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57 pages 1 hour read

Jon Krakauer

Where Men Win Glory: The Odyssey of Pat Tillman

Nonfiction | Biography | Adult | Published in 2009

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Prologue-Part 1, Chapter 3Chapter Summaries & Analyses

Part 1

Prologue Summary

On April 22, 2004, David Uthlaut and his convoy of Army Rangers receive dangerous orders during their mission to root out Taliban insurgents in the rough country of Khost Province. Their Humvee breaks down, and they must split the platoon up into Serial One and Serial Two, with one section towing the Humvee to a nearby town and the other following the original mission to search the next village. Uthlaut strongly requests headquarters reconsider these orders, but his requests are denied.

Led by Uthlaut, Serial One passes through a narrow canyon. Just as they get through, they see American tracer rounds returning enemy fire from an ambush in the canyon. Serial Two has inexplicably left their course and followed the rest of the platoon. Pat Tillman, the subject of the book, is in Serial One. Following 9/11, Tillman walked away from a multimillion-dollar NFL deal and enlisted in the Army infantry alongside his brother, who is in Serial Two. Tillman, with the bulk of Serial One, speeds back toward the firefight and is subsequently shot and killed by friendly fire.

Accidental deaths by fellow soldiers are often covered up in war, and Tillman’s death is no different, except that he is championed as a poster boy for Bush’s War on Terror, a role he detested and rejected.

Chapter 1 Summary

A gifted athlete from a young age, Tillman’s intermittent Army journal reveals that a diving catch he made in middle school was one of the defining moments of his life, one in which he realized, with “unwavering self-assurance” (4), that he wanted to be a professional athlete. Despite his small stature, he went on to excel at football.

Born November 6, 1976, Patrick Daniel Tillman grew up near San Francisco in Fremont, California, a municipality that hosts the largest concentration of Afghans in the US. A largely tribal country, Afghanistan was manipulated and influenced by the U.S. and the Soviet Union since the 1950s, when both tried to maneuver to their advantages during the Cold War. A Marxist brand of modernization took hold in the 1970s, and Afghanistan’s prime minister, Mohammed Daoud Khan, slowly began trying to modernize the rest of the country, aided by Moscow. This tie alienated Afghan nationalists, and the communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) broke ties with Daoud, murdering him and executing thousands of his supporters. Afghanistan’s elite society members fled the country, with many ending up in Fremont.

Afghanistan erupted into civil war, led by the Muslim holy warriors, the Afghan mujahideen. In late 1979, the Soviets dispatched 100,000 troops to quell the rebellion. The U.S. publicly rebuked this action, even though the CIA had been arming the mujahideen for months before the Soviet invasion to draw Russia into a debilitating debacle not unlike Vietnam. It worked, writes Krakauer: “[T]he legendary Society Fortieth Army found itself neck deep in an unexpectedly vicious guerrilla war that would keep its forces entangled in Afghanistan for the next nine years” (9).

The mujahideen were brutal in this conflict, mutilating the bodies of slain Soviet soldiers and brutalizing POWs. Many Soviets became addicted to heroin or were debilitated by disease. The Soviets changed tactics, concentrating their attacks on rural tribespeople, civilians, villages, farmland, and livestock in an act of genocide. They dropped mines and booby traps that would attract children, purposefully maiming rather than killing them. The CIA continued to fund the mujahideen, supporting military leader Jalaluddin Haqqani. In 1984, a young Osama bin Laden arrived to Khost to assist Haqqani, quickly gaining a highly regarded reputation. In 1988, he cofounded al-Qaeda, named after the training bases he organized in Khost.

Thanks to anti-aircraft weapons given to the Afghans by the U.S., the Russians admitted defeat and began to pull out of the country in 1988. Months later, the Cold War officially ended when the Berlin Wall fell, and modernity’s global Western ideology seemed to have won. The CIA pulled all their funding from the mujahideen, ignoring the fact that “Haqqani and bin Laden still controlled large numbers of fanatical holy warriors and possessed massive stockpiles of weapons that the CIA had graciously purchased for them” (16). 

