The History of Sexuality: Volume 1

Foucault considers why his questions need to be studied. Contemporary Western society, Foucault claims, was not built solely upon a foundation of political or bourgeois repression. Psychoanalysis supports this position by showing how power and desire cannot be separated from one another or from the individual. Foucault identifies what he calls the “juridico-discursive” model of power. A corollary of the repressive hypothesis, the juridico-discursive model sees power as always negative, acting on the individual from the outside, seeking to erase and forbid.

This model of power is deeply ingrained in Western culture. Foucault outlines its five principal features. First, the relationship between power and sex is always viewed as negative. Second, power must define and rank sex through law. Sex is placed into a binary system of good and bad, allowed and forbidden. Third, the only weapon power wields is prohibition with the threat of discipline. Fourth, this model relies on power’s use of censorship to practice avoidance, ignorance, and embargo. Finally, power is reproduced at every level in a hierarchy. The juridical conception of power, according to Foucault, is highly limited and does not reflect the vastness and diversity of the discourse surrounding sex and sexuality in contemporary Western society.

Foucault suggests that the reason the repressive hypothesis has been so widely accepted for so long is that “power is tolerable only on condition that it mask a substantial part of itself” (86). Power can hide the full breadth of its influence because it requires secrecy. This confidentiality is mutually beneficial: It helps to conceal the complex functioning of power while offering a small amount of freedom to those under its influence. Foucault challenges the juridico-discursive model by arguing that freedom itself is a mechanism used by power. Rather than working only through prohibition and repression, power strategically uses liberty to advance its own ends. The monarchy uses law to exert power, but Foucault rejects the view that power is only pointed downward or is reproduced consistently throughout the hierarchical class system. The monarchy needs secrecy to cover up the truth. A study of power must be immune from a fundamental belief in the law as the moral and ethical standard. Foucault narrows his focus to the various mechanisms used by power to gain access to individual truth about sex and govern individual sexuality. 

Foucault seeks to understand the relationship between knowledge and power, but first he must define what he means by “power.” Instead of representing a particular group or political system, Foucault refers to power as a pervasive, living body that evolves and shifts over time. A conception of power that is only tied to the state has a definitive end, whereas the power of Foucault’s study is unending. The law and control exhibited by the state are merely reflections of power throughout the social body. Power is reproduced in every relationship and every point of human life.

Foucault presents a layered proposition on the nature of power. First, power is not something that can be possessed. Everyone exercises power, and the exercise of power is complex and intricate. Second, power is productive. In any relationship, power serves a function. Third, power does not come from the top down. Foucault rejects the idea that power is only exerted from those at the top; even the monarchy is subject to the power of the proletariat. Power moves vertically, horizontally, diagonally, and all around. Fourth, power has a purpose. It is always exerted with a specific objective in mind. Fifth, “where there is power, there is resistance” (95). The relationships developed by power are complex, and they rely on levels of resistance. However, these points of rebellion are widespread and isolated rather than singular, sweeping movements.

Foucault seeks to discover the types of power relationships contributing to sexual discourse around children’s and women’s bodies and how the discourse supports power relationships. Foucault details four rules that uphold power relationships. The first is the rule of immanence. This rule suggests that there is a distinct relationship between knowledge and power. The discourses that emerge from power’s use of knowledge are mainly concerned with control of the body. The second is the rule of continual variations. This means that power does not always manifest in the traditional forms outlined by cultural norms. There will always be shifts and changes to the power-knowledge relationship. The third is the rule of double conditioning. Foucault has already established that power is pervasive. Local centers of power are related to larger strategies of power; each contributes to the other. For example, a father in the family is a local center of power. He does not enact his power as a reflection of the sovereign state’s power. Instead, he is a pawn for the larger strategy, and his contribution to the grand narrative endows him with a small amount of power within his insular family.

The final rule is the rule of the tactical polyvalence of discourses. By “discourse,” Foucault means “the complex and unstable process” by which knowledge and meaning are produced within social systems (101). Discourse is the connecting link between power and knowledge; however, like the rule of continual variations, discourse comes in many forms and manifests itself in different ways. It can be used to solidify the relationship between power and knowledge, but it can also be used to undermine power structures. One example of this is the historical discourse surrounding partnerships between two members of the same sex. A discourse that was intended to place restrictions on relationships between members of the same sex brought more power to that which was being prohibited. All power must be questioned on two levels. First, power must be examined for its reciprocal effects. Second, people must ask what relationships contribute to and uphold systems of power.

Foucault opens this chapter by claiming that sexuality is an instrument of power. He disagrees with the notion that sexuality is something that an individual possesses independent of larger structures of power. Instead, sexuality is a form of power exertion and is an extremely useful tool in power relations. While history may seem to point to an exertion of power centered on prohibiting sex in relationships between members of the same sex with the purpose of reproduction, the many manifestations of power have always produced a discourse more complicated than this simple prohibition. Foucault outlines four strategies that increased the prevalence of the knowledge-power relationship.

