Being And Time

As is clear from Chapters 5 and 6, Dasein does not just stand in a relation to its own temporality. It exists in relation to the temporality of a wider human community. Just as I must contend with my own past, in which I have lived a given way, and a future which I am in the process of becoming, so, too, with the group. My life is oriented towards constellations of others, and a society, and this society has a definitive and evolving past, and a future, in which certain human possibilities become either enhanced or restricted. Indeed, one is not possible without the other. Consider France in July of 1940. The possibilities for you of collaborating with the German occupation or of resisting it only make sense, and exist at all, because of the particular way history has unfolded at that moment. So, the converse is true. That there is a human history in which the Second World War came about in the first place is intelligible only because of the possibilities that countless Dasein chose to actualize.

All of this does not seem especially controversial. That Dasein’s existence as possibility is always situated in, and therefore must always take account of, the future of groups of others and what we call history, seems to follow naturally from what was said in previous chapters. Nor is it surprising that Heidegger should want to emphasize this point, kept until now in parentheses, in the context of a broader discussion of temporality. What is controversial is the relation authenticity plays to all this. Heidegger claims, regarding this, that “Dasein’s fateful destiny in and with its ‘generation’ goes to make up the full authentic historizing of Dasein” (436). In other words, it is not just that we must have a relation to peoples, to groups, and to history. Nor is just that authenticity can only take place within such a context, and by recognizing it. It is, rather, or additionally, that we must embrace and become part of the “destiny” of a group, “in communicating and struggling” alongside it (436). This is not one possible route to authenticity either; for Heidegger, it the ultimate path to authenticity, a necessary condition for any “fully” authentic life.

But why? Even if we adopted the weaker version of the claim, that authenticity is compatible with becoming part of the struggles and “destiny” of a group rather than requiring it, problems still abound. For one thing, who exactly are this group? Heidegger refers to “a community” and “a people” (436), but it is unclear to what these terms refer. If it is a national group, such as “the Germans” or “the Scottish,” then he seems to be venturing into the realms of nationalistic myth. We cannot, in any concretely meaningful or literal way, communicate with or struggle alongside such a vast and differentiated group of Dasein. On the other hand, if a “community” is an actual group of people with whom we have a possible relation, in the way one talks of a “local community,” it is hard to see what sense can be made of “destiny”. A concrete community may have, at times, a shared purpose, but this tends to be localized and limited. Its actual destiny, understood in any more significant sense, is a function of broader historical forces over which it has little or no influence.

That said, one might appeal to a certain argument about “culture” to defend Heidegger here. Something like what Nietzsche says in The Birth of Tragedy (1872) could be applied. Put very briefly, this would consist of two main elements. First, we might say that a truly authentic life can only emerge from a truly authentic culture. In fact, this coincides with a claim Heidegger makes about the they. This is that: “The extent to which its dominion becomes compelling and explicit may change in the course of history” (167). This suggests that our capacity for full authenticity is dependent on living in a culture that at least permits this as a possibility. The second element is more problematic. Since the goal is authenticity, to live the most authentic life possible would mean to struggle for a culture or society in which authenticity stands the best chance of flourishing. For Nietzsche in The Birth of Tragedy, this meant striving for a rebirth of German culture through the promotion of a new “tragic” artform. For Heidegger it could mean struggling for a society in which the organs of the they were controlled and tamed. For example, this might be achieved by collective efforts to limit the influence of newspapers, television, and mass culture.

However, there are also obvious issues with this. First, even assuming such a position could be attributed to Heidegger, the second claim does not seem to follow necessarily from the first. To be authentic does not automatically mean working for the potential authenticity of others, even if this is possible. This would be analogous to Sartre’s argument in Existentialism is a Humanism (1946), that to realize one’s being as free one must pursue the freedom of others. More significantly, the two claims might be said to be in conflict. This highlights a deeper worry with Heidegger’s discussion of history and authenticity. That is, to work towards a collective goal, in this case possible authenticity in a better society, seems still to involve a possibility that is not mine. The collective endeavor and striving required to enact any meaningful social change involve a sacrifice in authenticity—one that a reader invested in the values of Being and Time might be unwilling to make.