Chapter 2 Summary

The Tillman family spent Pat’s childhood in a small neighborhood at the foot of the Santa Cruz mountains. Tillman’s boyhood consisted of adventuring with his brothers in nature, very little television, and lively debates and discussions with his family. Krakauer writes, “Almost no subject was off-limits. Encouraged to think critically and be skeptical of conventional wisdom, Pat learned to trust in himself and be unafraid to buck the herd” (18). He was a rough-housing, physical kid who was nonetheless an attentive and polite student. Despite his small stature he excelled at every position in football.

An Army base a few miles from the hill where Tillman perished was renamed Forward Operating Base Tillman in his honor. Like at all FOBs, American Army troops are joined by Afghan forces, including many Pashtuns. Primary Pashtun principles are:

nang (honor), ghairat (pride), and badal (revenge), which—along with a fourth concept, melmastia (hospitality)—account for the most important tenets in an unwritten, overarching code of behavior known as Pashtunwali that shaped culture and identity in this part of Central Asia for centuries (21-22).

In Pashtun society, honor and respect are preserved through acts of courage and strength, often brutally, and over many years of family rivalries and deep-seated conflicts.

Tillman’s father, also named Patrick, instilled similar values of masculinity and physical and emotional toughness in his sons. Tillman learned early that to compensate for his stature, he had to be especially intense and intimidating on the field, even if he was sensitive on the inside. Tillman got in numerous fights but was never considered a bully. He earned the reputation of being an alpha male in the packs with which he ran.

Chapter 3 Summary

As Tillman excelled as a high school football player, the mujahideen was slaughtering their own people, destroying much of the Kabul region. The brutal Soviet-installed Pashtun president of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA), Mohammed Najibullah, was still funded by the Soviets after their retreat. With Pakistani support, the CIA tried to oust Najibullah by pressing mujahideen leaders, including bin Laden, to attack a DRA stronghold city, Jalalabad. This resulted in a bloody standoff, with the eventual retreat by the mujahideen.

Loyalty in Afghan society descends in importance from family, to extended clan or tribe, to ethnic group, to religious affiliation. The bulk of the nation’s population lives in rural areas, with no support from Afghanistan’s central government. Thus, these rural villages held allegiance to the local mullahs, village elders, and mujahideen leaders. Their income relied on the opium trade. In 1990, bin Laden left Afghanistan. The next year, Haqqani and his holy warriors overran the DRA and captured Khost City, taking a gruesome toll on the city’s occupants. When the Soviet Union officially fell, the resources to the DRA dried up and mujahideen leaders fought for seats in Najibullah’s government.

Najibullah publicly begged U.S. forces to help prevent fundamentalism from overcoming Afghanistan. Due to the Cold War-era mindset still present in Washington, however, George H. W. Bush’s administration saw the fall of the Soviet Union as an opportunity to wash its hands of Afghanistan’s affairs: “No effort was made to thwart a takeover by the holy warriors, and the moment passed” (32).

In 1993, the battle among mujahideen leaders for Kabul resulted in a catastrophic civil war. People in the outer provinces retreated under the less-extreme tyranny of their clans and local militias. According to Krakauer, “This atomization of the nation—the hunkering of the population into a thousand premodern fiefs” provided ideal conditions to incubate the spread of terrorism (34).

On February 26, 1993, a Kuwaiti named Ramzi Yousef designed a plan to take down the World Trade Center using a homemade bomb in a van strategically placed in the parking garage. The attack only killed six but was very close to succeeding in its aim. The U.S. didn’t take it seriously. The operation was supervised by Yousef’s uncle, Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the “principal architect” of the 9/11 attack on the same buildings, years later.

Prologue-Part 1, Chapter 3 Analysis

The book begins with the climax of the story, Tillman’s death, setting the event’s mysteries up for exploration. Krakauer intimates that political cover-ups and schemes will be revealed throughout the course of Where Men Win Glory.  Krakauer also introduces the parallel structure of the book. He intersperses stories from Tillman’s childhood and young adulthood with concurrent world events related to Afghanistan, the rise of the Taliban, and the architects of the 9/11 attacks.

