The American Crisis

These two essays show Paine's desire to distinguish between common Britons and their unelected government and suggest that he believed that the politics of ordinary English people may influence British policy towards America. He argues that because each British taxpayer will be responsible for paying for the cost of the war, regardless of its success, it is both their right and their duty to have an opinion about it. Paine perceives England to be misinformed about America and claims that his goal is to provide them with an American perspective. He recounts that before the war, the average American disliked the British government but thought highly of the country, and their goal was to reconcile with the British. However, this changed when the British violently responded to American petitions. Paine explains that, even as a newcomer to America, he wanted to revolt alongside colonists who “had something to defend,” and newcomers like himself who “had something to pursue” (91). This recalls his argument from previous essays that America is a victim rather than a country of rebels.

Paine first uses detailed financial arguments to persuade the English that their government is exploiting them to continue a foolish war. He reminds them that Britain’s past military victories raised, rather than decreased, their taxes. He also argues that even if Britain wins the war, the amount of taxes it could extricate from its American subjects would never cover the cost of their military campaigns, thus also burdening ordinary Britons. He posits that conflict inhibits trade, which Britain is reliant on, and wealth.

In his second address to the English, Paine shifts to making moral and emotional arguments. He asks English people to imagine what the American people have experienced due to British violence. He explains that the British have so far only experienced the expenses of the war, but not the human suffering it has caused. He uses vivid imagery to illustrate the plight of American civilians in war-torn regions, describing how there were “women and children wandering in the severity of winter [...] seeking shelter in every crib and hut” (105).

Trying to frighten his readers, Paine harshly predicts that Britain will also one day be subject to an invasion which civilians will be unable to escape. He writes that no one will pity them because of their war mongering and lack of pity for others. Paine claims that a war in Britain would be worse than in America, and its outcome would be highly unpredictable. He condemns Britain’s tendency towards “defensive combat” abroad, which only worsens the country’s overall situation (107). He then reiterates to the British public that American independence doesn’t require their acquiescence, and America will gain independence regardless of Britain’s participation in the war.

Paine expands his moral arguments, which are rooted in the Christian faith, to denigrate Britain’s motives more specifically towards its colonies. He chastises the British empire’s colonial politics, which he claims do not civilize but “brutalize” mankind. He explains that only defensive wars are just, while wars of conquest or profit are “inglorious and detestable” (92). He acknowledges that there are war profiteers in all countries and compares war to a disease.

Paine argues that while British individuals may be Christian, their nation does not behave in a Christian manner, but with the “rudeness of a bear” and the “ferocity of a lion” (94), using animalistic imagery to emphasize Britain’s uncivil behavior. He claims that had the British government responded to Americans with “greatness of heart” it would not have prosecuted the war (94). He argues that just as bullying is not tolerated in “private life” it should be banned from public life as well, as “that which is the best character for an individual is the best character for a nation” (93).

The author continues to build on his theme of military analysis as he tries to erode the British public’s support for their military. He claims Britain’s armed forces have thus far been unsuccessful in America, which Paine blames on poor planning, unskilled execution, and a lack of resources. The author tries to embarrass the British military by stating that the American army was a weak underdog, yet the British could not, or did not, seize the opportunity to thoroughly defeat them. He further humiliates the British by reminding them that America is not a “European power” but a fledgling country that Britain “affected to despise” (89). He questions Britain’s military strategy in America by pointing out that if Britain does “lay waste” to America as they had threatened to do, it would only enhance America’s need for materials and merchandise, which would deepen its alliance with France. As such, he assures the British that their strategy will only “enrich your enemies” (104).