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Pete NelsonA modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
Chapter 3 establishes the geopolitical climate before and during the Second World War, particularly in the Pacific Theater. In 1937, the Japanese army occupied Chinese Manchuria and continued its militaristic advance through Northern China and French Indochina (modern Vietnam). Japanese expansionism threatened the colonies of other colonial powers, such as Hong Kong (then under British control), especially when Japan became allied with Italy and Germany to form the Axis powers.
Franklin D. Roosevelt, president of the United States, implemented diplomatic strategies in an attempt to curb Japan’s dangerous trajectory. American trade with Japan ceased, including the sale of American oil in 1941, which Japan’s military relied heavily upon. Japan viewed America’s navy as a threat to its imperialistic goals, describing America’s naval forces at Pearl Harbor as a “dagger pointed at our throats” (21). Japanese military strategists decided on a decisive and aggressive preemptive attack on America’s naval forces, which would then allow them to move into strategic areas of the Pacific. Given that Japan estimated America’s industries to have “ten times the production capacity of Japan,” Japan’s strategy was to establish powerful strongholds in key areas before America had time to recuperate and rebuild its navy (21).
In the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941, eight battleships were sunk or badly damaged, as well as three cruisers, three destroyers, two auxiliary ships, one mine layer and one target ship. 188 aircraft were destroyed and 159 more were damaged. Most terrible of all in the eyes of the American public, 2,330 American servicemen were killed and 1,347 wounded. Japan gained an early advantage by this offensive, but America regained the initiative at the Battle of Midway. This decisive and massive naval battle saw Japan lose four carriers, one cruiser, 322 planes and 3,500 men. These losses signified a loss of Japan’s “sense of invincibility” (22).
The USS Indianapolis was a heavy cruiser known for her speed and maneuverability since her hull was not protected with heavy armor. She was the flagship for Rear Admiral Raymond Spruance, commander of the US fifth fleet. The Indianapolis was involved as US forces captured the Marshall Islands, followed by Palau, Yap, Ulithi, and Woleai between 1944 and 1945. Each successful capture moved the US closer to the Japanese homelands. Japan continued to resist desperately as the US closed in on Iwo Jima and Okinawa, both of which could be used to launch an attack on the Japanese mainland. At this time, Japan began using suicide bombers known as “kamikazes” and crewed (suicide) torpedoes called “kaitens.” Nine men aboard the Indianapolis were killed when a kamikaze and associated armor-piercing bomb struck the ship on March 31st, 1945.
Operation Downfall, the code name of the invasion of Japan, was scheduled for late 1945 into 1946. Estimates predicted that one million US soldiers would die in the fall of 1946. American strategists had an alternative solution to force Japan to surrender: nuclear bombs. The Indianapolis was selected to deliver the components of the first nuclear bomb (later dubbed Little Boy) to the island of Tinian, where a B-29 aircraft (later dubbed the Enola Gay) would drop the bomb on the Japanese city of Hiroshima.
A few of the men aboard the Indianapolis are introduced. Seaman first class Robert McGuiggan, age 22, was a gunner’s mate from Chicago. Jack Miner, 18, was a radio technician. Mike Kuryla was a coxswain from Chicago who was involved in general ship maintenance and manning the 5-inch guns. Morgan Moseley was a ship’s cook. Ensign Harlan Twible, a new officer, was in charge of the aft guns from an observation point on the second gunnery control tower. Giles McCoy was a twenty-one-year-old marine who also served as McVay’s personal orderly, bodyguard and message runner.
The Indianapolis took on its cargo of the atomic bomb components on July 15th at Hunter’s Point, San Francisco, as well as 250 new crew members and a new supply of lifejackets. It set sail the next day, reaching Pearl Harbor in record-breaking time. After refueling, the Indianapolis continued to Tinian, where the atomic bomb components were unloaded. On July 26th Captain McVay was ordered onto Guam, which the ship reached the next day, to unload passengers. From Guam, McVay received orders to report to the island of Leyte in the Philippines, where his crew were to participate in ten days of gunnery training.