The first few chapters give the reader Afghanistan’s back-story in relation to the United States, beginning with the Cold War. The Cold War and its subsequent tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union positioned Afghanistan as a battleground for manipulation between the two countries. The U.S. armed Afghan extremist military groups, the mujahideen, not to help Afghanistan’s people but to harm the Soviets. This tactic worked initially, and by the time the Cold War was over, the U.S. conveniently pulled its support from Afghanistan, leaving the country in deep turmoil and setting up the U.S. for further conflict.

Throughout the book, Krakauer emphasizes the history of U.S.-Afghan relations during the Cold War. While the conditions that led to the destabilization of Afghanistan were undoubtedly shaped by Cold War-era U.S. and Soviet foreign policy in that country, it is crucial also to acknowledge the role played by other factors in pitting the United States against al-Qaeda and its Afghan partners, the Taliban. For example, when Osama bin Laden returned to Afghanistan in 1996 and declared war on the United States, his central grievance was with the U.S.’s alliance with Saudi Arabia. Indeed, bin Laden only arrived in Afghanistan after his expulsion from Saudi Arabia and later Sudan, both of which came at the U.S.’s urging. Other events that shaped bin Laden and al-Qaeda’s animosity toward the United States and other foreign superpowers included the U.S.’s intervention in the Somali Civil War, Russia’s suppression of Islamist separatism in Chechnya, and the Qana massacre perpetrated against Lebanese civilians by the Israel Defense Forces. Thus, while Krakauer is well-supported in his argument that the U.S.’s involvement in the Soviet-Afghan War helped turn Afghanistan into an incubator for extremism, the September 11 attacks and the War in Afghanistan were the culmination of a wide range of geopolitical conflicts that bin Laden and other extremists viewed as hostile toward the Muslim world.

Moreover, many scholars argue that the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent War in Afghanistan were shaped at least as much by the post-Cold War politics of globalization as they were by the Cold War era. For example, in his much-cited yet controversial book The Crisis of Islam, the British American historian and public intellectual Bernard Lewis argues that post-Cold War globalization and the subsequent spread of Western cultural and political influence across the world led to what he terms the “humiliation” of the Muslim world. (Lewis, Bernard. The Crisis of Islam. New York: Random House. 2004.) Meanwhile, French philosopher Jean Baudrillard called 9/11 the first major event that “questions the very process of globalization.” (Baudrillard, Jean. “L’esprit du terrorisme.” Le Monde. 2 Nov. 2011.)

The myopic vision of the U.S. enabled the seeds of al-Qaeda to be planted in Afghanistan’s civil war-torn, post-Soviet condition. Many people, soldiers, and civilians alike, lost their lives. Tragically, the U.S.’s military conflict in Afghanistan continues as of 2020. Despite the resumption of peace negotiations in late 2019, attacks by the Taliban and pro-Taliban terrorist groups persisted throughout the first half of 2020, killing thousands of civilians and Afghan security forces. In the summer of 2020, Afghanistan once again found itself at the center of hostilities between the United States and Russia. The New York Times and other outlets reported that a Russian military intelligence unit offered secret bounties to Taliban-affiliated militants in return for killing coalition forces in Afghanistan, including American troops. President Donald Trump even justified what many perceive to be an insufficient response to recent Russian intervention in the War in Afghanistan by invoking the U.S.’s involvement in the Soviet-Afghan War. According to Politico, Trump said, “Well, we supplied weapons when they were fighting Russia, too” (Forgey, Quint. “‘A lot of people said it’s a fake issue’: Trump confirms he didn’t raise Russian bounties with Putin. Politico. 29 Jul. 2020. https://www.politico.com/news/2020/07/29/trump-russian-bounties-putin-call-385925.) Thus, the shadow of the Soviet-Afghan War continues to loom over three decades later.

Finally, Krakauer begins to draw comparisons between the ideology of Afghanistan’s largest ethnic group, the Pashtun, to the militaristic American ideals of masculinity. Both ideologies will shape Tillman.

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