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Friedrich Nietzsche, Transl. H.L. MenckenA modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
Friedrich Nietzsche’s preface dedicates The Antichrist to “the most rare of men,” whom he deems may not yet live (14). He himself claims to be one of them and suspects that those who understand his Also sprach Zarathustra (Thus Spake Zarathustra) might be among them, but admits he cannot name them.
Nietzsche describes these “most rare” individuals as being above the din of politics and nationalism, asking forbidden questions and doing forbidden things to free themselves, rising above the simplicity of humanity.
Nietzsche addresses his “most rare of men” and himself as “Hyperboreans” denying the power of the “south-winds”—Christian compassion (15). In a footnote, H.L. Mencken identifies the Hyperboreans as a mythical northern people of “unbroken happiness and perpetual youth” (15).
Nietzsche claims that the naturally courageous Hyperboreans have difficulty deciding where to direct their courage—and thus, lack purpose. He believes their philosophies are deemed too fatalistic by ordinary citizens and lesser thinkers.
Nietzsche lists a set of definitions: good is “whatever augments the feeling to power”; evil is “whatever springs from weakness”; and happiness is “the feeling that power increases” (16).
He claims that those who follow weakness are doomed, and those who follow strength should hasten their demise, arguing that the most harmful crime is compassion for the weak. The core function of Christianity, he argues, is this exact compassion.
The purpose of Nietzsche’s work is not to replace “man”—as he claims “man is an end”—but to point out which of them are Hyperboreans who should be championed above others (16).
He claims the Hyperboreans have always existed and been present throughout history, but were only ever perceived as villains. And through their demonization, Christianity was strengthened.
Nietzsche attacks contemporaneous ideas of progress as anathema to the Hyperboreans, who distinguished themselves far more frequently in Europe during the Renaissance.
Yet, he denies the Hyperboreans needing to be European at all, insisting that they can appear among any people or nation, and that whole peoples themselves can be representative of the Hyperborean ideal.
Nietzsche attacks Christianity for developing its “Evil One” out of Hyperborean characteristics, labeling Christian intellectual virtues as sinful (17). He argues that the most lamentable example of this “corruption” is French philosopher Blaise Pascal, though he does not specify why.
Nietzsche defends his assault on values he deems “rotten” by specifying that they are not meant to represent traditional “moral” values in the first place (17). He instead equates “rottenness” with “décadence,” the loss of instinct, the mental drive to embrace and welcome that which is detrimental to it (18).
All popular Christian moral values, he argues, are “décadent” and thus nihilistic.
Nietzsche outlines his argument against the Christian practice of pity, calling it a force that ultimately reduces one’s power and goes against the laws of natural selection—preserving what should perish.
He attacks German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer in particular for seeing virtue in pity and lauds Aristotle for viewing tragedy as a cathartic counteraction. He argues that the denial of pity is the ultimate calling of the Hyperboreans.
Nietzsche names theologians as the Hyperboreans’ mortal nemeses, though he believes only those who suffered by them can understand their danger. Because the popular naturalists and physiologists of Nietzsche’s time did not suffer, he does not believe they can comprehend theologians’ malice.
He argues that theologians are found in “idealists who claim to be above reality” and regard the Hyperborean ideals of “understanding,” “the senses,” “honor,” “good living,” and “science” (19) as sinful.
Nietzsche formally declares war on the theological instinct. He accuses theology of infecting humanity with the “pathetic” condition of faith, which he defines as “closing one’s eyes upon one’s self once and for all, to avoid suffering the sight of incurable falsehood” (20).
He believes truth and falsehood are forced to switch places under theology, and that real truth is whatever glorifies life, while falsehood is whatever damages life.
In the Preface and opening sections of The Antichrist, Nietzsche immediately outlines the character and quality of his interlocutors—the “Hyperboreans.” He argues that these interlocutors are not found in mass but in an exceptional minority, and all others who encounter his work will misunderstand it.
This characterization of the Hyperboreans as rare, brilliant, and courageous is emblematic of Nietzsche’s passionate elitism—and sets the stage for his later arguments against “equal rights” in favor of greater rights for his elite.
Nietzsche also introduces the reader to a number of reinterpreted common terms, such as his alternate definitions for “good” and “evil”—which center on the preservation of the tangible world and the proliferation of “power.”
Power is a central theme in all of Nietzsche’s work—The Antichrist originally being written to be the first part of his Will to Power—yet his definition of the word differs from common understanding. For Nietzsche, “power” is developed almost entirely internally, through self-inspection, self-love, and the mind’s success in overcoming nefarious outside influences (including, in The Antichrist’s case, Christianity). This definition is contentious, but could be seen as an instinctual psychological drive to continue acquiring and exercising power. This psychological drive is particularly powerful in Nietzsche’s Hyperboreans.
One of the primary enemies of the will to power, which Nietzsche redefines in Section 6, is décadence. This psychological affliction causes the mind to turn on itself and embrace ideas it would otherwise fight. Nietzsche’s décadence is related to a similar term, ressentiment, which Mencken briefly covered in the Introduction. Ressentiment is a psychological condition of self-loathing that stems from suppressed hatred or envy. Christian décadence, which The Antichrist is determined to destroy, is born of ressentiment. Later on, Nietzsche frames Christian décadence as particularly powerful due to Christian mythology and theology being primarily concerned with fortifying the ressentiment of its believers beyond the level it would otherwise organically achieve.
According to Nietzsche, those primarily responsible for constructing and promoting this system of décadence and ressentiment are “theologians.” Nietzsche uses this term as it concerns the entire ecclesiastical tradition of Christianity and Christianity’s most devious protectors—but the definition can be broadened to include any individual who intentionally cultivates ressentiment for the purpose of indirectly enhancing décadence.
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