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Nassim Nicholas TalebA modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
Taleb explores the limits of our ability to predict and forecast the future. In this chapter, he focuses specifically on the concept of “epistemic arrogance,” which he defines as "our hubris concerning the limits of our knowledge" (138). We simply do not have enough wisdom to be trusted with appropriate applications of our knowledge. We may know something, but we seldom know what to do with it. Furthermore, according to Taleb, "epistemic arrogance bears a double effect: we overestimate what we know, and underestimate uncertainty" (140). We are generally not very skilled in making predictions about the future. Even as we accumulate knowledge and information, reading countless books and staying informed about what's going on in the world by faithfully reading news, our ability to make predictions still does not increase.
Taleb reinforces two main ideas in this chapter: the limitations of human knowledge and the true nature of humanity. Taleb debunks the notion that accumulating knowledge will somehow result in sound predictions about the future, particularly about Black Swans. In fact, Taleb believes that hoarding knowledge and information may even decrease our ability to forecast future events. Human beings tend to perceive the number of possible outcomes based on observed precedent. We are not prepared to plan adequately for the future, by default.
Many of our most significant discoveries as a human race have been uncovered entirely by accident, or by serendipity. Columbus sought to find a new route to India and ended up discovering America; two scientists happened upon microwave radiation while theorizing that the static they heard was caused by bird excrement; and Alexander Flemming discovered penicillin while looking for something else entirely. There is nothing inherently wrong with this serendipity. However, acknowledging it instead of creating false narratives after the discoveries does not lead to a greater understanding of Black Swan moments that lead to scientific or technological breakthroughs.
Taleb references the work of Sir Karl Popper, who argued that "in order to predict historical events you need to predict technological innovation, itself fundamentally unpredictable" (171). Taleb is once again highlighting the limitations of human knowledge. Human beings simply do not have enough information to make valuable predictions, and yet we constantly turn to "experts" to help us understand the direction in which we are headed, and how today's events will shape our future for years to come.
Taleb articulates his idea of a utopia: In this society, people openly admit the value of their own ignorance, placing it above the value of their knowledge. He calls this utopia an "epistemocracy.” He then explains a concept he calls "future blindness," which he defines as "the inability to think dynamically, to position oneself with respect to a future observer" (194). The practical effects of this "future blindness" lead us to self-deception about how a particular decision or outcome will affect us, or how long the potential adverse consequences will last.
Taleb again expresses concerns about studying history in a way that produces causal, linear narratives between events. This perpetuates the notion that precedents—seeing a thousand white swans—will dictate the future, when in fact the future is far more unpredictable than we generally believe—the sighting of a black swan. Taleb alludes to the inherent tension between confirmation bias and objective analysis while studying historical events. When we seek to corroborate our biases through narratives that we ourselves construct, we lose the ability to analyze events objectively and empirically, both past and present.
In this chapter, Taleb's main goal is to provide the reader with practical measures regarding future (and past) blindness. For small matters, such as one's own social calendar, Taleb advises the reader to simply accept that "being human involves some amount of epistemic arrogance in running your affairs" (203). While we cannot predict everything, we can forecast where we we’ll be next week so that we can make plans for our next picnic, for instance. Taleb argues that we should ground our lives in practical reality, according to both the plausibility and potential harm of a particular prediction.
In dealing with "future blindness," he advises one to be prepared for all outcomes. From understanding trial and error to acknowledging the asymmetrical, nonlinear nature of Black Swans, adopting a system of thought that allows you to be prepared for life's most unpredictable moments can be highly advantageous. Furthermore, imagining the consequences of an event—such as an earthquake—is far easier than calculating the odds of an earthquake occurring. Taleb returns to the sheer power of the unpredictable, which can be confronted if we learn to live by the cliche, "expect the unexpected."
By Nassim Nicholas Taleb