Salt Sugar Fat

Humans evolved to have a taste for sugar. Contrary to the famous tongue taste map, the entire digestive system senses sweetness, and sends pleasure signals in the brain. Food companies exploit this, along with other properties of sugar, to produce cheap, appealing food: “On average, we consume 71 pounds of caloric sweeteners each year. That’s 22 teaspoons of sugar, per person, per day” (27).

Due to the historical course of agriculture and trade, from Columbus to today, we consume sugar from cane, beets, and corn.

Food scientists recently started discovering how powerful sugar is. Lab rats overcome fear to grab Froot Loops. Later, lab rats could be fattened by sweets, but not fats. After removing sugar, rats show signs of withdrawal.

Since 2001, scientists funded by government and industry have discovered the proteins that sense sugar. Some sensors get activated by cannabis, explaining the “munchies.” African Americans and children particularly prefer sweet and salty tastes, research has found. One scientist has suggested that childhood preference for sugar may come from consuming sweet foods, such that culture affects taste.

Julie Menella, of Monell Chemical Senses Center, measures the “bliss point” of children for sugar. Companies find the precise balance of ingredients to make consumers happiest. Child test subjects point out foods they prefer: “Tatyana’s bliss point for the pudding was 24 percent sugar, twice the level of sweetness that most adults can handle in pudding. As far as children go, she was on the lower side; some go as high as 36 percent” (37).

Sugar desire starts with salivation. This dissolves the sugar, making it easier to digest. Taste buds signal the brain to produce pleasure. Digested starches also send this signal.

Sugar tastes good to children, indicates foods high in energy, triggers an evolutionary sense of excitement at dense food stores, and reduces pain. These forces combine to make sugar a dominant ingredient.

The foods that children eat influence what they will eat later in life. Menella says that companies exploit children, instead of teaching them balance.

A public interest group went as far as promoting a ban on advertising sweet foods for children. Food companies hired Monell to defend against political problems brought about by the harms of sugar. These companies also found that the only taste newborns want is sweet. These food scientists further discovered that flavor alone wasn’t compelling without three key ingredients: salt, sugar, and fat.

Michael Tordoff, another Monell researcher, investigates soda. Drinking soda makes test subjects hungrier. Diet soda barely helps people lose weight. Regular soda causes significant weight gain.

Menella argues that soda has raised children’s bliss point. Today, most food products have sugar added. Another scientist suggests that liquid sugar does not get detected by the body like solid sugar.

The author writes that sugar produces the global obesity epidemic and its associated health problems. Children continue to become more obese.

The American government does not recommend maximum sugar intake, as it does for salt and fat. The American Heart Association did recommend reducing the majority of sugar intake. Food manufacturers responded that sugar is necessary to produce appealing textures. Sugar use rose higher.

Numerous celebrities have requested Dr Pepper. The soda has a cult following. Coca-Cola and Pepsi recently produced copycat products. Pepsi and Coke used “line extensions” (new variants of existing products) to gain market share as sodas peaked in popularity, selling billions of cases.

Line extensions gain new shelf space by offering more products. Existing products gradually adapt to consumer preferences. In bids to win shelf space, companies experimentally track consumer eye movements while shopping, then produce and distribute more desirable products.

Dr Pepper responded to the copycats with its own line extension, Red Fusion. However, drinkers disliked it, as well as disliking a sequel to Red Fusion. So the company hired Howard Moskowitz, who applies psychological expertise to increase product sales.

Moskowitz modifies the salt, sugar, and fat of foods. He has helped Kraft, Campbell Soups, and other large companies win sales by identifying bliss points: “Too little of this or too much of that might not ruin a product’s taste or texture, but the shortcoming will be reflected in sales, where even tiny slippages can cause food company executives to lose their jobs” (50).

Moskowitz adjusts ingredients, especially sugar, to engineer a food that people crave. Engineers “optimize” food by adjusting the “color, smell, packaging, and taste”: “Ordinary consumers are paid to spend days sitting in rooms where they are presented with the many variations, which they touch, feel, sip, smell, swirl, and most of all taste” (51).

