Nicomachean Ethics

Aristotle focuses in this book on friendship, a virtue that he states is “most necessary for our life” (141). He suggests that friendship is needed by all individuals, wealthy or poor. Friends help guide and protect one another from falling into the hands of vice. They encourage one another to be the best versions of themselves. Aristotle asserts that friendship makes up the fabric of existence and the success of humans as a species.

He presents several thoughts on friendship, including the notion that humans tend to become friends with those who are most like them and the theory that friends who are similar tend to fight more often. The pursuit of friendship is about both goodness and pleasure. Having friends is pleasurable, but it also contributes to good.

Three types of friendship align with three types of love. The first type of love sustains friendships with intentions of the good and delivers respect to both parties. The second, “love for the sake of utility,” consists of friendships that are rooted in the benefits each person gains from them (143). The third, “love for the sake of pleasure” (143), consists of friendships that are based simply on enjoying another person’s company so long as it continues to be entertaining. These last two types center on the self; they are both based on what one gains from the friendship and are not as lasting as the first. They tend to dissolve when one or both people fail to receive the goods—pleasure, status—that the friendship was predicated upon. These types of incomplete friendships are not restricted to those who are bad or trend toward vice. All people enter incomplete friendships. However, good people or those who actively seek virtue are more likely to obtain complete friendships; they are more desirable as friends and more lovable.

A friendship bound in love is about helping one another to achieve good, or happiness. This is a lasting friendship. Aristotle also suggests that these types of friendships do not come around often; they require time and effort to build and maintain. Most people have only a few complete friendships. Those with many so-called friends have an abundance of the other two types of friendships. A friendship rooted in love for the other person is also built upon equality. It is mutually beneficial for both people in it, and both parties in the friendship regard each other with love and admiration. Friendships that rely upon hierarchal structures are disproportionate and, therefore, not examples of pure and complete friendships.

Aristotle proposes that complete friendships are more focused on giving love than on receiving it. Both people in the relationship are focused more on expressing love outwardly than on getting something from the other person. In this way, they are equal. This rejects the idea that people are friends only with those who are like them; Aristotle suggests that this is true only if the similarity is that of equal of feeling and virtue.

Communities are built upon friendships and could not exist without them, and all communities contribute to larger political communities. Both friendship and justice play substantial roles in communities and political systems. For example, a king may have a friendship of utility with his subjects; the relationship is mutually beneficial for both parties. Each has something to gain from the other. When this relationship stops being advantageous, the friendship of utility dissolves. This friendship can also survive only so long as justice remains in play. If justice is removed, the superiority that a king has over his subjects renders the relationship incapable of friendship.

Another type of community is the family. Parents love their children as an extension of themselves, and children love their parents as they get older and gain a better understanding of the world. Children then see their parents as the source of their life and well-being and love them for it. Just as in these other structures, there are varying types of friendships. Equality and hierarchal structures play a role in the types of friendships that emerge from family structures.

Aristotle closes the book by examining disputes in equal and unequal friendships. Friendships based on utility are prone to disagreements. Since both parties expect to receive something advantageous from the partnership, the possibility of discord is great as those balances fluctuate. These types of friendship always end badly. Complete friendships based on virtue do not have these problems with disproportion; since social or financial advancement is not the purpose of the relationship, no one is hurt or leaves the friendship when it doesn’t result in material gain. Hierarchal structures also contribute to disputes in friendships. One party may believe it is more deserving than the other, tipping the balance heavily to one side.

In this book, Aristotle continues his study of friendship and its contribution to good and happiness. He presents advice and analysis of friendships in which both parties seek different aims. For example, sometimes one person loves the other in pursuit of pleasure and desire, and the other loves for utility or monetary gain. Aristotle considers this imbalance as he also raises questions about the conflicts that arise within friendships. He acknowledges that friendships are riddled with exceptions. He exercises caution in attempting to create a code of ethics that can be applied universally to all people and all types of friendships. The imbalances in friendships are indicative of their complexity.

Often, friendships dissolve. It is not a surprise when this happens to incomplete friendships. Because they are built upon mutual advantages, they come apart at the seams when those advantages begin to be stripped away. Aristotle suggests that humans must be aware of the types of friendships they enter and never assume that they are experiencing complete friendships predicated upon love when the opposite is true. One of the puzzles Aristotle presents is what a person should do if their friend, who was once good and part of a complete friendship, becomes bad. He wonders whether one has an obligation to continue to commit to the friendship. He suggests that humans are responsible for trying to help their friends reconnect with good. It is only when the bad overcomes the good and the friend cannot be pulled away from the bad that the friendship should be dissolved.

