The Federalist Papers

Hamilton discusses provisions found in state constitutions of Pennsylvania and North Carolina recommending that standing armies should not be maintained during times of peace because they are “dangerous to liberty.” He goes on to explain why a similar provision is not found in the US Constitution under consideration for ratification. For one, Britain and Spain each hold territory adjacent to the United States, and it is possible that the pair may become allies in the future. This, he adds, would only embolden the Indigenous peoples on the Western frontier, whose presence already requires garrisons in the Western states. Finally, Hamilton believes it is imperative that the United States build a navy, and to do so requires dockyards, arsenals, and fortifications that must be staffed by military garrisons.

Hamilton further expounds on the desirability of a standing army raised and maintained by the federal government. Absent this, states like New York—which is particularly vulnerable to foreign and Indigenous attacks—would be solely responsible for their own protection. In turn, Hamilton believes this could result in an arms race between the states which would only intensify the threat of violent factions and civil war. Finally, Hamilton revisits the example of Massachusetts, which recently raised troops to quell Shays’ Rebellion without first gaining permission from the Congress of the Confederation—further proof that states feel empowered to defy the Articles of Confederation as it suits them.

Hamilton argues that the clause in the proposed Constitution requiring legislative approval every two years for the raising and expansion of armies during peacetime is just and wise. He says no further restrictions should be applied, adding that calls to do so are rooted in “a zeal for liberty more ardent than enlightened” (124).

Hamilton returns to the objections that the only way citizens will comply with federal laws under the proposed Constitution is if a military force compels them. He argues that citizens will follow laws based on whether they are just and well-administered, not whether they stem from the federal government or the state government. For the reasons the authors have already laid out supporting a strong federal government, Hamilton believes it will be less likely under the Constitution that military force will be needed to achieve compliance with the law.

Hamilton writes that insurrection and sedition are always a threat. In the case of small insurrections, state militias may be called upon to quell them. However, in the case of large revolts like Shays’ Rebellion, a federal army is needed. Returning to the advantages of a Union versus a loose confederation, Hamilton argues that a despotic federal regime will find it difficult to maintain control of the entire United States through military means. By contrast, a despotic state regime under the current Articles of Confederation will find it easier to maintain tyranny in its limited territory.

Hamilton quotes the proposed Constitution concerning militias, writing that the federal government will be empowered “to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia [...] RESERVING TO THE STATES RESPECTIVELY THE APPOINTMENT OF THE OFFICERS, AND THE AUTHORITY OF TRAINING THE MILITIA” (138). He is shocked that this clause has generated controversy, given that it is natural for the central government to pay such an active role in issues of national defense, for reasons detailed in earlier essays. Hamilton also dismisses fears that militias are a threat to liberty, writing, “Where in the name of commonsense, are our fears to end if we may not trust our sons, our brothers, our neighbors, our fellow-citizens?” (140).

Hamilton condemns the current system of taxation, by which the federal government is forced to rely on quotas and requisitions from each of the 13 states. For reasons outlined in previous essays, these quotas are poorly calculated and difficult to enforce. And while some anti-Federalists are willing to allow the federal government to collect “external taxes” such as import taxes, this will not be sufficient to ensure the nation’s survival—especially if a war breaks out. Instead, the federal government should be allowed to collect “internal taxes” directly from the citizens.

Hamilton bemoans the fact that individuals easily accept complex mathematical principles as correct but are unable to do the same with principles of morality and politics, namely the principle that the federal government’s powers should include general taxation of its people. Some object that the federal government, if given unlimited powers of taxation, would encroach on the states’ own powers of taxation and deprive them of revenue. However, Hamilton points out that the opposite is more likely since in a republic power is ultimately held by the people, and state governments have more direct influence over the people than the federal government.

Looking to specific clauses in the Constitution, Hamilton lays to rest fears that the states would be prohibited from collecting their own taxes. As he points out, all existing state powers are preserved except those that the Constitution gives the federal government exclusive power to carry out. For example, on the matter of taxes, only the federal government can collect import and excise taxes, but that does not prevent the states from collecting other forms of tax revenue.

Hamilton points to two clauses in the Constitution which critics claim pose existential threats to local governments and personal liberty. The first states that the federal legislature can “make all laws which shall be NECESSARY and PROPER for carrying into execution THE POWERS by that Constitution vested in the government of the United States” (155). The second refers to the laws and treaties passed by the federal government as “the SUPREME LAW of the land” (158).

In response to these critics, Hamilton says the meaning of the Constitution would be the same if these clauses were removed, just as it would be the same if the clauses were written on every page. He adds that the rest of the Constitution makes clear that overstepping of the federal government’s jurisdiction into the domain of the states—for example, by passing a law prohibiting the states from levying taxes—would be “a usurpation of power not granted by the Constitution” (158). In modern terminology, it would be unconstitutional.

Hamilton discusses the concept of “CONCURRENT JURISDICTION”—meaning administrative duties carried out by both federal and state governments, like direct taxation. In the case of taxes, this is neither inconsistent nor redundant because states will limit their taxation efforts within “A VERY NARROW COMPASS” (160) of uses specific to each state. Meanwhile, the federal government, charged as it is with the safety and security of the entire nation, enjoys an unlimited right to raise whatever revenue is needed to meet that end.

Hamilton returns to the question of what may happen if the federal government is barred from raising revenue except through duties on foreign imports. If this were the case, the federal government would inevitably raise import taxes to exorbitant rates, encouraging smuggling and leaving merchants to pass on the expenses to consumers. As a result, inequality would increase both within states and between them—particularly between manufacturing states and non-manufacturing states, the latter of which are more dependent on imports.

A second major objection to the Constitution is that the House of Representatives is too small for each member to sufficiently represent all the occupations held by their constituents. Hamilton counters that blue collar workers like mechanics and manufacturers need not be elected to Congress because these individuals will generally elect merchants, a class of citizens who share their interests. The “learned professions”—namely, lawyers—will be satisfied to elect other lawyers to represent their interests. Finally, landowners are generally fixated on a single policy interest: keeping land taxes low. Therefore, it matters little whom they elect to represent them, as long as the representatives support low land taxes.

On the question of how the federal government can appropriately tax so many distant municipalities, each with its own peculiarities, Hamilton’s answer is simple: ask the states’ representatives for help. Even more to the point, the federal government can and should take advantage of the existing tax apparatus in each state.

Hamilton also expresses his personal distaste for poll taxes, which exist in some states. However, he also admits that the federal government would be within its rights to administer poll taxes if its representatives voted to do so.