Red Notice: A True Story of High Finance, Murder, and One Man's Fight for Justice

As March 2010 rolls by, the team hears nothing from Kyle Parker and begins to lose heart. Finally, Browder calls him and is told that “things don’t always work on a schedule over here” (299). Browder assumes this is a polite way of letting him down. In April, however, the team gets the text of a letter from Senator Ben Cardin to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, which includes the sentence, “I urge you to immediately cancel and permanently withdraw the US visa privileges of all those involved in this crime” (300). The letter is posted online, with a list of all sixty officials involved in the Sergei fraud and murder. Western and Russian media pick up the story; the list of names becomes known as “the Cardin List” (301).

The State Department does nothing. In May, Browder speaks at a congressional hearing on Russian human rights abuses; his story of Sergei Magnitsky’s torture and death moves participants to tears. Congressman Jim McGovern promises to put pressure on the Obama administration to take action against the perpetrators, and to submit legislation to bolster the effort. Senator Cardin agrees to co-sponsor the bill, which is to be called the Sergei Magnitsky Act.

Kyle Parker “spent that entire summer working on the draft law, and as he did, [he and Browder] developed a close friendship” (305). In September, Browder meets with Senator John McCain, who agrees to co-sponsor the bill on behalf of the Republicans.

The team hears from other Russians who have been brutalized by the same group that orchestrated Sergei’s arrest and murder. More research reveals that Kuznetsov and Karpov hide much of their ill-gotten gains in the form of expensive real estate and automobiles under the names of their parents. They and their wives live lavishly and see the world, brazenly posting selfies online from their travels. Browder states that “[t]hese guys were disgusting” (313).

Browder makes a video about Kuznetsov and posts it to YouTube, “and it was the top political video in Russia” (313). Activists take to the streets in front of Kuznetsov’s building. Jamie Firestone files criminal charges against Kuznetsov for his unexplained wealth. The government continues to stonewall, and Karpov “filed a criminal defamation complaint in Russia against [Browder’s] colleagues and [Browder]” (314). Browder responds by posting a video about Karpov’s unexplained wealth: “Kuznetsov and Karpov may have been untouchable by Russian law enforcement, but they were anything but untouchable in the court of public opinion” (315).

Jamie Firestone hears that Olga Stepanova, the woman in the Russian tax office who signed off on the phony refunds, “got millions from the fraud” (316). Jamie agrees to meet the informant, Alejandro Sanches, in London in August 2010. This could be a trap, so Browder’s security team covertly takes up positions at the meeting place.

Sanches appears, then confesses that his real name is Alexander Perepilichnyy. Vadim joins them, and they inspect the documents, which appear genuine and indicate that the tax official has deposited more than seven million Euros into Swiss bank accounts. They agree to meet again to review the rest of the documents.

The meetings continue, and the team obtains information that Stepanova and her husband have “amassed bank accounts and properties worth nearly $40 million” (321). But what if this is all a set-up? It’s possible Browder is being lured into posting false information, whereupon it would be discredited publicly by Russian authorities, thereby casting doubt on all of Browder’s previous claims.

Perepilichnyy explains that he has been a banker to wealthy Russians, including the Stepanovs; when they lose money in the crash of 2008, Olga insists he repay them. When he refuses, she has him charged with tax fraud. Browder writes that “Perepilichnyy promptly fled Russia to avoid arrest” (322). Assisting Browder’s team might help Perepilichnyy regain his good name.

The team is ready to launch a new video, this one condemning Olga Stepanova, but they get a cryptic message from Aslan: “‘Department K furious about Kuznetsov and Karpov videos. Large new operation being planned against Hermitage and Browder’” (322). This renews Browder’s fears that Perepilichnyy is an elaborate plant: “Before going forward I had to be doubly sure that we weren’t falling headfirst into an FSB trap” (323).

The Browder team is able to confirm, in the fall of 2010, that Olga Stepanova does indeed control a costly property with two houses outside Moscow, but the property is listed in her mother’s name: “When I saw the pictures of the houses, I thought they looked more like they belonged to a top hedge fund manager than a midlevel Russian tax collector and her husband” (324). Another expensive property is found under Olga’s husband’s name.

Browder writes, “Everything now hinged on the authenticity of the Swiss accounts” (325). They file a complaint with Swiss authorities, but getting confirmation will take time. By March of 2011, they still haven’t heard from the Swiss. Unable to wait longer, Browder posts the video online, and it causes a sensation in Russia. Olga’s mother admits to journalists that she agreed to put the suburban Moscow property in her name “in exchange for a cleaning lady to help her tidy up her apartment once a week” (326). Then, the Swiss authorities report back: following a criminal investigation, they have frozen Olga’s accounts. Olga becomes known as the Tax Princess. Browder is relieved: “I felt completely vindicated” (326).