Moskowitz analyzes the results using the statistical technique of “conjoint analysis”: many combinations mathematically reveal optimal products. In this case, it resulted in Cherry Vanilla Dr Pepper, a huge hit.

While gaining doctoral degrees in math and psychology, Moskowitz invented a science of taste. He argues that the food industry responds to consumer demand. As such, he disclaims moral responsibility for obesity and health problems.

After graduation, Moskowitz conducted research for the US Army. They needed to get soldiers to eat more food, not less, during combat. Rations must last three years in extreme heat, and appeal to changing tastes.

Soldiers refuse to eat unappealing food, costing important calories. New foods are very appealing, but only at first. Staple foods are not as exciting, but consistently satisfy. This “sensory-specific satiety” research addressed the Army needs, and went on to inform the processed food industry:

The biggest hits–be they Coca-Cola or Doritos or Kraft’s Velveeta Cheesy Skillets dinner kits–owe their success to formulas that pique the taste buds enough to be alluring but don’t have a distinct overriding single flavor that says to the brain: Enough already! (55).

Moskowitz found the scientific variables underpinning craving, which would inform the engineering of modern American food. He discovered the ideal amount of sugar, known as its bliss point.

In civilian life, Moskowitz consulted for the processed-food industry. The old giants faced financial difficulty. He was tasked with reinventing Maxwell House coffee to retain its competitiveness against Folgers. The innovation that Moskowitz applied was to group consumers into different preference groups: weak, medium, and strong. This knowledge let the company address specific tastes appropriately.

Applying the same technique across the board, Moskowitz transformed other areas of the food industry. Vlasic discovered weak, medium, and strong pickle preferences, and so forth. Food giants mixed the sugar expertise and optimization techniques of Moskowitz with their extensive use of salt, sugar, and fat. This resulted in foods at the bliss point.

Moskowitz then researched the intense experience that people expect of snacks. He investigated what makes people crave foods like cheesecake, ice cream, and hamburgers. Surprisingly, the answer was not hunger. Instead, emotions, along with sensations like taste, aroma, and appearance made people crave these foods. Moss adds that “[a]s disparate as these pillars may seem, one ingredient–sugar–can do it all” (60).

Moss goes to a diner with Moskowitz. The latter avoids potatoes, most bread, and soda. The author gets the waitress to bring Dr Pepper for its pioneer, Moskowitz, who tastes it and calls it “terrible” and “awful.” He identifies the flavor ingredient benzaldehyde.

The drink only appeals to a segment of the population; this is by design. Moskowitz had recruited people who already liked Dr Pepper. Mixing regular Dr Pepper flavor with cherry and vanilla flavors, sugar, and water, he produced dozens of variations, engineering the result.

In carefully-controlled conditions, volunteers rated the samples. His exhaustive research provided a template for soda makers. Characteristics such as “mouthfeel” apply to food and beverages, often following the bliss point in importance for producing craving.

One discovery arising from Moskowitz’s research revealed that the “bliss point” is actually a plateau, not a point. Therefore, manufacturers can use less syrup to achieve the same flavor, saving significant sums of money.

The final Cherry Vanilla Dr Pepper product was a smash hit, even expanding beyond Dr Pepper’s traditional territory in the southern US. 

Al Clausi studied chemistry. After World War II, he worked for General Foods. There, he worked with marketer Charles Mortimer to develop convenience foods, transforming eating.

Before convenience foods, people cooked meals at home. This required more time, yet produced healthier meals. Preparing Jell-O pudding required hours of careful activity. General Foods tasked Clausi with making instant pudding. He worked for years with a variety of pure ingredients. After a competitor invented an instant pudding with artificial ingredients, Clausi was told to use any ingredients. Clausi used two chemicals, pyrophosphate and orthophosphate, to make a product that could be prepared faster and that lasted longer than the competition.

