35 pages • 1 hour read
William EasterlyThe White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good
Nonfiction | Book | Adult | Published in 2006A modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
Part 3Chapter Summaries & Analyses
Part 3: “The White Man’s Army”
Chapter 8 Summary: “From Colonialism to Postmodern Imperialism”
Easterly argues that the previous imperial era did nothing for economic advancement in the Rest, and instead their actions consequently “created some of the conditions that bred occasions for today’s unsuccessful interventions: failed states and bad government” (272). In addition, the arbitrary borders put in place by colonizers did nothing but further exacerbate local tensions, suggesting that decolonialization tactics were haphazard: “First, the West gave territory to one group that a different group already believed it possessed. Second, the West drew boundary lines splitting an ethnic group into two or more parts across nations. Third, the West combined into a single nation two or more groups that were historical enemies” (291).
Although Easterly is aware of the reluctance foreign aid supporters show in looking at the historical implications of colonialism, he believes it is vital to examine these processes in order to address the consequences that the new wave of postmodern imperialism and Western intrusions may herald. He likens postmodern imperialism to colonialism, as today’s donors are no different than colonizers with their Planner mentality, ideals, little knowledge of the realities on the ground, and their ability to destabilize a country’s power. Due to the chronicle of exploitation, colonized countries inherit the problems left years ago and show a resistance to economic and political freedom and innovation. For instance, according to the data, countries that were non-colonies—those who had never been colonized—versus European colonies not settled by European migrants exhibit different situations: “The non-colonies had more rapid increases in secondary education from 1960 to 2001. Growth per capita from 1950 to 2001 was 1.7 percentage points higher in the non-colonies than the non-settlement colonies, a huge difference for a fifty-one-year period. By 2001, income was 2.4 times higher in the non-colonies than in the former non-settlement colonies” (284). The development success stories include non-countries such as China, Japan, Thailand, Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, although variations in their output exist. Yet not everyone who escaped the white man’s burden reaped benefits, as one can see in the conditions of Nepal, Bhutan, and Ethiopia.
Easterly concludes by arguing that the intervention of the West in the Rest has been discouraging and that the “West should learn from its colonial history when it indulges neo-imperialist fantasies” (305).
Chapter 9 Summary: “Invading the Poor”
Military intervention came simultaneously with neo-imperialism and became an example of what should not be done: have Western influences operating with no feedback or accountability mechanisms because “[t]the military is even more insulated from the interests of the poor than aid agencies are” (312). Invasions and destabilization processes are not conducive to the trust or the interests of the locals.
In this chapter, Easterly probes further: “Did this military intervention done by Planners promote peace, democracy, and development?” (313). He examines the cold war as more information is available about its long-term effects, and he analyzes countries that were supported by the American military in contrast to those overthrown by the CIA due to their Soviets sympathies: “As of 2004, the typical nation described […] was in the bottom 15 percent on democracy, the bottom 18 percent on rule of law, the bottom 22 percent on economic freedom” (316). Although America won the cold war, the countries on whose behalf they fought are in a dismal condition. Easterly suggests that the intervention made their state worse.
Similarly, in the cases of Nicaragua and Angola, the U.S. military backed the right-wing Contras over the Sandinistas and contributed to the killing of innocent people. The military deliberately used terror and land mines without considering the lives of the civilians. The CIA made it worse by providing lethal weapons to the Contras, making them “capable of inflicting harm on Nicaragua” (319). In the same manner, Easterly uses Angola as a case where colonialism created long-term instability and chaos due to a messy decolonization process caused the flight of the Portuguese community and a guerilla war. He writes, “Angola has never recovered from the double blow of civil war and settler exodus” (325).
Therefore, interventions, whether humanitarian or military, only serve the interest of the West. According to Easterly, "Peacekeeping could be good, but just who is willing to be accountable for its success or failure?" (334). When mayhem occurs, as in the case of the Rwandan genocide, the Planners blame each other, but nobody is willing to accept responsibility. Perhaps, as Easterly claims, “The best rule of all for Western helpers is, first, do no harm” (336), and this includes the damaging effects of intervention.
Part 3 Analysis
In Part 3, Easterly offers a transparent view of colonialism, imperialism, military interventions, and the past of the white man’s burden. Without an understanding of countries’ histories, the present challenges can only be tackled half-heartedly. Countries that have experienced military invasions or have been colonized usually have a more difficult time accepting economic and political growth and stability, though this is not always the case.
This section discusses the way colonization rendered aid more difficult. Easterly suggests that the history of the white man’s burden comes from a place of arrogance and aggression, with colonizers and intruders putting local structures into a disarray from which they can no longer return. In the instance of the Democratic Republic of Congo, “[a]fter five centuries of European intervention, the DRC is still today contesting the record for worst and longest misgovernment” (289), despite the World Bank’s lending $1.5 billion. Easterly emphasizes that aid cannot do anything against the past.
Easterly also discusses how aid could be considered postmodern imperialism. He suggests that aid itself is another form of the white man’s burden, and those with the power to disburse the aid only trust their own and not the locals. For example, Patrick Awuah, a wealthy ex-Microsoft employee, decided to go back to his homeland of Ghana to open a university. The institution would be the first to provide quality education that taught students “to solve problems, not just engage in rote memorization” (307). The university has not attracted support or recognition from Western donors, because the project does not meet Western ideals of “local ownership” and “participation” (307). The idea that only the West knows best is a prevalent struggle today, as it was during colonialism. The West does not trust the locals in solving their own problems. This thinking is what led to faulty decolonialization practices the aftermath decades later.
