The Federalist Papers

Madison compares the country to a sick patient who, after consulting the best physicians, is given a prescribed treatment. Numerous critics, though they do not doubt the seriousness of the disease, emerge to label that treatment a poison. However, these critics do not have a consistent alternative remedy to offer. Rather, Madison writes, they cannot even agree on what must change about the remedy. Each objection seems to be rooted in a particular individual’s interests and passions, whether they are from a big or large state, a manufacturing or non-manufacturing state, or a Northern or Southern state.

Sometimes, the objections are not even rooted in self-interest, as Madison points to arguments pertaining to the balance of power between the three branches of government. For example, some view the Senate’s approval of executive appointments as an inappropriate use of legislative powers, while others believe the President should have no say at all in these appointments. To Madison, there seem to be as many objections to the Constitution as there are administrative powers invested in each of the three branches.

Madison grants that the Constitution is not perfect. However, he points out that almost all of the criticisms leveled at the Constitution are true of the Confederation and ten times more severe. For example, those who worry that the Constitution gives the federal government too much power should be alarmed to know that the current Congress soon plans to annex Western territory, raise funds for its settlement, and amass troops for its protection, all without constitutional authority, the permission of the states, or checks on its power.

Madison believes it is important to establish that the government under the proposed Constitution will be “strictly republican,” unlike other countries like the Netherlands which carry the label of a republic but are not. To determine this, Madison lays out the “distinctive character” of a republic:

[W]e may define a republic to be, or at least may bestow that name on, a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people, and is administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behavior. (191).

He is also careful to note that powers must be derived from all the people and not a specific class of elites—otherwise tyranny will follow. Moreover, he makes clear that some government administrators may be “indirectly” appointed by the people—meaning, appointed by others whom the people “directly” appoint. In the case of the United States under the Constitution, the House of Representatives will be directly elected, and the Senate and President will be indirectly elected.

Madison turns to objectors who claim that the central government should be “federal,” or acting on sovereign states, rather than “national,” or acting on individuals. Although the author is suspect of this particular distinction, he concludes that the Constitution will create a government that is federal in some ways and national in others.

Madison examines whether the convention was authorized to write a Constitution and propose it to the states. Madison summarizes the scope of the authorization given to the convention by Congress: “They were to frame a NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, adequate to the EXIGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT, and OF THE UNION; and to reduce the articles of Confederation into such form as to accomplish these purposes” (197).

For Madison’s opponents, the point of contention is whether the convention was authorized not only to “reduce” or revise the Articles of Confederation but to eliminate them completely and start from scratch. Although Madison grants that the convention technically overreached in throwing out the Articles of Confederation, he ultimately views this as the only way to meet Congress’s objective of building an “adequate” government. Moreover, if the ultimate goal is the happiness and prosperity of the American people, the convention should be applauded for exceeding the scope of its task.

Madison takes a broad look at the powers the Constitution confers on the federal government. They include: national security, diplomacy, “[m]aintenance of harmony and proper intercourse among the States” (204), restraining the states from harmful acts, various miscellany of “general utility,” and “[p]rovisions for giving due efficacy to all these powers” (204). By national security, Madison means declaring war, raising armies and fleets, regulating and calling on militias, and raising money through taxes or foreign loans. The details of these powers aside, Madison sees every advantage to national security under a union, while disunion would pose a grave threat to America’s very existence.

Finally, Madison revisits the issue of standing armies during peacetime. Although he grants the dangers these armies pose to liberty, he also insists that the Constitution has provided “the most effectual guards against danger from that quarter” (208). More to the point, without the Constitution there is nothing stopping each state from raising its own standing army, which would pose a far greater threat to the American people.

Madison turns to the second power conferred on the federal government: diplomacy, or to “regulate the intercourse with foreign nations” (211). These duties involve treaties, ambassadors, piracy, and the regulation of foreign commerce, including the prohibition of imported enslaved people beginning in 1808. Concerning each of these duties, Madison explains why the Constitution is better suited than the Articles of Confederation.

Madison expresses his disappointment that the Constitution does not ban the international slave trade immediately, rather than allowing it to continue for another 20 years. He points out that the Constitution has attracted ire from both those who share Madison’s view and those who believe it should not place a prohibition on the slave trade at all.

