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65 pages 2 hours read

John McPhee

The Control of Nature

Nonfiction | Book | Adult | Published in 1989

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Themes

The Fallacy of Controlling Nature

Throughout this book, numerous individuals—from General Sands to Thorbjorn to engineers in Los Angeles—act as if they can control nature. This human belief in the control of nature undergirds the book’s central theme—and the book’s title. McPhee gradually shows the reader that these attempts to control nature are more limited and less effective than we might think.

Partway through the first essay, McPhee writes about the word “Atchafalaya” in a way that will echo the book’s title: “those rippling syllables have symbolized for me the bilateral extensions of the phrase ‘control of nature’” (69). There is perhaps no entity that symbolizes the control of nature better than the Army Corps, which appears in each of the three essays but most prominently in the essay on the Atchafalaya. Fearing what would happen to settlements and business in southern Louisiana if the Atchafalaya overtook the Mississippi, the Army Corps built a mechanism called the Old River Control, attempting to regulate water levels to an ideal amount. McPhee writes, “The Corps had built Old River Control to control just about as much as was passing through it” (27).

Nature subverts our human expectation of control, such as when the Devils Gate dam was “built in 1920 with control of water its only objective” (196), but Mother Nature filled the dam with rock and sand instead. The notion that we can completely tame our natural environmental is a human ideal, yet it is also a fallacy. Nature is unpredictable and cannot be permanently contained to ideal conditions for human settlement—at least, not in southern Louisiana. The Atchafalaya will inevitably overtake the Mississippi. The leaders of industry, however—particularly businesses that depend on the current flow of the Mississippi—would not let the Atchafalaya have its way: “For nature to take its course was simply unthinkable” (6). Industry worked hand-in-hand with the Army Corps in a futile attempt to restrict the Atchafalaya to 1950s levels: “The Corps was not intending to accommodate nature. Its engineers were intending to control it in space and arrest it in time” (10).

Not everyone buys into the idea that we can blithely control nature. Others acknowledge that it may be a fool’s errand to try and suppress an unpredictable force of nature. In Iceland, a camera captured the cooling efforts on Heimaey and broadcast them on television. An engineer watching television laughed, later explaining, “I laughed because I did not believe we could stop Mother Nature” (106).

There is a certain irony that emerges around this theme of controlling nature, particularly in the essay on Los Angeles. We retreat to nature to be free from the city, but then nature threatens us, as we see when McPhee describes a debris flow tearing through the town of Montrose: “This was the same Montrose to which Jackie Genofile would one day retreat in order to feel safe” (240). To their credit, most residents are self-aware of the contradictions in their presence in the area: “There isn’t a prettier, more secluded canyon in Southern California—when it isn’t on fire or being washed away” (245). For most residents, the risk of danger is worth the tradeoff of living near the mountains: less air pollution and beautiful vistas.

In the second essay, some residents yield to the idea of accepting nature (versus controlling it), particularly in the case of the Hawaiians who clash with the Army Corps over volcanic activity threatening homes in the area: “the Hawaiian heritage is to be fatalistic […] They accept the renewal of land by volcanic eruption” (147). Hawaiians have conceded to nature’s overwhelming strength, unlike the Army Corps, which believed there was still a way to tame the lava with brute strength. They believed the Icelandic model could be replicated in Hawaii, though some experts like Patton questioned whether they had really affected the outcome in Heimaey for the better. The Hawaiians resisted the Army Corps’s mentality; “The mentality says, ‘We must do something.’ If Madame Pele could not be stopped by the Pacific Ocean, how dare mankind stop her with pumps” (150-51).

In the third essay, control of nature gradually gives way to adapting to nature—at least, for some residents. As Chakib Sambar, a vice-principal of a local school and an immigrant from Lebanon, relays to McPhee: “This canyon and this entire mountain were on fire for forty days […] You learn to adapt. You live with it” (257). 