The port director at Guam, Commander Brooks, was out when McVay reported to the office for routing instructions, and McVay instead met with Lieutenant Joseph Waldron, the convoy and routing officer. Waldron recommended the standard ‘Peddie’ route (the most direct) to McVay, who was to travel at a speed of sixteen knots to save fuel. McVay requested a destroyer escort (equipped with sonar capabilities and anti-submarine technology), but was told that no escort would be needed. McVay’s routing instructions stated that the Commanding Officer may “depart from the prescribed routing” if “weather, currents or other navigational habits jeopardize the safety of the ship … Zigzag at discretion of Commanding Officer” (42). Zigzagging was a common tactic used to avoid submarine attack, although its utility was often debated.
The danger presented to McVay seemed low; the three possible submarine sightings in the last week were fairly standard. On the morning of departure, Admiral Spruance informed Captain McVay that he would not be boarding the Indianapolis. The ship departed at 9 in the morning on July 28th, and messages were transmitted to the Philippines Sea Frontier and to the Marianas area shipping control officer that it was due to arrive in Leyte at 8 in the morning on July 31st.
On the day the Indianapolis set sail there were further reports of periscopes spotted. An American anti-submarine group was deployed to investigate. The night of July 29th was a hot night, and many doors and hatches below were opened. McVay noted before he retired to bed that the night was dark and the sea was choppy, hindering possible sightings of the Indianapolis by enemy ships, submarines, and planes. He therefore decided that the ship could sail straight on the Peddie route instead of zigzagging. To compensate for the heightened risk of traveling the Peddie route, McVay sped the Indianapolis up to 17 knots. He instructed his officers on watch to wake him with any changes.
The i-58 Japanese submarine, captained by Mochitsura Hashimoto, was waiting on the Peddie route between Guam and Leyte. The i-58 was one of only four attack submarines left in the Japanese navy, which had been devastatingly depleted. Captain Hashimoto had not been performing well in his role and was anxious to come across an enemy ship. When a potential ship was detected via the hydrophones aboard the i-58, Captain Hashimoto surfaced to scan the horizon: He saw a “black dot on the horizon,” silhouetted briefly by the moon (51).
Hashimoto moved into position and waited until the Indianapolis moved closer; at 11:54 pm he fired six torpedoes in a fan pattern of three degrees. Looking through the telescope, Hashimoto saw two explosions aboard the ship.
On the Indianapolis, Kuryla had just finished his watch and was lying down to nap when suddenly “his whole body stung” with the force of the impact of the first torpedo (53). The second one flung him into the air. Meanwhile, Miner was sleeping at the backup command center. Moseley was in bed when the first explosion knocked him onto the ground. Twible, having just finished his shift at the watch station at midnight, was merely knocked off the ladder he was descending by the first explosion. McCoy was two levels below deck at the back of the boat guarding the brig, the prison on the ship, where there were two prisoners. He was slammed into the bulkhead by the force of the second torpedo, and all of the lights went out. McVay was thrown out of bed and hurried to the bridge, where he ordered a distress signal.
The first torpedo had ripped off the first 30-60 feet of the ship; the second had blown a 40-foot hole in the mid-ship. All communications between parts of the ship were lost. The engines continued to propel the ship forward, filling the bulkheads with water. McVay initially hoped to save the ship, but soon after gave the order to abandon ship. Neither radio room could be phoned from the bridge, so the message to send a distress signal was delivered by men who ran to radio rooms I and II. The technicians at each room sent SOS distress messages in morse code with the ship’s latitude and longitude position as the ship continued to “list,” or tilt.
Kuryla was on the deck trying to free a whaleboat when the ship rolled on top of him. Overall, 12 lifeboats and two whale boats were freed. Kurla managed to swim to the surface and found a raft. Moseley managed to open a hatch on the side of the ship as it listed. He tried to help a young boy, but he was knocked back down the hatch. Moseley climbed out and jumped into the water. Twible tried to direct men towards the low side—the bow—rather than the high side—the stern —which was rising rapidly as the boat sank. He and a group of men found rafts and floater nets; Twible ordered the injured to be put onto the rafts.
After the torpedoes, McCoy released prisoners from the brig and was helping injured men from underneath destroyed bunks when he heard the command: “dogging the hatches” (63). McCoy was the last out before the hatch behind him was “dogged” (sealed) with steel pins; he heard people screaming and begging behind him. McCoy walked down the side of the ship and jumped into the water and was afterwards pulled aboard a raft. Captain McVay was washed off the side of the ship and watched from the water as the ship disappeared. In only 12 minutes, the ship had sunk, killing 300 men, and leaving the remaining 880 in the water.
