Civilization: The West and the Rest

The final chapter of this book examines attitudes toward work and Max Weber’s concept of the Protestant work ethic as the sources of the West’s rise and preeminence. Ferguson reiterates his assertion that the West began to emerge around 1500 and remained “the dominant civilization of the world” even in the late 1990s as evident by numerous criteria—from universities to manufacturing (256). Within the West, it was the United States that remained the sole superpower after the Cold War. The author suggests that “it was a very specific form of Christianity,” Protestantism, one that emerged in Europe in the Early Modern period, that became “the sixth of its key advantages over the rest of the world” (259). He goes even further to argue that while religiosity declined in Europe in the latter part of the 20th century, the US continues to be a religious country. The latter is, in part, responsible for its elevated status in the international arena.

German sociologist Max Weber’s visit to the United States in the early 1900s made him wonder what “could possibly explain the dynamism of this society” (260). Writing his “The Protestant Work Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism” essay, Weber explained American successes through the Protestant work ethic—one of the “unintended consequences of the Protestant Reformation” (260). It was this work ethic that was linked to bourgeois capitalism. Ferguson argues that “Weber was onto something” but identifies some of the problems within (262). For instance, Weber did not sufficiently account for the successes of Catholic businessmen in Belgium and France or the successes of the European Jews.

The author identifies a relationship between Protestantism, literacy, and education—”work ethic and word ethic” as one of the key factors of the West’s success (256). He argues that “Protestantism made the West not only work, but also save and read” (264). Ferguson considers religions important to the makeup of each civilization as Confucian thinking was in imperial China.

Next, he explores the decline of work hours in Europe as compared to America and Asian countries. Entering the labor market late and longer holidays are just some of the reasons for fewer working hours in Europe. He writes: “The striking thing is that the transatlantic divergence in working patterns has coincided almost exactly with a comparable divergence in religiosity” (266). In America, the latter remained roughly the same, whereas in Europe it substantially declined. Even Britain has gotten de-Christianized, which is a “relatively recent phenomenon” (268). Some have explained this phenomenon by using Sigmund Freud’s theories from Civilization and its Discontents. Others suggested that the 1960s gave rise to hedonism, atheism, and other “anti-civilizational” trends.

Ferguson argues that the loss of faith has a more complex answer than the 1960s counterculture. After all, the US has the same cultural features, but statistics show that it continues to be a religious society. He divides the West into two: “a godless Europe” and a “God-fearing America” (273). One explanation, in his view, is the “fierce competition for souls” in the US (274). There are dozens of Christian denominations and countless churches. Some of the most successful variants “flourish precisely because they have developed a kind of consumer Christianity that verges on Wal-Mart worship” (275).

Ferguson also outlines the way in which Protestantism spread to China. Some estimates suggest that their numbers exceed those in Europe. 19th-century British missions to China sometimes met “unintended consequences,” such as threats to punish Christian missions by death because they encourage rebellion. Other times, it was the anti-foreigner sentiments of the Boxer Rebellion. In the early 21st century, Ferguson identifies one particular city, Wenzhou, which, in his view, features not only more than a thousand churches but also the Western work ethic and the “spirit of capitalism” (284). Some Chinese academics believe that Christianity has played “a very decisive role in people’s acceptance of pluralism in society and politics in the contemporary West” (287).

Ferguson believes that the vacuum left by the decline of the Christian faith in Europe not only led to the rise of “post-modern cults,” but also left a vacuum (289). In his view, this vacuum may be filled by other religions such as Islam, since Muslims comprise an important immigrant group. The author also fears that, if immigrants are unassimilated, they “become prey to radical ideologues, the consequences of which can be profoundly destabilizing” (289). He provides examples of young Muslim men who became radicalized and turned to suicide bombings in London in 2005.

At the end of the chapter, Ferguson asks an overarching question: Can Western civilization dissolve as suddenly as did Rome? He wonders whether climate change is one of the factors that would play a key role in such a collapse. Ultimately, he links the fear of civilizational collapse with the human awareness of mortality, but he suggests that fatalism is premature.