Madison discusses miscellaneous powers under the Constitution, starting with the federal government’s power to grant artists and scientists exclusive rights to their work through copyrights and patents. He also outlines the power to purchase small portions of states for federal forts and other buildings, including the area that would become Washington, DC. Additional powers listed here include the authority to punish treason, admit new states, and alter the Constitution through amendments ratified by three-fourths of the states.

Madison details various restrictions on states’ authority, including the right to make treaties with other countries, coin money, lay duties on imports, or grant nobility titles. Finally, he addresses objections over the clause giving the federal government the “power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States” (229). Although critics argue that this opens the door for tyranny, Madison insists that the Constitution would be a useless “dead letter” without this provision. In summary, Madison is confident that “no one of the powers transferred to the federal government is unnecessary or improper” (233).

Madison turns to the question of whether the powers granted to the federal government under the Constitution will threaten the remaining powers of the states. Given the extent to which those federal powers ensure the safety and liberty of the American people, Madison finds it “preposterous” to worry about whether state powers will suffer as a result. He argues that by all calculations, state sovereignty is of far less concern than the happiness of the people. Moreover, Madison sees no evidence that federal power will strike a fatal blow to state power. If history is any indication, the greater risk is that internal dissension will strike a fatal blow to federal power, which is all the more reason the federal government should be strong. Finally, Madison argues that the powers granted to the federal government by the Constitution are by and large the same powers currently vested in Congress under the Articles of Confederation. He writes, “The proposed change does not enlarge these powers; it only substitutes a more effectual mode of administering them” (238).

Madison argues that individuals who endlessly debate whether the state government or the federal government will be more powerful under the Constitution have ignored the fact that both governments will be subordinate to the people. He repeats the point made elsewhere that the people will be naturally inclined to offer greater support to their state government than the federal government, owing to their closer familiarity with the former’s administration of its duties. Even if the federal government were to launch a military assault against the states (an extreme and implausible scenario) the state militias would outnumber the federal army by a factor of 20-to-one. From this, there emerges another quality unique to America among other Western nations: its citizens are armed.

Madison addresses concerns that the three branches of government—legislative, executive, and judiciary—are not sufficiently separate and distinct. He wholeheartedly agrees that this is a crucial political maxim to uphold when creating a new government. That said, he also points to the fact that in the British Constitution the three branches are not entirely separate. Rather, they are given partial control over one another. Madison also points to various state constitutions which blend the roles of the branches. This includes New Hampshire’s constitution which stipulates that the legislature handle impeachments (a judicial role) and that the executive department appoint members of the judiciary.

Building off the previous essay, Madison argues that to preserve the positive effects of separating the three branches, they must be blended to a degree. The most important point is that one individual group or person comprise the entirety of more than one branch, not that the duties of the branches be separated entirely.

Unlike in a hereditary monarchy, where the greatest threat of tyranny lies in the executive branch, in a representative republic like the one proposed by the Constitution, the greater threat of usurpation lies in the legislative branch. He quotes Thomas Jefferson on the topic, who in his Notes of the State of Virginia pointed to the republic of Venice as an example of “ELECTIVE DESPOTISM” which should be avoided by placing adequate checks on the legislative branch.

Quoting Jefferson again, Madison presents the argument that whenever two-thirds of two branches of government agree either to amend the Constitution or correct breaches of it, a convention will be called to convey the will of the people. Although Madison agrees that the people are the ultimate authority in a republic, he cautions against calling on their intervention too frequently when handling disputes between the three powers. This is because the people will be naturally biased toward the legislature, as its members are directly elected by the people and better known to them. Moreover, frequent appeals to the people would suggest that the Constitution is unreasonably flawed, robbing the government of the veneration it needs from the people to function

Rather than frequent appeals to amend the Constitution or resolve disputes between the branches, Madison considers the efficacy of periodic appeals made at fixed intervals. He worries, however, about the length of the interval. If the intervals are too short, then the same negative effects of frequent appeals will be seen, and the government will lose its venerated status. If the intervals are too long, then there will be insufficient incentive for officials to avoid wrongdoing, as whatever censure they may expect will only come in the distant future. Moreover, if long intervals are used, then corruption could become so deeply embedded that it will be difficult to uproot.

Having dismissed popular appeals and other externalities as methods of maintaining checks and balances, Madison says the only solution must be baked into the structure of the government. Above all, each department requires the means and motives to prevent encroachments from the other branches. He writes, “It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devises should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary” (284).