As the anti-corruption legislation courses through Congress, Russian authorities increase their pushback. In November 2010, they give outstanding-officer awards to Karpov and Silchenko. At a news conference a few days later, evidence is presented to prove that Sergei was the beneficiary of the tax fraud, but the effort is clumsy, and the press doesn’t bite.

Russian citizens contact the sponsors of the Magnitsky Act, asking them to add to the bill the names of other Russians who have been tortured or killed. The sponsors add verbiage to “sanction all other gross human rights abusers in Russia” (328). Major Russian activists—Gary Kasparov, opposition leader Alexei Navalny, environmentalist Evgenia Chirikova—descend on Washington to lobby for the bill.

The Obama administration is in a bind: it doesn’t want to oppose the bill, but it also doesn’t want its “reset” with Russia to get scuttled. In July 2011, The State Department issues an opinion that claims the chief wrongdoers on the legislation’s list are already banned, so passage is unnecessary. Democrat Cardin defies his president and continues to work for passage. The administration responds with a suggestion: “the bill should apply globally, not just to Russia. The senators loved that idea” (330).

For some reason, John Kerry—who heads the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which must vet the bill—for three months refuses to add it to the agenda. This is despite the fact that Sergei’s mother has obtained definitive proof that her son was beaten to death, including post-mortem color photos of his bruised and battered body, along with “a protocol […] authorizing the use of rubber batons on Sergei by riot guards on the night of November 16” (331).

Browder flies to Washington in November 2011 and meets with Kerry’s advisor on Russia, Jason Bruder. The meeting is a failure. It later develops that Kerry’s opposition to the bill is personal: “he wanted to be secretary of state after Hillary Clinton resigned […] one of the conditions for his getting the job was to make sure that the Magnitsky Act never saw the light of day” (333).

In 2012, Russia will be admitted to the World Trade Organization, but an old law still on the books prevents American businesses from taking full advantage. The administration wants the law repealed; Browder meets with Senator Joe Lieberman, who agrees to block the repeal unless the administration goes along with passage of the Magnitsky Act.

A compromise puts the Magnitsky Act on the same bill as the repeal: “Our human rights campaign made strange bedfellows with Montana beef farmers, Russian human rights activists, and Boeing airplane salesmen,” but that is “how sausages and laws are made” (336). In June 2012, the bill makes it out of committee.

Russia sends a delegation to Washington in July 2012; its purpose is to deter passage of the Magnitsky bill. The delegation is headed by Vitaly Malkin, a billionaire named by Canada as a “member of a group engaging in trans-national crime” (340) and someone is banned from Canada.

Fortunately for the bill’s chances, the Russian meetings are a disaster, the delegation’s presentation—complete with clumsily trumped-up evidence and implausible denials—quickly dismissed by legislators and media: “Instead of driving people away from the Magnitsky Act, it drove them even closer” (343). On July 18, the bill passes the Finance committee.

With election season in full swing, the bill languishes until after Election Day in November. The House now wants to redraw the bill so it once again deals exclusively with Russia; this will cause a conflict with the Senate version. Finally, the bill comes up for a vote; as Browder watches the TV feed in London, he gets a call from an associate: “Alexander Perepilichnyy is dead” (348).

The House version of the Magnitsky Act sails through by 365 to 43, but Perepilichnyy’s sudden and suspicious death puts a damper on Browder’s celebration.

He attends a performance of a play about Sergei’s death, then joins Tom Stoppard, former political prisoner Vladimir Bukovsky, and Bianca Jagger onstage for a panel discussion. Stoppard wrote a play about Bukovsky that helped get Bukovsky released; the consensus is that “after all this time almost nothing had changed in Russia” (350). Browder says “there is one small ray of light” (350), and announces the House vote. The audience leaps to its feet in applause.

Police are unresponsive to requests for information about Perepilichnyy; after a week, Browder goes to the media, telling them his informant may have been murdered: “The story ricocheted between every television station, radio show, and newspaper in the United Kingdom” (352). Police interview Browder’s team and promise a full toxicology report on the victim.

In December, the Senate version of the Magnitsky Act passes easily, 92 to 4.

Putin searches for a way to punish the US for the Magnitsky Act. He settles on “a law that would permanently ban the adoption of Russian children by American families” (357). This puts thousands of innocent Russian orphans in danger because most have medical conditions: “Some of these children wouldn’t survive without the medical care they would receive from their new American families” (358).

Blowback for Putin’s act comes not from America, but from Russia itself. The idea that some Russian children might now die does not sit well with the Russian people, including high-ranking government officials, some of whom protest publicly. The finance minister declares, “Logic of tit for tat is wrong because children will suffer”; the foreign minister says, “It is not right, and I am sure that eventually the Duma will make a balanced decision” (358).

Putin delivers his annual four-hour press conference in December 2012. He is inundated with questions about the orphans; his answers are vague and unconvincing. One western reporter suggests that the money stolen by the police could finance orphanages: “The hall erupted in applause. Putin was stunned […] the press was in open revolt” (360).