Food additives became a public health concern. In the 1950s, food coloring sickened some children. General Foods fought against federal regulations on additives. Over time, attitudes have changed, and some people now worry more about salt, sugar, and fat.

Clausi argues for freedom as necessary to innovation. Marketers like Mortimer jumped on board the new food inventions, not so much for their chemistry but for their convenience.

General Foods assigned Clausi to work on Post cereals, combining sugar and the convenience factor. Traditional cereals were unsweetened and sold as a health food: “Indeed, the physician who had invented the cereal flake, John Harvey Kellogg, was quite a stickler on sweets, running his cereal company from a sanitarium where he banned sugar altogether” (73).

In 1949, Post introduced sugary cereals. Competitors, including General Mills and Kellogg, took over the market with their own sweet cereals. General Foods, a conglomerate, responded by having Clausi design alphabet-shaped cereal.

Mortimer rose from marketing to become an executive. He revolutionized General Foods, by making their foods more convenient: “These foods had to be easy to buy, store, open, prepare, and eat” (76).

Mortimer insisted that General Foods produce new breakfast foods instead of competing on breakfast cereals, citing his daughter eating cake for breakfast. This inspired Clausi to invent new products.

Clausi reinvented numerous foods, even pet food. He used sugar instead of the traditional dryness to protect dog food from bacteria, making the product moister. This technique now applies to processed foods, especially those reduced in fat.

In 1956, Clausi developed Tang. This sugar, flavor, and water replaced orange juice for many consumers. Under research, the new beverage matched the nutrition of orange juice but tasted worse. Clausi removed the nutrients except for vitamin C, so that it tasted less bitter. General Foods marketed it as far more convenient than the frozen or concentrated orange juice then prevalent.

An unexpected benefit of Tang was that consumers could adjust its bliss point simply by adding more crystals. Clausi noticed that in China, people made sweeter Tang the further south one was in the country.

Tang also found a place in space. Because of the fiber in orange juice, it produces excess waste. Free Tang was sent to space, and rave reviews returned to Earth.

In 1961, food scientists invented an instant breakfast that was drinkable. It was also a very sweet concoction. Post invented a cake-like breakfast product that stored for extended periods and could be heated in a toaster. Kellogg copied this product, replaced fruit with reams of sugar, and sold Pop-Tarts. Decades later, people now eat these cold at any time of day.

Mortimer spoke at a 1955 consumer confidence meeting: “Food, clothing, and shelter were still important, he told the crowd. But now there was a fourth essential element of life that could be ‘expressed in a single word–convenience–spelled out with a capital C’” (80).

Post-war social and technological changes had made convenience a primary consideration. New inventions facilitated cooking, shopping, and household chores. As women joined the workforce, many welcomed this ease.

School teachers and social workers continued to promote traditional homemaking. Departments of agriculture sent government workers to teach gardening and preserving.

A southern home economics teacher, Betty Dickson, taught basic cooking. She and other home-ec teachers rejected the movement towards convenience through industrial food. They argued that traditional methods cost less, tasted better, and offered enough convenience.

Food companies hired attractive home-ec communicators to show the new food preparation methods. They even invented Betty Crocker, an advertising symbol, who received fan mail despite not being an actual person. Betty Crocker brought international attention to the transformation of food preparation:

But even Betty Crocker wasn’t enough to totally undermine the teachings of Betty Dickson. To do that, the processed food industry had to come up with another, more insidious strategy. Like the Hoover-era FBI pursuing its enemies list, the industry infiltrated the association of home economics teachers (84).

General Foods liberally endowed home economics institutions, instilling lessons about new products. In a social shift, women would now only cook from scratch to entertain, instead of regularly.

Mortimer received media attention for the “Modern Living” era he introduced. Industrial efficiency replaced traditional homemaking. Instant foods became stars.

Clausi notes that the current generations, offspring of those experiencing the industrial food revolution, now return to more traditional foods. He suggests that food corporations switch from sugar to other ingredients like nut proteins. Instead, Kellogg relies on more marketing for its sugary products.