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 foreshadow the tragic sinking of the USS Indianapolis by exploring Japan’s increasing desperation and by establishing the technological and human errors which led to the cruiser being torpedoed. In Chapter 3, Nelson describes the growing power of Japan in the Pacific region and alludes to the bloody war which ensnared US forces stationed in the Pacific. Nelson explains that Japan's expansionist policies posed a threat to American stability in the Pacific. This growing threat was confirmed in Japan’s aggressive attack on America’s naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The attack triggered America’s participation in the war.
Foreshadowing is present in Chapter 3, which describes how the USS Indianapolis was renowned for its speed and maneuverability due to a lack of heavy armor on her hull. This information on the composition of the ship foreshadows the devastation caused by the two Japanese torpedoes which struck on July 30th, 1945. The drawback of the absence of heavy armor is that the cruiser was left “vulnerable to attacks from mines and torpedoes” (23).
Furthermore, Nelson establishes that the cruiser was the flagship for Rear Admiral Raymond Spruance. This flagship status meant that Spruance often requested rerouting the Indianapolis from plotted routes for missions which were often last-minute and classified. Her flagship status was one reason that the alarm was not raised when the Indianapolis did not reach her intended destination in the Philippines, as it was assumed that the ship was on one of Spruance’s missions (even though Spruance decided at the last minute to not board the vessel at Guam).
Nelson describes Japan’s growing desperation as the tide of the war began to turn. Japan won “too much too fast,” and struggled to retain control of the areas of the Pacific which it had captured (22). By 1945, not only had Japan lost much of what it had won, it had also started losing control of islands which had been in Japanese control before the expansionist policies of the 1930s and 1940s. The war effort was “looking hopeless” for Japan (50). Nelson effectively establishes that Japan, initially desperate to expand and to establish itself as a world power, was now at risk of losing everything.
Japan’s immense losses at the Battle of Midway and its subsequent losses of the Marshall Islands and Palau, Yap, Ulithi, and Woleai between 1944 and 1945 foreshadow Captain Hashimoto’s desperation in trying to regain an advantage over the American navy at any cost, as well as his determination to sink the Indianapolis when it came into his sights just before midnight on the 29th of July 1945. Hashimoto’s personal record as a captain was “less than stellar” (50). The misfire of two kaitens (suicide submarines) fired by Hashimoto was not only a further blow to Japan’s dwindling supply of naval weaponry but also meant the pointless deaths of the two Japanese kaiten pilots. Hashimoto, lying in wait along the Peddie route between Guam and the Philippines, was therefore highly motivated to achieve a successful attack on a US vessel.
Information in Chapter 5 that the hatches throughout the ship had been left open for ventilation alludes to the mere 12 minutes which the ship took to sink, despite the efforts to dog hatches in order to slow the ship’s sinking. Suspense is further built for the ship’s imminent tragedy when Captain McVay instructs officers to cease zigzagging as he retires to bed in the mistaken belief that the risk of attack is fairly negligible. A sense of foreboding is created as the moon appears from behind the clouds, perfectly silhouetting the USS Indianapolis to Captain Hashimoto, who begins to prepare torpedoes and kaitens.
The estimated casualties from Operation Downfall (1 million US troops) alludes to the importance of the Indianapolis’s job in delivering the components of the first atomic bomb, which would later be dropped on Hiroshima. The Indianapolis's delivery of these components led to the Japanese surrender which, although causing immense loss of life and tragedy at Hiroshima, undoubtedly saved many lives of US troops poised to participate in a bloody and desperate war on the Japanese mainland.
Captain McVay’s selection for the sensitive and vital mission of delivering the components of the first atomic bomb is also significant. His later representation by the US navy as an irresponsible captain is contradicted by their choice to select him to transport this precious cargo. The authorities told McVay that “every day he saved” by sailing at flank speed (as fast as possible), “would cut the length of the war by that much” (31). As Nelson points out, “that the navy trusted Captain McVay with it [the atomic bomb components] indicated that they held him in high regard” (31).