Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex

Butler engages with the notions of the penis and phallus as a way of deconstructing the relationship between matter and discourse. They take up this distinction through Sigmund Freud’s and Jacques Lacan’s works. Freud’s theory of penis envy posits that girls recognize their lack of a penis and desire to possess one, considering it a source of power. Lacan, building upon Freud, introduces the symbolic dimension of the phallus as a signifier of lack and a central concept in the formation of subjectivity. In Lacanian psychoanalysis, the penis refers to the biological organ, while the phallus is a symbolic concept representing “lack” and desire within the symbolic order.

Butler accepts the link between the penis and the phallus but argues that this link does not imply the fact that the two notions are the same thing. Rather, Butler argues that it is precisely because the phallus is a symbol that it does not represent the penis fully. To make the distinction between the two notions clearer and disrupt the masculinist focus on the phallus as representative of male authority, Butler introduces the concept of the lesbian phallus. This concept severs the traditional association between the phallus and masculinity, suggesting that the symbolic phallus is not exclusively tied to the penis. Butler’s idea of the lesbian phallus is a metaphorical concept that questions the binary and fixed associations between gender and desire. It challenges the assumption that the phallus is inherently male and that female desire is always marked by lack or penis envy.

Butler argues that the phallus is a transferable notion, and its transferability means that it is not an essentially masculine symbol. The lesbian phallus represents a way of rethinking desire and pleasure beyond the traditional male-centric model. This implies that the symbolic phallus, as a signifier of lack and desire, is not confined to male anatomy but can be reconfigured and appropriated in diverse ways.

Central to Butler’s argument in Bodies That Matter is the idea that identity is not a fixed essence but a series of repeated actions that contribute to the stabilization of social categories. Identities are not given to the individual. Rather, identities are constantly formed and reiterated over time. In this understanding of identification, performativity is not a passive replication of predefined social norms but an active and ongoing process through which individuals enact and embody gender roles. This performative aspect becomes crucial in understanding how identification is not a straightforward reflection of preexisting identities but a continuous process.

In the context of performativity, identification involves the repetition of acts that align with socially recognized norms. Individuals engage in performative acts that adhere to established gender scripts, contributing to the formation of recognizable gender identities. However, Butler complicates this process by highlighting its contingent nature—identifications are not fixed but subject to change and contestation. Moreover, performativity challenges the idea of a stable, unified subject behind these acts of identification. Instead of assuming a coherent and self-identical subject, Butler argues that the subject is the result of repeated acts of naming and identification. This means that identity is not a foundational essence but a product of the ongoing, performative practices that individuals engage in.

In the realm of gender, these performative acts often involve conforming to societal expectations associated with masculinity or femininity. The notions of performativity and identification challenge the fixed understanding of sex as a biological fact with which one is born. Butler challenges the very idea of matter as the foundation for the articulation of sex and gender. They argue, instead, that sex, as well as gender and other categories of identification, are performatively formed by repeated acts of iteration, as they argue in the following quote:

In the first instance, performativity must be understood not as a singular or deliberate ‘act,’ but, rather, as the reiterative and citational practice by which discourse produces the effects that it names. What will, I hope, become clear […] is that the regulatory norms of “sex” work in a performative fashion to constitute the materiality of bodies and, more specifically, to materialize the body’s sex, to materialize sexual difference in the service of the consolidation of the heterosexual imperative (xii).

Butler goes beyond the fixed understanding of sex and gender and introduces the idea of subversive performances. These are acts that disrupt or defy normative gender expectations, revealing the constructed and arbitrary nature of those norms. The performative acts of identification, then, can be both conforming and subversive, offering a nuanced understanding of how individuals navigate and negotiate gender norms.