John Harvey Kellogg started a health institution to address stomach bloating and gas, or “Americanitis.” The diet of the time included large amounts of fatty and salty meats, and whiskey. His retreat became popular. It featured physical activities, as well as a diet of plain grains, without salt or sugar, and with little fat.

Influenced by an inventor, Kellogg made his own wheat cereal. John Kellogg had a younger brother named Will, who took over the cereal production and made it more practical. They also made corn flakes for brewers. While John was away on a business trip, Will added sugar to the breakfast cereal. The sweetened cereal won favor with eaters, although not with John.

Will went into business alone, and produced thousands of cases of corn flakes. He twice defeated John on legal matters.

Eventually, sugar-laden breakfast cereals displaced fat-laden breakfast meats. Moss writes that the food industry has ever since substituted problematic ingredients as they pass in and out of style.

One guest of the Kellogg sanitarium, C. W. Post, copied the business, including having cereal such as Grape-Nuts. Post also pioneered catchy advertising.

These two manufacturers produced a kind of gold rush town for cereal makers:

By 1911, Battle Creek was home to 108 brands of cereal, but Kellogg and Post would emerge as the dominant players. They were eventually joined by a third manufacturer, General Mills, which began making cereal at the colossal flour mills it had on the great falls of the Mississippi River in Minneapolis (92).

General Foods acquired Post, which candy-coated their cereal. Competing cereals increasingly added sugar. Company nutritionists complained, but company marketers won out.

In the 1970s, young women often went off to work. For the sake of convenience, breakfast cereals could make a huge profit for these companies. Sales rose from under a billion dollars to several billion dollars.

In 1976, the Federal Trade Commission accused the cereal makers of running a cartel. The complaint dragged on ineffectively for years.

The Food and Drug Administration did not consider sugar as a public health issue. Nor did they require sugar contents on labels. Moss writes, however, that “[t]his all changed in 1975, when sugar–the keystone of the cereal makers’ fortunes–suddenly became a matter of vivid distress to consumers” (94).

A dentist became shocked by so many new cases of tooth decay in youth. He carefully measured dozens of commercial cereals. They contained sugar amounts from 10 percent up to 70.8 percent. The sweetest brands were those most marketed to children.

An influential nutritionist, Jean Mayer, argued in national newspapers that the dentist’s report showed a huge health problem in sugary cereals. He titled his piece “Is It Cereal or Candy?,” comparing sweetened cereals to candy.

Rather than fighting back, the cereal companies made slight adjustments. They stopped selling a few sweet products, and removed the word “sugar” from other product names.

By 1977, thousands of health professionals and consumer advocates asked the Federal Trade Commission to ban advertising sugary foods on children’s television. They sent 200 decayed teeth from children to the FTC.

A new FTC chairman turned the tide, taking on a consumer advocacy role. The FTC would go even beyond the initial request, proposing to ban all TV advertising to children. This would affect $600 million in annual ads.

Moss argues that marketing complements salt, sugar, and fat as a key ingredient:

In any given cereal aisle, two hundred cereal brands–and their spinoffs–compete for the shopper’s attention, so food manufacturers now spend nearly twice as much money on advertising their cereals as they do on the ingredients that go into them (98).

Renowned consumer activist Ralph Nader warned that this fight would be too costly. The FTC pursued it anyways. The food industry spent millions of dollars fighting back. Lobbyists had the FTC chairman removed from the hearings, and waged an intensive media campaign.

Newspapers such as The Washington Post echoed the food industry lobbyists. The FTC even ran out of funding, for the first time. Eventually, the FTC case ran out of steam.

The FTC did, however, reveal how effective advertising sugar to children was. Professional promoters forcefully pushed children from healthy foods to junk foods.

Fallout from the FTC also included consumer activist and media groups fighting against sugar into the 1980s.

In the 1990s, supermarkets started selling their own cereals, making large indents. General Mills lowered prices and increased marketing. Kellogg struggled to compete, even dropping its conservative business practices. Anything was fair game: “The target was the civilians who were buying the rival cereals” (105).

