Anarchy, State and Utopia

Political Philosophy

Nozick’s first chapter starts by questioning the necessity of a state. He considers the anarchist alternative of a non-state situation and suggests exploring a “state of nature”—the hypothetical idea of how people lived before creating societies—to understand the implications of a world without a government. This examination, he argues, is crucial for determining whether a state is morally justifiable or if an anarchic situation, in which people generally act morally, could be better. The chapter emphasizes the role of moral philosophy—rights and wrongs as determined by a culture—in setting the boundaries for political philosophy and the legitimacy of state power.

Explanatory Political Theory

Nozick identifies three possible perspectives when viewing politics: as related to the non-political, as originating from the non-political but not reducible to it, and as an autonomous realm. He argues that the first approach offers the most comprehensive understanding. Thus, he proposes to start with a non-political situation and show how a political situation would emerge from it.

Nozick relates the non-political situation to state-of-nature theories. Nozick argues that state-of-nature theories provide insight into human morality outside of the state, even if these theories are not factually accurate. Nozick identifies three types of potential explanations: fact-defective explanations, which rely on false starting conditions; law-defective explanations, which rely on false law-like statements; and fundamental potential explanations, which are not necessarily correct but remain informative for understanding a realm. Nozick argues that state-of-nature theories are fundamental potential explanations and have great explanatory potential.

Thus, state-of-nature theories help examine how states arise and why they might differ from theoretical models. This approach follows the tradition of John Locke, although Nozick claims that Locke’s explanation of the law of nature in his Second Treatise is insufficient.

In the beginning of Chapter 2, Nozick discusses John Locke’s state of nature, in which individuals have total freedom of action and decision if they abide by the law of nature. The law of nature prohibits harming others in their “life, health, liberty, or possessions” (10).

However, individuals do sometimes transgress the law of nature, which leads to self-defense and punishment. Nozick underlines the limitations of this state, such as inadequate natural law for all situations, biased personal judgment, disproportionate retribution, and endless feuds.

Protective Associations

In this section, Nozick imagines how issues within a state of nature can be addressed. As an example, he uses the formation of groups of individuals who enforce their rights and protect themselves. Such groups lead to the formation of mutual-protection associations, and these formations face challenges, for example, in their availability for defense. There is also the risk of members of the protective associations abusing their power. Nozick notes that protective services can become specialized and commercialized, offering protection as a service for a fee.

Some individuals may seek arbitration outside the system of protection associations, which can lead back to state-run legal systems. However, Nozick claims that a state-run legal system limits individuals’ options for the private enforcement of justice, leaving those who do not wish to submit to the state’s system without options.

The Dominant Protective Association

Nozick focuses on the possible conflicts between clients of different protective agencies in a state of nature. He proposes three scenarios: one agency consistently wins battles, leading to a monopoly; agencies dominate different geographical areas, resulting in territorial divisions; or equally successful agencies decide to avoid costly conflicts and rely on a third party for arbitration, leading to a judicial system.

All these scenarios, argues Nozick, lead to a situation resembling a minimal state. Nozick questions why a market for protection services tends toward monopoly, attributing it to the unique nature of the service in which the strength of competition directly affects the value of protection.

Invisible-Hand Explanations

In this section of Chapter 2, Nozick compares a dominant protective association with the state. He questions Locke’s idea of the emergence of money from an agreement. He argues that in a barter system, individuals gravitate toward more marketable goods without a formal agreement, a process explained by “invisible-hand explanations” (18). This term, which Nozick borrows from Adam Smith, describes complex patterns that unintentionally arise from individual actions. This contrasts with “hidden-hand explanations” (19), which bring together disparate facts and claim they are patterns of someone’s intentional design. Nozick likens hidden-hand explanations to conspiracy theories.

Further, Nozick explores different types of invisible-hand processes, focusing on the establishment of patterns within filtering and equilibrium processes. Filtering permits only compatible elements, removing the rest, while in equilibrium, each component adapts to its surroundings, and these collective adaptations together shape the overall pattern.

Lastly, Nozick notes that methodological individualism might overlook social filtering processes that explain why all instances of a phenomenon fit a certain pattern. Methodological individualism is the principle that explanations in political and social science should focus on information regarding individuals and their relationships, avoiding the consideration of broader social structures.

Is the Dominant Protective Association a State?

Nozick identifies two differences between private protective associations and the minimal state: private enforcement of rights and selective protection. He notes that Max Weber and other political thinkers consider the monopoly on force within a geographical area to be an essential condition for the constitution of a state. However, Nozick argues that the monopoly on force is neither a sufficient nor necessary condition for statehood. He thinks that a state announces its intention to punish unauthorized use of force, unlike private agencies, which are not required to do so. In addition, private agencies offer protection to those who buy their service, unlike a state, which protects all individuals within its jurisdiction. Nozick concludes that despite initial appearances, the dominant protective agency in a territory does not fulfill these criteria, thus not constituting a state.

