67 pages • 2 hours read
Timothy SnyderThe Road to Unfreedom: Russia, Europe, America
Nonfiction | Book | Adult | Published in 2018A modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
Chapters 2-3Chapter Summaries & Analyses
Chapter 2 Summary: “Succession or Failure”
Chapter 2 explores how idealized visions of leadership undermine statehood. Snyder discusses the notion, prominent in Russian political thought influenced by Ivan Ilyin, that a leader can transform a nation through mystical intervention, sidestepping the need for robust political institutions and processes like democratic succession. This fantasy overlooks the principles of succession and institutional continuity, which ensure that a state can progress beyond the life of any single leader.
Snyder uses the historical example of the Soviet Union, founded in 1922 following the Russian Revolution of 1917, to demonstrate that states maintained by the charisma or vision of an individual rather than democratic mechanisms do not last. He criticizes the Soviet Union for lacking a succession principle, which contributed to its instability and eventual collapse. The Soviet Union was headed by the communist party, which, in turn, had one leader. The leaders of the communist party were in power until death or until another figure took over the position by defeating his predecessor. According to Snyder, power in the USSR was maintained through constant acts of violence, some of them on a large scale, such as mass killings, starvation, and deportations. By contrasting these historical failures with the democratic model, Snyder illustrates that enduring states are those that foster a collective belief in the future through institutional renewal.
Then, Snyder discusses how Ivan Ilyin’s vision influenced post-Soviet Russia, particularly the rise of authoritarianism in the 2000s and 2010s. Ilyin had hoped for a fascist dictatorship maintaining Soviet territories and perpetually combating the West. Although his ideas did not influence the Soviet Union’s dissolution, they shaped the new authoritarian oligarchy post-1991. The transition from Boris Yeltsin (the first president of the Russian Federation after the fall of the USSR in 1991) to Vladimir Putin (who took power in 1999) exemplified the manipulation of political narratives to create a redeemer myth and secure power without genuine democratic processes. This shift was marked by engineered crises and staged elections that solidified Putin’s leadership, far from the democratic ideals hoped for during the transition period from 1991 until 1999.
Snyder describes the evolution of a “managed democracy” in Russia (45), a concept where political outcomes are orchestrated behind the scenes. This strategy is exemplified by Vladislav Surkov’s (Yeltsin’s deputy chief of staff, who continued to work during Putin’s presidency) use of crises to consolidate Yeltsin’s and, subsequently, Putin’s power. Surkov’s tactics included controlling media narratives and manipulating political institutions, such as abolishing elected regional governorships. This approach limits democratic processes and maintains illegitimate power through a facade of legality and manipulated public opinion. This strategy of controlled democracy underpins Putin’s extended tenure and exemplifies the suppression of political succession, effectively stagnating Russia’s political development.
In 2011, Dmitry Medvedev, who was the president of Russia, and Vladimir Putin, who was prime minister, announced their decision to switch roles (allowing Putin to return to continue as president after serving as prime minister for a mandate). United Russia, Putin and Medvedev’s party, won parliamentary elections in December 2011. Afterward, in spite of widespread protests, Putin won the elections as president on March 4, 2012. International observers reported that United Russia secured a majority through significant electoral fraud, including digital manipulation and biased media coverage. These elections and the suppression of the protests further solidified Putin’s perpetual hold on power.
Russian leadership under Putin revived the strategy of Leonid Brezhnev during the Soviet Union of portraying democratic opposition as morally and sexually corrupt. This tactic links democratic movements to homosexuality, which is depicted as a Western tool to weaken Russia. Snyder argues that the absurdity of these claims highlights the Kremlin’s use of sexual morality to distract from its democratic deficiencies. Putin’s personal portrayal of rugged masculinity in the media presents a strongman image standing against the supposed moral decay introduced by the West.
Snyder next describes how Putin responded to 2011-2012 protests against electoral fraud by blaming external forces, particularly the US, claiming Hillary Clinton had instigated the demonstrations. This narrative suggested that protestors were foreign agents, a tactic to deflect from domestic discontent and consolidate power by painting democracy and Western influences as threats to Russian sovereignty. By 2012, Putin had manipulated state laws and policies to align with conservative values and suppress dissent, criminalizing libel, restricting non-government organizations (NGOs), and enhancing state security powers. This transformation reinforced an autocratic governance style, portraying any opposition as part of a Western conspiracy against Russia.
Snyder then analyzes how Putin leveraged the politics of eternity, reviving Soviet symbols and aligning with the ideologist Ilyin to promote a narrative of Russia as an innocent nation continuously threatened by foreign forces. Putin’s manipulation of history and national identity aimed to unify diverse political extremes within Russia, blurring the lines between communist and orthodox, secular and religious.
In his 2012 address to the Russian parliament, Putin positioned himself as a timeless figure akin to the ancient ruler Vladimir/Volodymyr, asserting a mythic continuity of Russian history. This narrative claims that Russian innocence is eternal and endorsement for Putin’s rule is divine. Volodymyr, who converted to Christianity in the year 988, united for the first time the regions of today’s Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine.