Kellogg switched from engineering cereals first to marketing first. They developed Rice Krispies Treat cereal to appeal to customers. However, by the 2000s, the store brands had continued to take away market share.

Kellogg then introduced Apple Jacks, with a bolder ad campaign. The fruit component was portrayed negatively against the sweetened cinnamon. This upset parents and regulators, who portrayed fruit as nutritional.

Consumers learned of the nutritional benefits of whole grains. Kellogg marketed sugary Frosted Mini-Wheats, which contain some whole grains, as brain food. It cited a clinical study paid for by Kellogg itself. The FTC accused Kellogg of misleading advertising:

Kellogg’s campaign, to be sure, was not in the same league as the ads run by old rival, C. W. Post, a century earlier, in which he was accused of insinuating that his cereal, Grape-Nuts, would cure appendicitis. But with Kellogg spending $1 billion a year on advertising that can deeply influence America’s shopping habits, the commission was incensed (111).

The ads, however, had convinced consumers, who bought more Frosted Mini-Wheats.

Kellogg followed up with further advertising, including a website geared at mothers. It had become a marketing company.

Jeffery Dunn worked at Coca-Cola, as did his father. The company marketed extensively, especially against rival PepsiCo. His job was to sell fountain drinks to restaurants. Fierce competition constantly drove the companies.

Coca-Cola had a long history of corporate marketing. Robert Woodruff established the brand culture, providing immense volumes of Coke overseas and to soldiers. Coca-Cola associated itself with happiness.

Coke is both the most recognized brand and the brand most blamed for obesity.

Soda transports sugar in a form hardly noticed by the body, enabling people to drink supersize amounts. In the 1980s and 1990s, ever larger amounts of soda were consumed, especially by children.

Dunn became the Coca-Cola president for North and South America. He disclaimed responsibility for public health problems. While on a business trip to Brazil, Dunn realized the harms that his company caused to children. After failing to alter the company course, he left.

Dunn now blames the obesity epidemic on junk food and soft drinks. A passionate man, he struggled to get a job at Coca-Cola in the first place. Once there, he developed the fast food combo containing a soda. He led hundreds of employees to combat Pepsi.

In the mid-1980s, Pepsi made its first serious threat to overtake Coca-Cola, which responded with New Coke. The Great Cola War wound up enlarging both companies.

In addition to sugar, caffeine, and secret flavors, Coke has other appeal. It is bubbly, and moreover it overcomes “sensory-specific satiety.” Coke has a unique balance, like fine wine. It mixes spiciness with tingling and warmth.

Dunn says that the branding matches the ingredients in importance.

In 1980, Coke switched from regular sugar to high-fructose corn syrup, and doubled its marketing budget. Obesity rates began to surge.

In 1994, Mexico devalued its currency, precipitating a financial crisis. Coke continued to market heavily. Coke grew there while the Mexican economy shrank.

In the US and elsewhere, Coke competed for market share, and to increase per capita consumption: “By 1997, Americans were drinking 54 gallons of soda a year, on average, and Coke controlled almost half of the soda sales, with a 45 percent share” (129).

Competition from sweet tea and sports drinks spurred more marketing. Poor southern cities kept drinking larger amounts of Coke. “Heavy users” constituted the twenty percent of the Pareto principle, which states that 80 percent of effects come from 20 percent of causes: “The goal became much larger than merely beating the rival brands; Coca-Cola strove to outsell every other thing people drank, including milk and water” (130).

Coke did not advertise to audiences primarily composed of children younger than 12. Teenagers, however, have spending money and form lifelong preferences.

The company conducts sociological research to precision-engineer marketing efforts. Coke tells grocers where shoppers walk, in order to maximize sales. The company divides shoppers into demographics, and understands their tastes.

Convenience stores stock the foods containing the most salt, sugar, and fat. Moss writes that “[t]o nutritionists, these stores are to obesity what drug dens were to the crack epidemic” (134).