Aristotle also explores the nature of self-love, or befriending oneself. Just as a complete friendship is centered on a desire to help the other achieve the most good, the relationship with the self should pursue the same. Aristotle calls the person who enters this kind of personal relationship an “excellent person” (167). This type of person enjoys spending time alone and finds satisfaction in memory. Later in the book, Aristotle questions whether one should love oneself and how this love diverges from selfishness. He denounces the notion that all self-love is a shameful act. The philosopher recognizes that certain types of self-love that are rooted in intemperance and incontinence are vices and devoid of justice. However, pure self-love that is focused on doing what is right is praiseworthy.

Aristotle then looks at the various features of friendship. Goodwill is a key component and is not the same thing as love. Instead, goodwill is the condition with which friendship begins. Even relationships of great passion, including erotic passion, must start with goodwill. It does not preface friendships that are based on utility or pleasure; goodwill undergirds only those that are founded upon love. Concord is another essential aspect of friendship and means more than merely having the same beliefs or similar views. In fact, those with dissimilar beliefs can still achieve harmony. Concord occurs when both parties act in ways that contribute to the desired effects of the friendship. Another feature of friendship is benevolence, as friendships are about mutual exchange.

The philosopher argues that friendships are vital to happiness. He disputes the argument that the person who achieves the highest level of good is no longer in need of friendships; this would be an unworthy punishment. Believing that a happy person is without a need for friendship implies that friendship is only about mutual benefit. In an earlier book, Aristotle suggests that happiness is about action: The happy person is engaged in constant activity of good. Friendships are essential to ensuring the continuity of this activity. When good people spend time together, goodness can thrive. Friendships of love, or complete friendships, are few. It would be unreasonable—and, perhaps, impossible—to pursue numerous friendships of love. They persist through various life experiences, good and bad. The excellent person who achieves happiness engages in rich and meaningful friendships with others. The excellent person also actively pursues a rich and meaningful friendship with the self. 

The focus of Book 10 is pleasure. Although humans are closer to the divine, they are also still animals, and animals are primarily preoccupied with matters of pleasure. Therefore, parents use pleasure and pain to instruct small children, whom Aristotle suggests are closer to states of animalia. It is wrong to look at pleasure and pain as either good or bad. Rather, each state informs whether the action is good or bad, and each can also play a role in the excesses of vice. Because pleasure and pain are both feelings, they cannot be rationally blamed for vice. Feelings are not quantifiable by facts.

Some philosophers argue that pleasure is good. It is the thing that all animals seek, and its enjoyment can be attributed to its goodness. This thought coincides with the belief that pain is purely bad, to be avoided at all opportunities. Aristotle presents a different view of pleasure and pain. He suggests that these arguments do not represent the many nuances of the two states. Pleasure and pain operate on a scale. Just as virtue is the mean and vice is the outlying extreme, pleasure and pain have a moderate effect that is good and an extreme effect that is bad. Pleasure and pain cannot be entirely good or entirely bad because they are not complete states of being in this way. They are, however, complete entities on their own.

Therefore, pleasure is not good, but it is a good. Aristotle argues that pleasure is more activity than it is feeling, state of being, virtue, or vice. Pleasure does not persist in humans because humans grow tired. No activity can last forever. It must reveal itself in cycles. Aristotle compares the concept of activity to life. He argues that life and pleasure are intrinsically linked. Humans seek pleasure because they seek to live; humans seek life because they seek pleasure.

Finally, Aristotle revisits the topic of happiness, the goal of human ambition. Happiness is not a state of being. Instead, it is the “character of actions that are in accord with virtue” (192). Although some may think that happiness is about the pursuit of pleasure, it is independent of entertainment. Happiness is good, the outcome of correct living. Aristotle considers it as being closer to activity than as a state. True happiness is achieved through understanding and truth.

Happiness and understanding distinguish humans from the animal world and characterize human divinity. Aristotle suggests that humans should endeavor to be as close to the divine as possible, to attempt to reach beyond mortality. This is done through virtue. Aristotle looks once more at the various virtues that contribute to happiness. He suggests happiness becomes complete in many of the virtues: in understanding, in study, in generosity. Study rises above the rest because it concerns itself with all the virtues and is the most divine. Aristotle ends as he began. He presents a summary of what is known based upon his own study and pursuit of knowledge and asks that the reader engage in a discussion and continue the work.