The Minimal State and the Ultraminimal State

In the first section of Chapter 3, Nozick introduces the concept of the ultraminimal state, distinguishing it from the night-watchman state. The ultraminimal state maintains a monopoly on force but only offers protection and enforcement services to those who purchase its policies. The night-watchman state, which Nozick also calls the minimal state, protects all citizens through a redistributive plan financed through taxation.

Nozick poses several questions regarding the legitimacy of redistributive functions for protective services and whether protection is a unique case for such redistribution. He also asks whether compelling non-redistributive reasons justify providing protective services for some at the expense of others.

Moral Constraints and Moral Goals

Further on, Nozick critiques utilitarian approaches to social organization and individual rights. He argues that utilitarianism, the ethical theory that promotes the greatest happiness for the largest number of individuals, could lead to compromising rights in favor of perceived greater happiness. Nozick contrasts this with a view in which rights place moral constraints on actions and not just end goals. This view prohibits violating these constraints for any purpose, unlike a goal-oriented position, whereby rights can be breached to minimize overall societal rights violations. Nozick also argues that the ultraminimal state should include constraints on certain actions to protect individuals’ rights.

Why Side Constraints?

In the third part of Chapter 3, Nozick discusses Kant’s categorical imperative, which states that individuals are ends in themselves and not merely means to be used. He argues that side constraints reflect the inviolability of individuals and protect against specific ways of using people. This contrasts with end-state views, which focus on minimizing the use of people as means altogether.

Nozick emphasizes the moral significance of recognizing individuals as separate entities with their own lives, arguing against using individuals for the benefit of a perceived social good.

Libertarian Constraints

Further on, Nozick discusses the moral justification for libertarian constraints. He argues that individuals have separate and distinct existences, which prohibits sacrificing one person for another. This idea leads to a libertarian constraint on initiating aggression because it requires respect for the separateness of individual life. Nozick notes that further steps are needed to fully develop this principle, especially in cases involving innocent threats or shields, where moral complexities arise concerning self-defense and aggression.

Constraints and Animals

In this section, Nozick examines moral side constraints as related to animal rights. He asks whether animals have moral status beyond mere objects for humans and if certain purposes justify imposing significant costs on them. Nozick argues that animals’ treatment should be weighed in moral deliberations.

Nozick asks whether animals should be sacrificed for greater overall happiness. He challenges the utilitarian thesis of the greater good because, he argues, even animals have claims to fair treatment despite being brought into existence for human use.

The Experience Machine

In the sixth section of Chapter 3, Nozick introduces the thought experiment of an “experience machine” that offers any experience to individuals. This machine requires individuals to be floating in a tank with electrodes connected to their brains. Thus, they would be able to experience anything they desire. This experiment presents the question of whether experiences matter only if they feel real “from the inside” and if one should choose to live a simulated life (42).

Nozick argues that people seek more than detached experiences; they want to do things in the world, have agency over the type of person they are, and have contact with reality at a more profound level. The experience machine experiment reveals that living an authentic life and engaging with reality directly is crucial to individuals because without experiencing the world, the machine is doing the living instead of the individuals floating in it. Therefore, mere thought experiences—even if pleasurable—are insufficient for a fulfilling life. This discussion leads to broader questions about what truly matters to humans beyond just sensory or thought experiences.

Underdetermination of Moral Theory

In this section, Nozick asks what distinguishes humans from animals and whether the difference justifies animals being treated as a means to an end (or against Kant’s moral imperative). He proposes a hierarchical moral scale with three statuses: beings that cannot be sacrificed (status 1), beings that can be sacrificed only for higher beings (status 2), and those that can be sacrificed for beings at the same or higher levels (status 3).

Nozick considers whether humans could belong to status 2. Furthermore, he uses an analogy involving hypothetical beings superior to humans who might sacrifice humans for their benefit.

What Are Constraints Based Upon?

Nozick questions whether moral views should be based on a side­-constraint view or a more complex hierarchical structure. He asks what specific qualities necessitate moral constraints on how a person is treated by others. He considers traditional attributes, such as sentience, rationality, free will, and moral agency. However, he finds these insufficient for establishing a clear connection to moral constraints. Nozick raises ethical questions about moral judgments and the nature of human interactions with animals, suggesting that although animals are not rational beings capable of ethical decisions, it is nevertheless problematic to apply the utilitarian principle to their treatment.

Furthermore, Nozick suggests that the ability to formulate and live by an overall conception of one’s life is crucial. He asks whether interfering with someone’s life path undermines its meaningfulness. Nozick does not provide clear answers to this series of questions, stating that he plans to explore these moral and ethical issues further in future works.

The Individual Anarchist

In the final section of Chapter 3, Nozick revisits the concept of moral side constraints concerning the state and the private protection system. He discusses the individualist anarchist’s view that the state, by monopolizing force and compelling individuals to fund others’ protection, violates moral side constraints because it separates those who do not participate in the justice system (for example, peaceful individuals) from their right to not contribute to the protection of others.

Nozick argues that for a state to be morally legitimate, it must transition from a private protection scheme to an ultraminimal state—and then to a minimal state—without violating individual rights. He plans to justify this transition in the rest of the work, showing that a minimal state is the only morally permissible form of government because it balances individual rights and state responsibilities.