Angry, Putin replies that Sergei “was not a human rights activist but a lawyer for Mr. Browder, who is suspected by our law enforcement agencies of economic crimes in Russia” (360). This is the first time Putin has mentioned Browder by name; the implications are ominous.

The adoption ban is promptly passed. Journalists ask Browder if he feels responsible; he answers, “‘No, Putin is the one who is responsible. Only a coward would use defenseless children as human shields’” (361).

In January 2013, 50,000 protesters demonstrate against the adoption ban. Putin’s “aura of invincibility” is damaged (361). Browder writes, “What does a man like Putin do when he is humiliated? As we’d seen so many times before, he lashes out against the person who humiliated him. Ominously, that person was me” (362).

At the annual Davos conference in January 2013, Browder learns that Russian Prime Minister Medvedev has told an interviewer, “Yes, it’s a shame that Sergei Magnitsky died, and Bill Browder is running free and alive” (363). Browder writes, “I’d been threatened many times by people from Russia, but never by the prime minister” (364).

The Russians follow up by launching the long-promised trial against Browder, in absentia, and Sergei Magnitsky: “They were going to put the man they had killed on trial. […] Even Joseph Stalin […] never stooped to putting a dead man on trial” (364). The legal implications are unprecedented: “The last time a dead person had been prosecuted in Europe was in 897 CE” (364), when a pope was tried and convicted posthumously.

Russian state television NTV airs a documentary, “The Browder List,” that implicates Browder in everything from the theft of billions of dollars to the murder of Sergei.

The trial begins on March 11: “Every Western government, parliament, media outlet, and human rights organization viewed this as an appalling miscarriage of justice” (365). Browder guesses that Putin will present a conviction to other governments, asking, “How can you put a piece of legislation in place that is named after a criminal convicted in our court?” (366).

On April 22, the Russians issue an arrest warrant for Browder. The British government ignores the warrant. In mid-May, the Russians issue a Red Notice that directs Interpol to detain Browder for extradition to Russia. This means that “any time I crossed an international border, I could be arrested” (367). Browder is in Norway to give a speech; later at the airport, the border control officer merely glances at his passport and waves him onto the plane. When he arrives in Britain, border control—on orders to ignore the Interpol directive—lets him enter the country.

Browder is safe for now, but international travel will be dicey: “By putting out a Red Notice, they could effectively prevent me from traveling, and by not traveling, they were betting that they could stop Magnitsky sanctions from spreading to Europe” (368).

Browder issues a press release about his Red Notice; Interpol decides to meet to discuss what to do, as the agency “had a pattern of being abused by rogue nations such as Russia” (369).

On May 24, Interpol announces that is has rejected Russia’s Red Notice: “Interpol rarely rejected notices, and if they did, they never publicly announced them” (369).

In July, the Russian trial concludes. The verdict is read aloud: “When the judge was finished, Sergei and I had been found guilty of large-scale tax evasion, and I’d been sentenced to nine years in prison” (370).

For nearly a year after Sergei’s death, Browder bottles up his emotions: “I locked up my emotions so tightly that if there was any sign of their coming out, I would shut them down as quickly and as hard as I could” (371).

In October 2010, Browder attends a private screening of a Dutch documentary, Justice for Sergei. During the screening, Browder begins to cry, and soon he is sobbing. He asks to watch the film again, and he “cried some more. That was when the healing finally began” (373).

After the March 2013 Red Notice is rejected by Interpol, the Russians file a second time, and that, too, is rejected. In Britain, Karpov’s libel suit against Browder is thrown out.

More than once over the years, friends suggest to Browder that he halt his campaign for justice for Sergei because of the danger to himself and his family. They have a point. “Nothing upsets me more than the idea that my children could grow up without their father” (374). He does worry that his days may be numbered: “I have to assume that there is a very real chance that Putin or members of his regime will have me killed someday” (375). However, he thinks of Sergei’s heroism and decides to carry on: “Otherwise, the poison of not doing anything would eat me up from the inside” (375).

Already there are heavy costs. Browder writes that he “lost the business [he] so painstakingly built; [he] lost many ‘friends’ who distanced themselves from me […] [and he] lost the freedom to travel without the worry that he might be arrested […]” (375).

His old investment business gone, Browder is now a human-rights activist: “Yes, I could go back to my previous life. But now that I’ve seen this new world, I can’t imagine doing anything else” (376).

Browder moves Sergei’s widow, Natasha, and son, Nikita, to a “to a quiet suburb of London where Nikita was able to attend a prestigious private school and where Natasha could stop looking over her shoulder every day” (377).

In April 2014, Browder travels with them to the European Parliament to watch a vote for sanctions against the Magnitsky conspirators. A last-minute attempt by the Russians to scuttle the vote is defeated. Just before the vote, Browder and the Magnitskys are introduced, and all 751 European Parliament members rise and applaud: “Not polite applause, but real, thunderous applause, which carried on for nearly a minute […] I watched tears welling up in Natasha’s eyes” (379). The vote is carried unanimously.