Chapter 3 Summary: “Integration or Empire”
Chapter 3 starts with a discussion of the transition from European empires to states, followed by the creation and expansion of the EU, which promoted the idea of integration alongside state sovereignty as a peaceful alternative to imperialism. However, with the historical propensity for alternatives to the EU, in 2013 Russia proposed a project called “Eurasia” (67). This concept, according to Snyder, favors the politics of empire for Russia, while relegating others to nation-states, despite the historical failure of such structures in Europe. This move aligned with Russia’s re-adoption of fascist ideologies from the 1930s, which challenges the stability achieved by European states through integration into the EU (a process that started after World War II).
In the 20th century, Europe transitioned from an empire-centric structure to one prioritizing integration, led initially by the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 involving countries like Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. These countries were followed by Great Britain, Ireland, Spain, and Portugal. The European integration model, which promoted democracy and economic cooperation, expanded significantly to include most of Western Europe and, in 2004 and 2007, former communist Eastern European nations and former Soviet Republics.
The EU emerged as a key framework supporting this integration, establishing an area characterized by free trade, movement, and shared legal standards. By 2013, this integration had reshaped Europe into a cooperative economic space. The EU had only integrated countries that were outside the original (1922) Soviet Union area. The EU’s approach, which emphasized collective governance and shared sovereignty, differed from traditional empire-driven dominance that disregarded the sovereignty of the dominated regions. However, Snyder argues that, by the 2010s, the citizens of European countries believed that their nations had been around for a long time and existed by default. Snyder calls this symptom of the wider politics of inevitability “the fable of the wise country” (75).
Under Putin, Russia portrayed itself as a model for Europe by defining success through cultural and sexual identity rather than economic growth and freedom, portraying the EU and the US as threats to Russian purity. Initially, Putin’s foreign policy through 2011 sought cooperation with the West, viewing the EU and NATO positively. However, after 2012, as Russia failed to democratize and became a kleptocracy, its foreign policy shifted. Actions like the cyberattack on Estonia in 2007 and the invasion of Georgia in 2008 signaled the deepening of a distinct, authoritarian Russian model. Putin, discarding the rule of law, embraced lawlessness as a form of patriotic virtue, aligning with philosopher Ivan Ilyin’s rejection of legal governance in favor of the arbitrary power of the redeemer.
Putin envisioned a Eurasian Union as an alternative to the EU, promoting an integration based on Russian cultural values rather than legal standards or democratic principles. This union began taking shape with the establishment of the Eurasian Customs Union with Belarus and Kazakhstan in 2010. By 2011 and 2012, Putin rejected EU’s model of integration based on common achievements and the rule of law, arguing instead for a civilizational model centered on Russia. He proposed that Europe should become more like Russia, discarding the EU’s demanding criteria, such as democratic governance and adherence to the rule of law. Putin’s Eurasia rejected such reforms as free elections or lawful governance.
Snyder traces the background of Eurasian thought, which emerged in the 1920s as a response to Russian intellectual debates between “slavophiles” and “westernizers.” In turn, Eurasianists proposed a unique Russian destiny distinct from Western influence, focusing on cultural purity and a mythic historical narrative. This ideology, revived by the thinker Lev Gumilev during the Soviet era, saw Russia as naturally aligned with the Mongol heritage (the Mongols defeated Rus in the 1240s) and promoted a Eurasian identity that drew from cosmic energy and the harshness of the Siberian landscape. In spite of being persecuted and serving time in the USSR Gulag, Gumilev praised repression, both on nationalistic and antisemitic grounds. He greatly influenced modern Eurasian politics, impacting contemporary Russian policy. His vision of Eurasia inspired Putin, who promotes Russian dominance over Europe and other states.
In the 2010s, theories of Eurasia in Russia combined a rejection of the West, which it saw as corrupt, with antisemitism. Alexander Dugin, a key proponent of Eurasia, imported extremist ideologies from European far-right thinkers, emphasizing Russia’s destiny against Western decadence. Dugin advocates for a Russian-led Eurasian bloc, which incorporates Ukraine, positioning it as a barrier between the EU and Eurasia.
From 2012 onward, Snyder argues, Putin intensified his fascist stance, supported by thinkers like Ilyin, Gumilev, and Dugin, promoting Eurasianism as a dominant geopolitical strategy. This movement was embodied by the Izborsk Club, a think tank that includes many notable figures like Dugin and the monk Tikhon Shevkunov. The Izborsk Club promotes a narrative of Russian cultural and spiritual superiority. It also advocated for Eurasian unity under Russian hegemony, rejecting Western democratic values and legal norms, framing the West and particularly the Jews as corrupting influences. Furthermore, it promotes an aggressive foreign policy aimed at dismantling European unity and expanding Russian influence through the civilizational mission of Eurasianism.
Sergei Glazyev, the advisor of both Yeltsin and Putin, helped significantly in linking historical fascist ideologies to current Eurasian strategies, emphasizing anti-Western sentiments and dismissing democracy. Inspired by Lyndon LaRouche, an American promoter of conspiracies, he started promoting the idea that a Jewish group had conspired to destroy Russia in the 1990s. As he was an elected parliamentary member, he became more influential, promoting the inclusion of Ukraine into Russia, the fact that independent states, such as those forming the EU, must be abolished, and that Russia must restore the order for all other regions.