A War Against Nature, and a Race Against Time

In the first essay, General Sands frames the efforts to tame the Atchafalaya: “Man against nature. That’s what life’s all about” (20). This sentence sets the tone for the book. From the Army Corps to Icelandic mayors, nearly every expert or significant figure quoted in this book uses the language of war to refer to their interventions in nature. McPhee describes the scenes of natural disasters—say, a debris flow—much like the site of a bloody battlefield: “On the terrace, the crushed vehicles, the detached erratic wheels suggested bomb damage, artillery hits, the track of the Fifth Army. The place looked like a destroyed pillbox” (199).

Iceland in particular views “the Battle of Heimaey” and the control of nature through the lens of war. The pumping operation retreats like a soldier moving behind enemy lines, and in the aftermath of the experience, the townspeople view themselves as veterans of war: “He was a foot soldier, and looked upon his role as such. Like the others, he viewed the struggle through the metaphor of war” (101). The enemy, however, is not another country, but nature itself. We see another example of this militaristic language in the following passage: “On this day […] virtually everyone on the island presumed that the battle was over—before it had really begun” (112). We see how natural disaster can traumatize people much like a war.

Words such as “war,” “battle,” and “fight” might seem like natural phrases to describe controlling the Atchafalaya’s flow, cooling lava in Iceland, or stopping debris flows in Los Angeles. However, nature cannot be reasoned with, unlike other humans during a battle. There is no treaty to be signed with nature. McPhee writes, “In making war with nature, there was a risk of loss in winning” (143). Nonetheless, entities like the Army Corps try to control space and time to halt the progression of natural occurrences and also to keep nature at a stable climate suitable for humans. Regarding the Army Corps’s efforts to suppress Old River flows to 1950s levels, General Sands says that “what we’ve done here at Old River is stop time” (21). 

It’s a race against time, however, and Mother Nature “has nothing but time” (24), according to Rabalais. Many of the experts whom McPhee interviews says it’s a matter not of if, but of when we will lose this fight with nature. The hydrologist Wade Wells, for example, says of the houses perched next to the mountains of Los Angeles: “Their houses are living on borrowed time” (204). There is a certain hubris in our fight against nature, as humans continue to develop settlements in areas where we know Mother Nature is unstable. Fighting with nature is like going to battle—and we’ve lost that battle. Andrew Ingersoll, a planetary scientist, soberly reflects on the losing battle with regard to the fight against debris flows in Los Angeles: “It might have been a very poor concept to try to control the San Gabriels” (231). 

Blinded by Arrogance

This book of essays exposes humans’ propensity for arrogance in assuming that we can mold Earth to our liking due to our superior technology. This ego tends to blind humans, leaving us with a false or overblown sense of confidence in our man-made interventions to control nature. As the book shows, man-made interventions fail just as often as they succeed.

Sometimes, nature’s inventions are even better than our own, though humans are reticent to acknowledge that we can be bested by nature. Take, for example, the scientist Kamb’s chiding of the crib structures in the San Gabriel mountains: “These cribworks are less strong than nature’s own constructs. The idea that you can prevent the sediment from coming out is meddling with the works of nature” (231). Sometimes, humans feel the need to create the illusion that they are taking control of their situation, even if they aren’t actually helping control the environment. Another scientist illuminates this dilemma when he describes the ineffectiveness of the crib structures as “an example of bureaucracy doing something for its own sake” (231).

Moreover, we also see the arrogance in the attitudes of scientists who criticize ignorant residents for living on dangerous mountainsides, although these same scientists live near the San Gabriel mountains as well. An engineer tries to justify his residence to McPhee: “Like my neighbors, I figure that I’m protected. I haven’t seen anything across my yard yet” (232). Human nature—human arrogance—is such that even when we logically understand a future threat, until it happens to us, we often assume that we will face no harm. We assume that our man-made devices can save us, even if we have historical evidence to the contrary.

In fact, some residents are upset by the debris basins, which they deem to be an ugly blight on nature. Until residents experience a debris flow firsthand, they don’t see the value in the basins. Human arrogance goes hand-in-hand with complacency towards the natural environment. These residents hope for the best, even when history warns otherwise. A series of conversations with different residents late in the book illustrates this all-too-human problem, as one resident explains to McPhee why he believes his house will be spared from the debris flows: “I think we’re all pretty well covered. I’m hoping so. The water rushes down quite nicely in the wash” (246).

