The Bomber Mafia: A Dream, a Temptation, and the Longest Night of the Second World War

Nonfiction | Book | Adult | Published in 2021

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Summary

Chapter Summaries & Analyses

Introduction-Part 1, Chapter 2

Part 1, Chapters 3-5

Part 2, Chapter 6-Conclusion

Key Figures

Themes

Symbols & Motifs

Important Quotes

Essay Topics

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Discussion Questions

Key Figures

Carl Norden

The character who made possible the debate that forms the basis of this book is Carl Norden. He was born a Dutch citizen, studied in Switzerland, and later immigrated to the United States. Gladwell describes him as a genius who is happiest alone and working. He seemed to do his best thinking sitting at his mother’s kitchen table in Switzerland and would sometimes slip away there for inspiration. He left little evidence of his work, as he did much of it in his head. He had quirks, such as believing that sunlight made people stupid (he wore big hats everywhere he went). He was also an independent thinker who wanted to start from nothing rather than rely on the previous work of others.

Norden began working on the bombsight in the 1920s and eventually factored in all the variables—a total of 64— that he determined affected its accuracy. In effect, he created an analog computer, a machine full of moving parts that required intricate training to use. His goal was to improve the accuracy of bombing to limit destruction. Planes could drop bombs that only hit their intended military targets and war could then be waged entirely in the skies, largely ending the need for massive armies that fought to a bloody standstill in World War I.

Norden’s invention set in motion the philosophy of the group of pilots who would become known as the Bomber Mafia. They bought into his theory of waging a more precise and thus more “moral” war. This would be tested during World War II and fall short of its promise. It turned out that in the real world, the bombsight was inaccurate, and many problems stood in the way of its proper use. Therefore, Norden’s dream would not be realized and more destructive methods of bombing were adopted by the Army Air Corps. His sight would continue to be used, however. In fact, the crew of the Enola Gay used a Norden bombsight to drop the world’s first atomic bomb on Hiroshima. The bomb fell 800 feet from its target, but its immense power rendered that moot. Norden was not told that his sight was used to drop the bomb: Gladwell has said, “He was a committed Christian. He thought he had designed something that would reduce the toll of suffering in war. It would have broken his heart” (“Malcolm Gladwell: The Strange Tale of the Norden Bombsight.” YouTube, uploaded by TED Talks, 26 Oct. 2011).

Haywood Hansell

Hansell came from a distinguished line of Southern military men. He was athletic and cultured, a fan of Gilbert and Sullivan (a musical theater writing team from the Victorian era known for their comic operas) and Cervantes’s Don Quixote. There was a bit of the romantic in him, and he could be introspective. As an instructor at the Air Corps Tactical School in Alabama, he became “one of the sharpest minds in the entire school” (79). There he bought into the Bomber Mafia philosophy, becoming one of its greatest proponents during the Second World War.

Gladwell describes how precision bombing campaigns led by Hansell in both Europe and the Pacific failed to achieve their goals. Hansell believed in the idea that one could identify and take out crucial choke points of an enemy that would cripple its ability to wage war. His attempt to do this in Germany and Japan was not successful and made little more than a dent in their war efforts. Still, he could not bring himself to adopt area bombing, especially ones using incendiary substances, because it would unnecessarily kill civilians. He held to his principles even under pressure from his commanding officers, who urged him to use napalm. This eventually cost him his job as leader of the 21st Bomber Command in the Mariana Islands.

Hansell represents the idealistic half of the equation that Gladwell examines in the theme of Idealism versus Pragmatism. Gladwell draws a connection between Hansell and the character of his favorite novel, Don Quixote—the knight errant whose actions are based on illusions. Although Hansell’s efforts were unsuccessful, he did not change course but held on to the dream he had of making war more humane. In a footnote to Chapter 7, Gladwell notes the irony in the fact that Hansell’s last bombing mission before being replaced by LeMay was extremely successful. Japan’s Kawasaki plant was destroyed and production dropped 90%. By holding onto his dream, Hansell maintained a certain dignity: “Because one day your dream may come true. And if you cannot keep that dream alive in the interim, then who are you?” (198). The Conclusion makes clear that precision bombing did, in fact, win in the end, as the Air Force today can bomb targets with great accuracy.

Curtis LeMay

LeMay was the antithesis of Hansell. For starters, he was a northerner with a modest background, growing up poor in Ohio. He worked to put himself through a public university, then joined the Army. Gladwell describes him as a “bulldog,” with a large, square head. His nature was very pragmatic, seeking only solutions to problems, not grand theories. He created a formation for bomber planes that helped protect them from enemy attacks, which other commands adopted. He was also “rational and imperturbable and incapable of self-doubt” (84). In interviews, he was terse and direct.

When LeMay encountered an obstacle, he would do whatever it took to overcome it. During the 1943 bombing campaign of Germany, for example, he made pilots abandon any evasive movements and instead fly directly at their targets, hoping to improve accuracy. While this made them more vulnerable to attacks, he guessed that however much they were hit by enemy fire, the B-17s could take it and keep going (he calculated how many rounds it would take to down a bomber). He didn’t just force his pilots to do this themselves, however; he led the way in his own plane, putting himself at risk first.

This practical, no-nonsense general was the realist in Gladwell’s comparison of styles and bombing methods. Whereas Hansell wouldn’t veer an inch from his principles, the only principle LeMay had was the one that got the job done. Thus, it comes as no surprise that he was the one to adopt firebombing with the use of napalm as an incendiary. When all else failed, he believed it was the only way to get the desired results. He figured that the horror of harming more civilians might just end the war faster, which would save others from dying. In the final analysis, Gladwell sees merit in both approaches. Hansell was admirable in sticking to his ideals, but this might have resulted in a drawn-out war and costly invasion of Japan before the Japanese capitulated. On the other hand, while there’s no denying the brutality of LeMay’s methods (his March 9-10, 1945 attack on Tokyo killed up to 100,000 people), they might have hastened Japan’s surrender.