Rhetoric

“So let Rhetoric be defined as the faculty [power] of discovering in the particular case what are the available means of persuasion.”

This definition of rhetoric sets the stage for the entire work, establishing the central theme of the Means of Persuasion. This definition also prepares the reader for Aristotle’s methodical approach to analyzing rhetoric through categorization and identifying topoi.

“On matters which admit of no alternative, which necessarily were, or will be, or are, certainties, no one deliberates, at least not on that supposition—for nothing is to be gained by it.” 

Here, Aristotle considers what matters are subject to rhetorical treatment. The persuasive function of rhetoric is central to its existence; a subject must be open to some form of debate if one is to apply rhetoric. This statement perhaps contains a veiled criticism of the Sophists, rhetoric teachers who would appear to prove impossible facts through fallacious logic. These speakers called objective truth into question and made rhetoric a tool for mischief.

“As for the divisions of time which severally belong to these several kinds of speakers, to the deliberative speaker belongs the future, for he gives advice about things to come, exhorting or dissuading; to the judicial pleader belongs the past, for it is always with regard to things already done that the one party accuses and the other defends; and to the epideictic speaker, above all, belongs the present, for every one praises or blames with regard to existing conditions.” 

As he begins to schematize his rhetorical approach, Aristotle divides the three styles of oratory according to temporality, setting the logical basis for most of his guidance regarding each style. The argumentative tools available to each style are therefore dependent upon the sort of information available, the listeners’ personal investment, and other such factors.

“Happiness may be defined as prosperity conjoined with virtue; or as a self-sufficient existence; or as the pleasantest life, with secure enjoyment thereof; or as a thriving condition of property and persons, with the ability to take care and make use of them.”

Aristotle identifies happiness as the goal of deliberative oratory, which aims to advise the audience on topics pertaining mainly to the state. We see here an element of Aristotle’s philosophical background: his teacher, Plato, had tied happiness in with morality by arguing that only the virtuous person is happy. Aristotle’s philosophical works emulate Plato’s conflation of virtue and happiness, and the definition above hints at that premise.

“That is good of which the opposite is ill; and that of which the opposite is advantageous to our enemies.” 

Aristotle attempts to define “the good” in terms that are useful to the deliberative orator. This pithy phrase corresponds precisely to Aristotle’s own advice on crafting lively sayings: he recommends, among other things, using short sentences, containing clauses with similar wording and antithetical statements. This definition illustrates Aristotle’s method of reaching conclusions through opposites—an approach that constitutes one of the universal in Book 2.

“And those things are goods which will gratify our friends or annoy our enemies.”

This sentiment is not a nuanced philosophical definition of “good” such as we find in other works of Aristotle. However, it does reflect a commonly held belief among the Athenians, whose ethical values often expressed themselves in terms of friendship and enmity. This statement, which again matches Aristotle’s description of lively sayings, also constitutes a maxim, or an enthymeme whose premises are self-evident.

“All actions which men do of themselves are either good or apparently good, or else pleasant or apparently pleasant.”

Many of the lessons in the Rhetoric rely on an understanding of human nature. In his discussion of character in Book 2, for example, Aristotle draws generalizations about various types of people in order to target arguments at and for them. Aristotle uses human nature to examine the motives behind voluntary wrongdoing: regardless of malice, perpetrators act for their own benefit. This knowledge can help a speaker to construct their accusation.

“We may lay it down that pleasure is a certain motion of the soul [of the vital, sensitive system], a perceptible settling of it, all at once, into its rightful nature; and that pain is the reverse.”

Although he wrote extensively on the natural world and philosophical ethics, Aristotle rarely brings his theories into the Rhetoric. This is one subtle example of the author’s broader worldview creeping in; the imagery of pleasure in terms of the soul’s “rightful nature” figures prominently in the Nicomachean Ethics.

“Our delight is not in the original; rather, there is an inference: This [the artistic imitation] is that [the object represented]; and so an act of learning takes place.” 

This passage explores the implications of pleasure through learning; Aristotle often revisits the principle that audiences react with pleasure when they learn. Again, there is a subtle nod to Aristotle’s other philosophical thought here (particularly the Poetics). Artistic imitation, or mimesis, is not only a replication of the original, but a perfection of it. Hence, an audience need not find pleasure in the original in order to enjoy the imitation.

“No one is on his guard against a disease from which nobody ever suffered.” 

This metaphor illustrates Aristotle’s point that people are least suspicious of those who have not yet committed any crime. This is another example of a lively saying that is likely to stick with the audience, since it is brief and well-balanced. In this case, Aristotle mixes two tools, employing both metaphor (disease for wrong-doer) and enthymeme to make his point.

“Evincing the right character is more important in deliberative speeches, and producing the right attitude in the hearer is more important in forensic.” 

The many distinctions between the styles of oratory can all be traced back to the temporal aspect, as discussed in Book 1. Aristotle recommends emphasizing the speaker’s character in deliberative speeches. Since these speeches pertain to advice about the future, the speaker must appear trustworthy. In forensic oratory, which concerns events of the past, it is more important that the speaker put the audience in a frame of mind to react with the right emotions, such as pity or outrage. Hence, both ethos(character) and pathos (emotion) can be useful rhetorical tools.

“Finally, hubris [wanton insult, outrage, insolence] is a form of slight. Hubris consists in doing or saying things that cause shame to the victim [...] merely for your own gratification.”

