Civilization: The West and the Rest

Shortly following the 2003 invasion of Iraq led by the United States, Ferguson publicly described himself as “a fully paid-up member of the neo-imperialist gang” (“Niall Ferguson: admirable historian, or imperial mischief maker?“ The Guardian, 18 June 2012). That same year, his book, Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World, was published. Throughout his career, Ferguson has consistently praised the Western imperialist project as a key vehicle behind the spread of civilization around the world. It is this type of thinking that underpins Civilization: The West and the Rest. From the onset, the subtitle of this book engages in Othering and sets up an “us versus them” dynamic by labeling the diverse civilizations outside the West as “the Rest.” The author maintains this dynamic throughout this study because he considers Western global domination to be an important factor in its internal success and cohesion. This domination generally occurred by using economic (mercantilist, then capitalist) and military means and, later, soft power.

However, there are other criteria that can make a civilization successful, such as longevity. China claims to have 5,000 years of uninterrupted history, which makes it a success in this category. The Inca Empire is viewed by some anthropologists as an impressive imperial state, yet it achieved its status without a written language, iron, or even a wheel. In other words, there are legitimate challenges to Ferguson’s conception of success throughout the historical record.

Ferguson’s definition of “Western civilization” also requires further scrutiny. His West from around the 16th century comprises Western Europe and, later, North America. This definition generally coincides with different civilizational theories forming this grouping, for instance, based on the common Western Christian traditions. However, Ferguson also calls the Early Modern West, ”West 2.0.” In his view, the original West not only included ancient Greece and Rome but also ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia:

Finally, it is worth remembering that Western civilization has declined and fallen once before. The Roman ruins scattered all over Europe, North Africa and the Near East serve as potent reminders of that. The first version of the West— Western Civilization 1.0—arose in the so-called Fertile Crescent stretching from the Nile Valley to the confluence of the Euphrates and the Tigris, and reached its twin peaks with Athenian democracy and the Roman Empire (16).

Apart from the fact that these were advanced civilizations of their time, Ferguson refrains from explaining his reasoning for turning these separate groupings into the “West 1.0.” Typically, ancient Egypt and the different Mesopotamian civilizations (Sumerian, Akkadian, Babylonian, Assyrian) are considered to be civilizations in their own right. Also worth considering is that he portrays this text as a comparative study yet provides little criteria for selecting other civilizations (i.e., “the Rest”). Moreover, he uses one-to-one comparisons that fit his narrative, forgoing larger comparative samples. Throughout the book, he frames arguments using the context that best supports his claims and ignores or downplays others.

Ferguson considers it a sign of Western superiority that his six “killer apps” are exportable abroad. At the same time, he laments when a non-Western country “borrows” one “killer app,” such as science, but not the others. It is a form of veiled neoliberal supremacy to assume that only Western institutions, economic systems, and cultural expressions should be implemented around the world. It is precisely this type of homogeneity that Western consumer culture brings that seems to surprise Ferguson in Chapter 5.

Periodically, Ferguson appears to use this book to make populist statements about contemporary political issues. He disparages immigrants of non-European descent coming to Europe because some fail to assimilate. However, he refrains from examining the behavior of powerful Western countries engaging in wars of aggression and destabilizing the Middle East and North Africa in the early 21st century which have contributed to the recent waves of refugees. Ferguson also claims to not subscribe to Samuel Huntington’s clash-of-civilization thesis. However, at times, he portrays the relationship between the West and Muslim states as one of strictly sectarian conflict since the Medieval Crusades rather than distinct conflicts with specific and complex geopolitical causes.

Ferguson’s target audience appears to be high-school and college students since he relies on the buzzy term “killer apps” that might appeal to this tech-savvy demographic. However, he glosses over important nuances that readers in this age group would likely find of great interest. The question of the rise and fall of civilizations—and their classification—is a complex one worth investigating. However, it is important to be mindful of the author’s approach and motivations when reading this study.