These stores cater to teenage tastes through snacks and sodas: “In big cities like New York and Philadelphia and Los Angeles, there are thousands of corner stores strategically located near the schools, to catch kids coming and going” (134). Moss adds that “[t]he soda and snacks are not just the most profitable items in the C-store; they make the C-stores the cash cows that they are” (135). Teens form brand loyalty, and promise greater overall returns.

In 2000, Dunn received a book arguing that soda sugar caused serious health problems. He got engaged to a thin woman who eschewed sugar. These developments convinced Dunn to question his corporate allegiance.

Coke, along with Kraft and other food corporations, began targeting Brazil. While walking through a barrio, Dunn realizes the harm that Coke would cause, and changes his position.

Dunn develops Dasani bottled water. He pushes against marketing soda to children. Coke fires Dunn.

Dunn later presents a new snack idea to investors: carrots. He applies industrial marketing techniques to a vegetable.

At tobacco company Philip Morris, a dozen top executives meet monthly. They had taken over beer and food companies, including General Foods and Kraft. By 1989, these had overtaken tobacco sales at the company.

Geoffrey Bible, an Australian who became chief executive at Philip Morris, speaks after retirement with Moss. Bible, like Dunn, avoids many processed foods and beverages. He quit smoking in 2000.

Contrary to tobacco, food products are difficult to get vendors to carry. Food requires product differentiation to sell, whereas tobacco sells more on ideals.

At a 1990 meeting, executives noted that competitors were catching up to Kool-Aid. They determined to market its fruitiness as healthy.

Edwin Perkins invented Kool-Aid in 1927. During the Great Depression, he marketed it as an affordable beverage.

By the 1980s, sodas and other competitors pressured Kool-Aid. Philip Morris responded with Kool-Aid Kool Bursts. Heavy marketing would target the kids to whom they were now prevented from marketing tobacco to. Philip Morris even sent mailings to children. However, the company also added tiny amounts of fruit juice to the product to market it to mothers: “It was barely half a tablespoon of juice, a mere 5 percent of the total formula, company records reveal, but the Kool-Aid managers already knew that even a hint of fruit was worth a zillion times its weight in marketing gold” (148). The product succeeded wildly.

In 1957, General Foods built its Technical Center to develop products such as Jell-O and Kool-Aid. Manufacturers use different types of sugar, such as fructose and sucrose, for their cooking properties. A chemist at General Foods developed an extra sweet fructose suitable for use in beverages.

The company spent less on sugar, as the new version was sweeter. Less sugar also meant advertising health benefits. At the time, academic and governmental groups were starting to call attention to the more severe health effects of sugar.

Researchers now investigate whether fructose causes worse health problems than glucose.

Manufacturers also market fruit juice concentrate as a healthy sweetener. However, this industrial product often consists of essentially pure sugar.

Companies sell drinks like Capri Sun as “fruit drinks,” labeled “contains fruit juice,” and “Natural fruit drink. No artificial ingredients.” However, these products still consist of sugar, water, and flavorings. Some contain more sugar than soda does.

A Florida woman launched a lawsuit for deceptive marketing against Kraft, which then had to change its marketing and ingredients.

The Philip Morris merger combined two food giants with disparate corporate cultures:

One former Kraft executive who started out with General Foods described the latter as Ancient Greece, studied and cultured and not especially keen on warfare. By contrast, he viewed Kraft as the imperial Roman army on a brutal march to conquer the world (156).

Kraft culture dominated after the merger. The joint company also benefited from having Philip Morris as owner, with its economies of scale.

They sold around a billion dollars of beverages in 1996. Kool-Aid, developed by General Foods and marketed by Kraft, propelled beverage sales up to third place, just behind Coke and Pepsi: “They rolled out products whose formulations were still guaranteed to generate bliss, but with fruit motifs that disguised the sugar as something more nourishing” (158).

To target diabetics, the joint company promoted its sugar-free products. They also marketed Tang to tweens.