Aristotle is enumerating the slights that can lead to anger. Hubris is a distinctly Greek concept that has no direct equivalent in English, though Aristotle’s definition here is adequate. Hubris was considered the ultimate insult among the Athenians; it constituted not only an act of underserved disrespect, but one that needlessly elevated the status of the perpetrator above that of the victim. A fundamental tenet of Athenian democracy was the equality of all, which made hubris particularly egregious.

“And they are friends who have come to regard the same things as good and the same things as evil, they who are friends of the same people, and they who are the enemies of the same people; for between these there must needs be an identity of wishes [good, for example, to the common friend, harm to the common enemy].” 

Aristotle’s definition of friendship is strikingly similar to his definition of “the good” (34)and draws upon the same tradition of reciprocity through friendship. Taken together, the two principles approach a tautology—“friends are those who consider the same things good as me” and “good things are those which benefit my friends.”

“Nor, again, are we ashamed of the same things before our intimate friends as before strangers; with respect to intimate friends we are ashamed of things that are considered essentially disgraceful, while with respect to outsiders the standard is that of convention [-law or custom].” 

Aristotle employs friends as a standard of measurement. In this case, they serve to illustrate that emotions are not absolute, and that the correct deployment of emotional speech requires a thorough understanding of the attendant circumstances.

“Both emotions are characteristic of good men, who are bound to feel sympathy and pity for undeserved ill fortune, and indignation at undeserved prosperity; since whatever comes to a man against his deserts violates the principle of justice.” 

This passage, which distinguishes the emotions of pity and indignation, is a useful illustration of how justice is attendant not just upon law. Aristotle argues in Book 1 that there are both written and unwritten laws, both of which are useful persuasive tools. In this case, we see how a speaker might appeal to the audience’s awareness of unwritten law. Aristotle also makes a subtle ethical statement here by equating goodness with a sense of justice.

“Through emulation a man prepares himself to win what is good; through envy he proceeds to keep his neighbor from having it.”

In this portion of his discussion of emotion, Aristotle again employs a pithy and lively phrase to make a useful point. These two antithetical phrases elegantly illustrate the difference between envy and emulation through the use of contrast and parallel construction. This statement demonstrates, furthermore, that there are noble ways to experience what would seem to be base emotions.

“The body is in its prime from thirty years of age to five-and-thirty, and the soul about forty-nine.” 

This statement comes in the midst of the discussion of ethos and the times of life. Aristotle does not provide justification for his reckoning of the body and soul’s respective primes. The numbers 35 and 49 are both multiples of seven, and it could be that the philosopher placed particular value on that number. More notably, we again see a hint at Aristotle’s philosophical thought here: he envisions the body and soul developing separately and at different rates.

“Now Enthymemes are a kind of syllogism which almost entirely deals with such matters [human actions or concerns]; take away the syllogistic form, then, and a premise or a conclusion of an Enthymeme is a Maxim.” 

In outlining the elements of logos, or logical reasoning, Aristotle identifies two types of proof: enthymeme and example. He admits the value of maxim, as well, but contends that it is merely a form of enthymeme expressed as a lone premise or conclusion. Despite its strict classification as enthymeme, maxim still receives a thorough examination and exposition of its proper use.

“Our speaker, accordingly, must start out, not from any and every premise that may be regarded as true, but from opinions of a definite sort—the [actual] opinions of the judges [audience], or else the opinions of persons whose authority they accept.” 

Aristotle devotes considerable attention to the construction of enthymemes. Although the construction of this logical process is simple enough, we see here that complex considerations go into its formulation. The need to form premises of a particular sort points to the need for topoi, or standard lines of argument to which a speaker can turn.

“Strict justice, of course, would lead us, in speaking, to seek no more [of an emotional effect] than that we should avoid paining the hearer […] the case should, in justice, be fought on the strength of the facts alone, so that all else besides demonstration of fact is superfluous.”

Book 3 concerns style and arrangement as rhetorical elements of a speech. Aristotle is a grudging advocate for such considerations: in an ideal world, purer forms of argumentation, such as enthymeme, would be sufficient for persuasion, and external factors, such as emotion, would be extraneous. However, Aristotle recognizes that the expectations of the audience go beyond mere presentation of fact.

“Words are like men; as we feel a difference between people from afar and our fellow townsmen, so is it with our feeling for language.” 

Aristotle bases this elegant simile on a principle that he revisits a number of times throughout this work: that people feel an affinity for those who are most like them. This concept is nothing new for the author. The theme of “self and other” is one of the strongest in Athenian literature. He adapts this principle to explain why audiences prefer a natural speaking style.

“Naturalness is persuasive, artifice just the reverse.”

Again, Aristotle employs a lively and memorable phrase to emphasize a point; in this case, that a natural style is essential in rhetorical delivery. Along with the elements of balance and antithetical clauses we have seen in other examples present in Book 1, this quote illustrates its point through its own structure. Elsewhere, Aristotle argues that long, florid sentences sound artificial, and he advocates concise periods for the sake of the audience; this sentence employs exactly that principle in its structure.

“This, then, is the superlative function of the proem, this its distinctive task: to make clear the end and object of your work.” 

Although Aristotle feels that the proem (introduction) is ultimately unnecessary, he still devotes considerable attention to it. The author compares the proem in oratory with those of poetry, tragedy, and comedy, and finds that they all contain the end in the beginning by laying out the themes and goals of the work. This is an important function, yet Aristotle also maintains that a speaker can at least accomplish this concisely.