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54 pages 1 hour read

Ezra Klein

Why We're Polarized

Nonfiction | Book | Adult | Published in 2020

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Chapter 5-InterludeChapter Summaries & Analyses

Chapter 5 Summary: “Demographic Threat”

Klein notes that the US is changing quickly. In 2030, immigration will outpace new births. By 2045, non-Hispanic white people will no longer be a majority. As Hillary Clinton’s presidential nomination in 2016 attested, gender dynamics are also changing. Furthermore, in 2018, for the first time, those with no religion were the largest group in the General Social Survey. White Americans, feeling their dominance slipping away, have strengthened their group identity. The reaction to these changes is bifurcated between those who express hope, as Obama did, and those who see change as threatening, as Trump does.

Klein cites researchers who have found that the fear of losing majority status has changed the political behavior of white people in America. Even “gentle, incidental exposure to reminders that America is diversifying” causes white people to adopt more conservative positions and to support the Republican Party (108). Obama became a symbol of diversification to conservatives, which caused party identification to be more divided by race. In 2012, Obama won only 39% of the white vote, a smaller share than Michael Dukakis in 1988 when he lost to a Republican. Given changing demographics in 2012, Obama was able to defeat the Republican nominee with a diverse coalition.

Klein explains that political power runs about a decade behind demographic changes, with older people turning out to vote at higher rates. That, combined with the advantages of an unrepresentative Senate, gerrymandered House districts, and an electoral college favoring rural states, has enabled Republicans to wield political power. However, cultural power, dominated by youth, runs ahead of demographic changes. Thus, conservatives are offended culturally and feel invisible. Trump, Klein argues, capitalized on those feelings.

Instead of attempting to broaden the appeal of the Republican Party, Trump focused on increasing the turnout of white voters. He appealed to racial solidarity and was aided by Fox News journalists who repeatedly emphasized the “threats” to white America: “[R]acial resentment activated economic anxiety, rather than the other way around” (120). After Trump’s election in 2016, there was an 80-point jump in Republican confidence in the economy and 37-point fall among Democrats. Klein explains that demography and culture, not economics and policy, are critical to understanding 21st century populism. Noting that no one used to care about debates on elite college campuses, Klein notes that the new dynamic is about power. The people who decide what is offensive have changed, a fact that leaves the old guard confused. Again, the old power holders feel threatened.

As demographics have changed, positions on issues, such as immigration, have changed. In 1996, with a small Hispanic vote and white voters split in their allegiance to the parties, both parties expressed skepticism about increasing immigration. In 2016, with white voters concentrated in the Republican Party and a large Hispanic vote, Democrats had friendlier immigration policies—and Trump attacked immigration. Klein contends that Democrats cannot win elections without an enthusiastic, diverse coalition and that Republicans cannot win elections without an enthusiastic white base.

Interlude Summary

Thus far, Klein has explained what has caused the current levels of polarization in US politics. Prone to join groups, humans then assume to be in competition with other groups. Maximization of one’s group’s advantage is preferred even when the overall outcome for all is worsened. While the two major parties in the US were once not sorted ideologically, they have become so. In 2020, the two major parties were “sharply split across racial, religious, geographic, cultural, and psychological lines” (136). These multiple identities fused together, with a threat to one impacting all. As a result, partisanship is constantly activated and reinforced. These strong partisan identities are forced to cope with significant changes in demographics. Non-Hispanic white people are projected to be a minority in the coming decades, those with no religion are the largest denomination, and women are assuming high-profile positions and attending college at higher rates than men. Those groups who are increasing in numbers are seeking more power in politics and were the base of Obama’s coalition. Those groups losing power and fighting to keep their status and privileges were the base of Trump’s coalition.

Next, Klein seeks to expose the relationship between a polarized public and polarized political institutions. Political institutions polarize to appeal to a more polarized public, which becomes further polarized, forcing the institutions to polarize more. This creates a feedback loop, Klein says, and the problem is getting increasingly worse.

Chapter 5-Interlude Analysis

As he concludes the first half of the book, Klein emphasizes the importance of the context in which partisan identities have taken hold: great demographic change. Non-Hispanic white voters, the power holders for so long in the US, are told that they will be a minority by 2045. Men are facing a world in which women have assumed positions of leadership and norms of behavior are changing, as symbolized by Hillary Clinton. Christians, once the dominant religious group in the US, are alarmed at the increasing percentage of “nones,” or those without religious affiliations. Notably, there are significant Differences Between Republicans and Democrats in their response to these changes.

Klein highlights that while George W. Bush sought to expand the Republican Party’s appeal to Latino/Latina voters, Trump chose a strategy of mobilizing those dominant groups feeling threatened by these changes. He directly appealed to white, male, and/or Christian voters. For example, he depicted people from racial minority groups, especially Latino/Latina people, as threatening, invading, and unable to assimilate. He called for a ban on Muslims entering the country, combining racial and religious identity. He also belittled and insulted female journalists. Klein explains that group identity causes members to act hostilely to those outside of the group. Encouraging his supporters to call for Clinton to be locked up and for protesters to be beaten up, Trump tapped into this desire to punish outsiders. Given the demographic context of “threat,” these attacks resonated and reinforced Republican identification. That identification triggered defenses of racial, religious, and geographic identities, which were fused with it. Such activation and reinforcement of partisan identity leads to an Increase of Polarization in US Politics.

On the other hand, Democrats have embraced America’s demographic changes and represent groups increasing in number and percentage. To win, the Democrats need a diverse coalition. Obama, for example, expressed hope for a unified country and sought to heal divisions. While he was careful not to speak in a “threatening” manner about race, his identity as an African American made him a symbol of diversification. As Klein explains, even incidental exposure to diversity causes white voters to adopt more conservative positions and to support Republicans. As president, Obama was thus a constant reminder of the country’s diversification. In fact, Trump began his political rise by attacking Obama’s legitimacy, falsely claiming that he was not born in the US.

Klein maintains that partisan identity drives the increase in political polarization, as policy positions follow from identity. For example, racial resentment activated economic anxiety, not vice versa. Over time, the positions of the parties have changed to accommodate the changing demographics in their coalitions, and identity is the driver.

In the Interlude, Klein puts the pieces of his theory about the causes of the increase in political polarization together. He notes the strength of group allegiance, how the political parties have been sorted, and how partisan identity has been fused with multiple strong identities. In the context of demographic change, the constant activation and reinforcement of identities has strengthened partisan identity to the point that it is a threat to democracy. Next, Klein explains why the problem is reaching the point of crisis.

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