

“Put differently, neither Donald Trump nor Bernie Sanders would’ve had a prayer in the 1956 presidential primaries, but one of them won and the other nearly won the 2016 presidential primaries.”

Klein identifies the Consequences of Polarization in the US System of Governance, not polarization itself, as the source of the crisis the United States faces. While party officials once influenced the choice of presidential nominees, that is no longer the case. Highly motivated voters select nominees in primaries and are more inclined to select either ideological purists, such as Sanders, or those promising to punish political enemies, such as Trump.

“You have to get noticed, retweeted, booked. And, in general, loud gets noticed. Extreme gets noticed. Confrontational gets noticed. Moderate, conciliatory, judicious—not so much.”

The media’s criteria for coverage influence political behavior. Not only do confrontation and extremism garner media coverage due to increased ratings—and thus more revenue—but they also enable candidates to raise money from partisans who love the attacks on the other side. The media thus reinforces and increases polarization.

“As party affiliation becomes more important, individual candidate traits lose their power.”

When individuals tie their identity to their party, it becomes unimaginable to vote for the other party. As a result, they will support any nominee, even one who rejects longstanding and consensual beliefs in US politics or displays a tendency to insult, belittle, or otherwise behave with hostility toward political opponents (or people perceived as opponents). For this reason, partisan identity threatens democracy.

“[A] presidential political system in which power is divided among different branches works when the parties that control those branches are ideologically mixed enough to cooperate with one another, and that was, for much of the twentieth century, the secret to the American political system’s success.”

The US system, grounded in a separation of powers, necessitates compromise among political actors. With the political parties sorted and polarized in the 21st century, this system is potentially on the verge of crisis. Klein cites government shutdowns and threats to not raise the debt ceiling as examples of the consequences of polarization in the US system of governance.

“To ideologues, transactional politics always looks dirty. To the transactional, ideologues look self-destructive.”

For much of its history, Congress relied on transactional politics to pass bills. In that form of politics, deals—which often benefit constituents—are cut to win the votes of legislators. Since 2011, Congress has greatly reduced this form of politics. This makes it much more difficult to win bipartisan, and sometimes even partisan, support for bills.

“Trump wasn’t a break with this Republican Party. He was the most authentic expression of its modern psychology.”

Agreeing with political scientist Norm Ornstein, who identified destructive trends in the Republican Party in 2012, Klein observes that the Republicans refused to compromise with the Obama administration, rejected science if inconvenient, and increasingly labeled Democrats as illegitimate. The Tea Party, which was a faction of the Republican Party formed to protest the Affordable Care Act, was a precursor to Trump. Although Republican elites did not initially want Trump, the rank-and-file party members were thus primed for his candidacy.

“But if polarization has given the Democratic Party the flu, the Republican Party has caught pneumonia.”

Stressing the Differences Between Republicans and Democrats, Klein argues that the Democratic Party—which is itself more ideologically diverse—has remained tethered to constitutional norms and will compromise when necessary. In contrast, the Republican Party has demonized the opposition to a point that makes compromise almost impossible. Its members want the party to become more conservative, while most Democrats want to see their party moderate.

“The alternative to democratizing America is scarier than mere polarization: it’s a legitimacy crisis that could threaten the very foundation of our political system. By 2040, 70 percent of Americans will live in the fifteen largest states. That means 70 percent of America will be represented by only thirty senators.”

Because partisan identity aligns with geographical identity, Republicans are advantaged. Those from rural states are more likely to support that party and are advantaged in the constitutional system, which grants equal representation in the Senate to all states, regardless of population. Thus, the Republican Party will continue to hold political power despite its minority status. Klein expects this bias to worsen unless institutional reforms are enacted.

“[W]e give too much attention to national politics, which we can do very little to change, and too little attention to state and local politics, where our voices can matter much more.”

Klein identifies the nationalization of politics as a source of increased political polarization. When political figures nationalize their campaigns—often assisted by media coverage of divisive or controversial statements—they tend to raise more money from small, partisan donors, thus incentivizing such statements. Klein encourages people to engage at the state and local levels of politics, which are not as likely to be polarized, because it is more difficult to polarize people who—despite ideological differences—share a geographical identity, for instance.