Snyder ends the chapter with a discussion of Russia’s campaigns to destabilize and weaken the EU. For example, Russia supported France’s Front National, as Marine Le Pen, the party’s leader, is opposed to France’s participation in the EU and promotes the same anti-homosexual ideas. Russia also backed Donald Trump’s starting in 2013, while building a relationship through various business ventures with Russian oligarchs. Russian involvement intensified around the Scottish separatist referendum in 2014, with disinformation campaigns aimed at fostering distrust in British institutions. This pattern continued with Russia’s support for Brexit, especially Nigel Farage’s campaign, employing internet trolls and bots to sway public opinion. Russian support extended across Europe, undermining the EU by boosting far-right movements and exploiting political vulnerabilities, aiming to reshape European politics more congruently with Russian interests and perspectives on governance and territorial influence.
Chapters 2-3 Analysis
Chapters 2 and 3 of The Road to Unfreedom analyze the mechanisms and historical contexts of Russia’s path toward authoritarianism, while contrasting these dynamics with the trajectory of European integration and ending with a discussion of the involvement and repercussions of Russia’s increasingly aggressive ideology on European and American democracies. Snyder articulates a narrative that shows how idealized visions of leadership, particularly the influence of philosopher Ivan Ilyin, coupled with an updated version of the concept of Eurasia, have culminated in Russia’s Missed Democratic Opportunity, ultimately undermining genuine democratic processes in Russia. Meanwhile, he illustrates how the EU emerged as a countermodel, promoting integration over the imperial ambitions revived in Russia.
Snyder’s analysis in Chapter 2 outlines how the myth of a redeemer leader, as conceptualized by Ivan Ilyin, has been central to the establishment of an authoritarian regime in Russia, undermining the political institutions and leading through narratives based on mythical ideas. The belief in a singular, almost mystical leader who can transform the state without the need for democratic institutions or processes has deep roots in Russian political culture. Snyder argues that this notion effectively sidelines the essential democratic principles of succession and institutional continuity. By relying on charismatic or visionary leadership as a substitute for democracy, the state becomes vulnerable to instability once that leadership wanes or fails.
Snyder traces the origins of the current form of this myth in Ilyin’s thought:
It is impossible for a human being to do what Ilyin imagined a Russian redeemer should: emerge from a realm of fiction and act from the spirit of totality. Yet a feat of scenography by skilled propagandists (or, in the nice Russian phrase, ‘political technologists’) might create the appearance of such an earthly miracle. The myth of a redeemer would have to be founded on lies so enormous that they could not be doubted, because doubting them would mean doubting everything. It was not so much elections as fictions that allowed a transition of power, a decade after the end of the Soviet Union, from Boris Yeltsin to Vladimir Putin. Then Ilyin and Putin rose together, the philosopher and the politician of fiction (42-43).
Historically, as Snyder points out, this kind of governance model has not endured successfully, as it is inherently unstable and prone to collapse once the charismatic figure is gone, as evidenced by the fall of the Third Reich and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. However, the narrative of Putin as a redeemer echoes through the state’s propaganda.
Putin’s use of the myth of the redeemer is coupled with Russia’s focus on gender roles and heterosexual sexuality, as opposed to gay rights, which symbolize the West’s decadence. Highlighting The Use of Sexuality and Gender Tropes in Russia’s Strategy, Snyder analyzes how, by casting democratic opposition and sexual diversity as a moral degradation, the Kremlin fabricates a narrative that obscures the need for legitimate political processes, thereby substituting political debate with a simple, yet powerful, narrative of moral conflict. This narrative strategy diverts attention from the regime’s deficits and solidifies Putin’s image as a savior battling against Western depravity.
In Chapter 3, Snyder shifts focus to the ideological contrast between the EU’s integration model and Russia’s renewed imperial ambition under the banner of the Eurasia. This project is a geopolitical and ideological one, rooted in a rejection of Western democratic values and legal norms. Putin’s vision of Eurasian unity, headed by Russia, and with all other states subordinated to it, seeks to redefine Russian success not in terms of economic prosperity and liberal democracy but through cultural and sexual identity, portraying the West, especially the EU and the US, as existential threats.
This vision is closely aligned with the fascist ideologies of the 1930s, adapted for modern use. Eurasia, as conceptualized by Putin, rejects the cooperative, law-based integration seen in the EU, instead promoting a model where authoritarian regimes are maintained without the pressures of democratic reforms or legal accountability. This approach fundamentally opposes the EU’s principles, aiming to obstruct its integration efforts and extend authoritarian rule under the guise of cultural preservation and civilizational superiority.
The contrast between Eurasian and EU internal dynamics highlights the broader geopolitical and ideological battles shaping a large part of the world. Snyder argues that it is this contrast, for example, that shapes Ukraine’s Struggle for Democracy. As Snyder articulates, the future of European stability and Russian influence hinges significantly on the ideological path chosen by its leaders and the resilience of its institutions against interference and destabilization campaigns, and the allure of authoritarianism.
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