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Immanuel KantA modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
Kant routinely grapples with the idea of free will in a way that readers may find confusing. After establishing the importance of an autonomous will in the Second Section, he begins the Third Section by claiming that examining a “positive concept of freedom” will yield a line of inquiry that is “so much the richer and more fruitful” (56, 4:447). Positive freedom describes what we are free to do, whereas negative freedom describes what we are free from doing. Since Kant eventually offers a theory of morality that is based on making an active choice to act in a given way, it makes sense he would begin by focusing on an action-oriented definition of freedom.
Kant acknowledges that many of his readers will initially find his connection between morality and free will circular, writing:
We take ourselves to be free in the order efficient causes so as to think ourselves under moral laws in the order of ends, and we afterwards think ourselves as subject to these laws because we have ascribed to ourselves freedom of the will; for freedom and the will’s own legislation are both autonomy, and hence reciprocal concepts; but precisely because of this one of them cannot be used to explicate the other or to state its ground, but at most only to reduce to a single concepts, for logical purposes, representations of just the same object that appear dissimilar [...] (59-60, 4:450).
Here, he highlights a potential contradiction in the idea that free will is grounded in morality while the categorical imperative requires us to follow a specific set of actions. While he is able to eventually separate the two, his instinct to showcase this suggests he anticipates his readers’ desire to protect their own free will. This can be interpreted as a byproduct of his time, as the Enlightenment Era heavily emphasized free will and free thought (see Philosophical Context for more information). He reconciles this by arguing that freedom and morality are connected by reason. Harking back to our idea of positive freedom, we can infer reason prevents us from being limited by a rote tendency to react to input we receive in the world of sense. Though it may be contradictory to remove these limitations by following rigid moral laws, doing so actually allows us to freely pursue actions that are both important to us and morally right. Just as we live in both the intelligible world and the sensible world, negative freedom from our instinctual desires helps us gain the freedom to participate in a morally grounded world.
Kant goes to great lengths to continuously argue that reason is a faculty unique to humans. It is what distinguishes us from other animals and proves that we are rational beings. As such, we have a responsibility to use it well. Though our reason is powerful, there are many external factors that could lead it astray. In the First Section, Kant cautions us against letting our “private” instincts, such as happiness, turn our reason towards self-interested ends. Even though we have the capacity to reason, human instinct drives us to self-preservation and personal pleasure. While it is fine to pursue these in moderation, seeking them to extreme ends can drive a person away from morality. Conversely, Kant also argues that reason is bad for our overall happiness, since reason can make us overthink. He goes so far as to say that some people may develop “misology,” or a hatred of reason, since it will force them to scrutinize themselves so heavily. He writes that upon attempting to reason, these misologists may
still find that they have in fact just brought more hardships upon their shoulders than they have gained in happiness, and that because of this they eventually envy, rather than disdain, the more common run of people, who are closer to the guidance of mere natural instinct, and do not allow their reason much influence on their behavior (11, 4:396).
This showcases our complicated relationship with reason: though we need it to be moral, this could come at the cost of happiness. While it tempers our instinct, its failure leads us to succumb to baser instincts. If we develop misology and intentionally allow reason to fail out of envy for those who think to prioritize happiness, we will be choosing to act against morality. This is a possible interpretation for why Kant finds his project so crucial: if we understand the importance and benefits of a moral society, we may be able to stomach the more unpleasant elements of reason.
Kant’s methodical proof of the supreme principle of morality supports this theory—his choice to chart its development from its origins as a categorical imperative to the backbone of the kingdom of ends suggests that reason cannot go unchecked and requires guidance. Similarly, this may be why Kant is so concerned with demonstrating how and why human beings are incentivized to follow universal laws. Though reason tells us we ought to and bridges the gap between morality and freedom, our instinct may tell us otherwise. By proving that following these laws can be beneficial, it is possible our reason will override our instinct.
Kant’s idea of morality operates in an ambiguous place between the individual and the community. Kant often discusses the rational being as an individual, but he couches morality within ideas of community obligation. For example, in the First Section Kant cautions against letting our reason pursue happiness to an extreme end. He writes it is a characteristic of “private” life and says it can cause us to become too self-centered (12, 4:397). Similarly, he takes issue with moral philosophies that rely too much on subjective human experiences. His idea that our maxims ought to hold when universalized suggests we need to take others into consideration when deciding our behavior. His kingdom of ends, the pinnacle of morality, is centered around an egalitarian community. To decisively convey this idea, Kant clarifies he is not referring to a kingdom in the traditional sense, instead defining it as a “systematic union of several rational beings through common laws” (45, 4:433). This shows Kant believes the height of morality is when humans come together and all commit to using their reason in ways that are mutually beneficial.
While the end of morality seems to be based around community, we must also acknowledge the influence of individual responsibility. Though morality is meant to be communally beneficial, it is up to an individual to ensure this happens. In the Preface, Kant argues that a metaphysics of morals is necessary because it will give individuals an objective rubric they can use to judge their own actions. Kant emphasizes it is an individual’s responsibility to ensure they are acting morally. This can be seen in Kant’s choice to carefully map out the evolution of the categorical imperative, taking it from a universal law to the universal law of morality. We can therefore understand morality as beginning with individual action and peaking when used for community good.
By Immanuel Kant