Some believe that because they’ve suffered one kind of natural disaster, they’re prepared for all of them. Another resident tells McPhee, “No, we’re not concerned. We lived through the San Fernando earthquake” (246). Some even act as if nature sets limits on the number of times natural disasters can occur (which isn’t true, as McPhee describes floods in which numerous debris flows occur): “The fire was three years ago. It’s not supposed to flood. I cancelled my flood insurance last year” (246). They act as if they know better than nature.

Still, some humans have been able to put aside their egos to recognize their impact on the environment. McPhee speaks with Charles Colver, who runs an experimental forest in the mountains. Colver concedes to McPhee that humans’ reckless interventions have brought about their own folly: “We’ve encroached on nature […] When we diddle with Mother Nature, we mess up things” (234). McPhee takes this self-reflection to another level, implying that human intervention in nature creates more unanticipated problems in the long run: “They all involved human intervention, with effects that affected other effects and were ultimately so imponderable that no one could assign to people or to nature an unchallengeable ratio of triumph to defeat” (136).

Balancing Competing Interests

As with many stories involving the environment, there are plenty of entities with different—and oftentimes competing—demands about how to intervene in nature. In the first essay, McPhee interviews General Sands, who talks about the challenges that the Army Corps faces in trying to meet these varying needs: “In most water-resources stories, you can identify two sides. Here, there are many more. The crawfisherman and the shrimper come up within five minutes asking for opposite things. The crawfishermen say, ‘Put more water in, the water is low.’ Shrimpers don’t want more water” (22). The Army Corps runs a boat—also known as the Mississippi—that goes up and down the river flagging residents’ concerns about how best to manage the Atchafalaya. Some of the foremost concerned parties are those whose livelihoods depend on the water flow—those who fish on the river—but even among those fishermen, there is dissent, as some ask the Corps to lower water levels, and others ask to raise water levels.

These small-business owners must also compete with the oil and gas industries based in southern Louisiana, which also ask the Corps to control the Atchafalaya—just in different ways. Many of these small-business owners believe that the Corps prioritizes the rich oil and gas industries—which bring money to the state of Louisiana—and does not consult enough working-class fishermen like Bourque. This belief has fostered mistrust of the Corps’s actions, which poses a problem for the Corps: “but now that the structures were emplaced at Old River […] suspicion was one more force they had to try to control” (77).

Of course, conservationists also worry about the effects of the Corps’s actions on the local flora and fauna. Although the Army Corps cannot satisfy everyone’s demands, it does its best, according to Sands and the other people that McPhee interviews. McPhee states, “The conservationists, the Corps, landowners, and recreational interests have worked out a compromise by which all parties putatively get what they want: floodway, fishway, oil field, Eden” (70). Likewise, in Los Angeles, environmentalists oppose the construction of dams and dumping of sediment out of concern for the local nature. This tension between protecting nature and protecting humans frustrates local residents.

The same issue of competing interests arises in the next essay, when the mayor of Heimaey, Magnus Magnusson, must decide whether to save the harbor—the town’s economic lifeblood—or the houses in the town. He chooses the harbor, as the townspeople can rebuild the houses, but if the harbor is destroyed, their way of life will be lost. The townspeople seem to largely agree with the mayor’s decision. That is not the case in Hawaii, where authorities must decide whether or not to expend millions of dollars to protect a small number of homes and people. Harry Kim, director of the Hawaii County Civil Defense Agency, says, “I would not spend a million dollars to save five houses. And government has to be careful. We must not destroy one home to save another. Morally, we should not do it—even if you give me legal protection” (150).

There are also competing interests at stake in the Los Angeles mountains, as residents elsewhere in Los Angeles pay for the debris basins—via taxes—that they won’t even use, but which will instead shelter the residents who choose to build their homes there. Army Corps engineers therefore have an incentive to keep these debris basins in place—even if residents would be safer moving elsewhere—because that’s how they earn a living. McPhee speaks with lifelong resident Miner Harkness, who begrudges the Army Corps for putting profit over people: “The difficult thing is, they get paid, and we—who just live here—don’t” (259).  

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