The first strategy is the hysterization of women’s bodies. Foucault describes this as a three-part process. The female body, considered to be merely a vehicle for sexuality, is assigned a value. It is placed under the care of medical practice before being relegated to the family unit. There, the female body’s sole purpose is the creation and care of children; any emotion from a woman is considered a negative outcome of her nervousness. The second strategy is the pedagogization of children’s sex. Foucault argues that all children participate in sexual activity. Pedagogization strips them of their sexuality and categorizes them pre-sexual beings. This requires a collective effort of restriction and monitoring by the child’s community. The third strategy is the socialization of procreative behavior. The reproduction of couples moves from an insular concern to an economic one. Sex becomes the domain of the social body. The fourth strategy is a psychiatrization of “perverse” pleasure. Individual sexual desires and instincts are assigned to the medical field. These instincts are rooted out, and a treatment course intended to return the patient to normalization is enacted. The purpose of these strategies, Foucault argues, is not to restrict sex. Instead, they serve to form and shape sexuality. The repressive hypothesis relies upon the deployment of alliance—the use of marriage to contribute to the power-knowledge relationship. This strategy is difficult to manage and failed to keep up with the complex economic demands after the 18th century. Therefore, power began to deploy rather than repress sexuality.

Foucault offers four hypotheses concerning the deployment of sexuality:

[S]exuality is tied to recent devices of power; it has been expanding at an increasing rate since the seventeenth century; the arrangement that has sustained it is not governed by reproduction; it has been linked from the outset with an intensification of the body (107).

These hypotheses are in direct contrast to the repressive hypothesis. The basis for the deployment of sexuality was the use of penance and religious oversight. The family unit became the hub for the deployment of sexuality. The female body was put under review, and births were highly regulated. Families became a source of research for scientists and psychologists, and various perversions were defined, including the frigid wife or the hysterical woman. Power was enacted within the family to source sexual perversions and seek the advice of experts. Patients were then separated from the family unit, ostracized in the name of science. Sexuality was removed from the system of alliance. Sexuality was not functional to marital sex. All these elements of sexuality after the 17th century form the strategies of power.

Foucault argues that the modern history of sexuality presents two major ruptures. The first occurred in the 17th century with the rise of puritanical prohibitions. This period cast a spotlight on the marital bed, emphasizing decency, silence, and the covering of the female body. The second rupture occurred in the 20th century with the sexual liberation movement. This period showed a shift from sexual taboos to acceptance or tolerance. Foucault argues that the origin of these ruptures traces back to medieval Christianity. Simultaneous to the rise of religious ordinances placed upon sex was a secular interest in the topic. Medicine, education, and economics—which Foucault refers to as technologies—all played a role in the development of sex as a state and secular concern. These forces targeted children especially: “Thus the ‘sin of youth,’ ‘nervous disorders,’ and ‘frauds against procreation’ (as those ‘deadly secrets’ were later to be called) designate three privileged areas of this new technology” (117). The development of perversions and venereal diseases attached a moral responsibility to the control of sex. Psychiatry developed as a field for the extraction of knowledge and established itself as the mechanism for handling “sexual degeneracy.” This began the clinical takeover of sex, separating it from its companion, pleasure.

The combination of all these fields and mechanisms for exerting power over sex refutes the repressive hypothesis. Rather than repressing sexuality, Foucault asserts, multiple fields and manifestations of power contributed to the innovative production of sexuality. While a historical lens may reveal the apparent direction of power over lower classes, Foucault argues that the exertion of power over sex began in the wealthier classes. Aristocratic families became the epicenter for the repression of child sexuality and the medicalization of female sexuality. This was because aristocratic society placed value on itself above all others. The “idle” woman was seen as the antithesis of the longevity of the upper class’s success. Concepts like the “nervous” woman and the “hysterical” woman were born from this assumption. Children were monitored at every moment by servants and governesses. The emphasis on sexual health and scrutiny was an avenue for ensuring the advancement of the bourgeoisie.

The spread of power over sex was slow in the working class. Laborer families had little interest in the religious patrol of sex. The takeover occurred in three stages. First, the introduction of birth control turned sex into something that could be controlled and managed. Second, the 19th century saw the rise and refinement of what was termed the “conventional” family. This unit could be manipulated to support the upper class. A cultural focus on developing the morality of the lower classes created a precedent for the exertion of power. Third, at the end of the 19th century, the medicalization of sex presented the opportunity to advance societal aims. Foucault notes that while these stages represent larger cultural trends, they are not indicative of how power functioned in every instance.

Foucault explains that this chronological explanation of contemporary history refutes the repressive hypothesis. The strongest piece of evidence is that the ruling classes first exerted power over themselves before it spread to the working classes. Instead of a repressive entity, power intensified the sexual relationship of the aristocratic caste. Power was about longevity rather than destruction. Foucault refers to this as the “autosexualization” of the body. Aristocrats medicalized sex to support their own fragile control. The increased focus on heredity and genealogy shows how sex was tied to the preservation of aristocratic power. The upper classes grew obsessed with the localization of power through sex. Meanwhile, interest in the bodies of the lower classes was slow to develop. It was only when capital gain could be extracted from the health of the lower classes that power over the body began to spread to the proletariat.