Anarchy, State and Utopia

Section I: The Entitlement Theory

In Chapter 7, Nozick articulates his thesis that the minimal state is the largest justified state form and that any state exceeding this scope infringes on individual rights. He examines various arguments for a more extensive state but chooses to focus on those related to distributive justice, or the way that a society distributes resources among people.

Nozick analyzes the term “distributive justice” and notes that there is an implicit assumption that there should be a central authority in society responsible for distributing resources. Against this idea, he argues that in a free society, distributions arise from individual actions and voluntary exchanges, not from a central distributive process. Nozick then proposes the term “holdings” rather than “distributions” to emphasize individual entitlement rather than collective distribution. Holdings are any property that an individual owns.

The section then turns to the concept of justice in holdings, and Nozick focuses on three components that he will develop over the following sections:

1. Justice in acquisition, which deals with the initial acquisition of holdings, its nature, and its complications
2. Justice in transfer, which covers the transfer of holdings from one individual to another
3. Rectification of injustice in holdings; this principle is highly historical, as it addresses the past injustices of holdings acquisitions and transfers

Nozick’s discussion in this chapter is essential to his overall argument in favor of a minimal state that respects individual holdings and entitlements based on justice in acquisition, transfer, and rectification.

Historical Principles and End-Result Principles

Nozick analyzes time-slice principles of distributive justice. He states that “current time-slice principles of justice hold that the justice of a distribution is determined by how things are distributed (who has what) as judged by some structural principle(s) of just distribution” (153). These structural principles are based on a structure at a given moment, without consideration of historical context. Nozick contrasts this with his entitlement theory, which is historical and bases justice on how holdings were obtained and exchanged. Nozick argues that time-slice principles are inadequate, as they ignore the process and history behind distributions, focusing only on the outcome.

Patterning

Nozick explores patterned principles like distribution according to merit, usefulness, or a combination of factors. Patterned principles of distribution are principles determined by natural patterns, such as IQ scores or any other natural dimension that is not historical. Nozick sees patterned principles as arbitrary. Instead, he advances the entitlement theory—the idea that distribution is only just if each person has the holdings to which they are entitled—which he asserts is historical and focuses on how holdings are acquired and transferred. Nozick argues that just distributions depend on past actions and entitlements, not on fitting predetermined patterns.

How Liberty Upsets Patterns

In this section, Nozick discusses the entitlement theory and contrasts it with patterned principles of distributive justice. To argue against patterned distribution principles, such as distribution by merit or equality, requires constant intervention in people’s choices and exchange processes. Nozick argues that this excessively restricts personal freedoms and does not lead to a just system.

To illustrate his argument, he uses the famous Wilt Chamberlain example. Chamberlain, due to being a popular basketball player, collects a large sum of money due to the popularity he enjoys based on his skill. Each spectator who wishes to see him play contributes only $0.25 toward his holdings. Thus, he ends up with the sum of $250,000 because one million people come to see his game. Nozick argues that it would be difficult to argue that Chamberlain unjustly collected the sum of money. Nozick’s entitlement theory, resulting from the Chamberlain example, illustrates how voluntary transactions, such as paying to see Chamberlain play basketball, can lead to unequal wealth distribution while still being just.

Sen’s Argument

Nozick analyzes economist and philosopher Amartya Sen’s argument on individual rights and social ordering. Nozick argues that rights should be viewed as constraints within which social choices operate rather than determinants of social order. This perspective reinforces that continuous interference is needed to maintain any distributive pattern, as individual choices can transform any social outcome.

Redistribution and Property Rights

In this section, Nozick discusses patterned principles of distributive justice by focusing on recipients, asserting that these principles limit individuals’ choices about resource allocation, particularly when benefiting others. Such principles overlook the significance of individual choices and gifting, which are central to relationships like family, and necessitate constant adjustment and interference to maintain desired patterns. This raises questions about the rights of givers and the implications of enforced redistribution.

Locke’s Theory of Acquisition

Nozick explores Locke’s principle of justice in acquisition through his theory on property rights. For Locke, property originates from someone mixing labor with an unknown object (through labor, the object becomes property). Nozick discusses the challenges in defining property boundaries, asking whether labor justifies full ownership of an item. Nozick also examines Locke’s proviso of leaving “enough and as good” for others (176), questioning its applicability in a world with limited unowned resources. The complexity of establishing a baseline for comparison and the economic significance of original appropriation are highlighted.

The Proviso

Nozick argues that any satisfactory justice in acquisition theory must contain a Lockean-like proviso—a conditional stipulation—that prevents deteriorating others’ positions through appropriation. This includes cases where someone exhausts a vital resource. In this case, they would have to compensate others for having exhausted the resource.

According to Nozick, however, the proviso does not limit opportunities to appropriate or prevent participation in competitive market actions. Instead, the Lockean proviso deals internally with such cases, not through external overriding, focusing on specific situations of deterioration of resources.

Section II: Rawls’ Theory

In this section, Nozick praises John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice, recognizing it as a comprehensive and important work of philosophy that other philosophers in the field should be in conversation with. Nozick notes that he will engage with Rawls’s work and focus on his disagreement with it, but that is not because he does not appreciate Rawls’s seminal work. In the following sections, Nozick discusses several concepts from A Theory of Justice.

Social Cooperation

Rawls’s theory suggests that justice must guide distribution in society, questioning how individual contributions in joint production are valued. Nozick argues that discerning individual contributions and incentives within a cooperative framework remains a challenge, especially when considering efficient resource allocation and justifiable inequalities.

Terms of Cooperation and the Difference Principles

In this section, Nozick analyzes Rawls’s concept of distributive justice, according to which individuals choose justice principles behind a veil of ignorance, not knowing their social status or abilities. Rawls argues for principles that ensure equal basic rights and justify inequalities only if they benefit everyone, especially the least privileged. Nozick is critical of Rawls’s focus on group benefits rather than individual gains and asks whether the better endowed have reasons to accept terms favoring the worse off. He suggests the difference principle proposed by Rawls might not be seen as fair by those more fortunate.

The Original Position and End-Result Principles

In this section, Nozick criticizes Rawls’s distributive justice system that privileges the less fortunate. He argues that differential contributions should lead to privileges. He thinks that Rawls’s distributive system does not apply to real-world situations, where individuals have different entitlements, leading to differing results. Nozick argues that Rawls’s model, suitable for hypothetical scenarios like the distribution of resources falling from the sky, does not translate well to situations where production and entitlements are involved. He believes that Rawls’s original position, designed to derive justice principles without knowledge of personal attributes or histories, leads to an unfair system that excludes historical entitlement conceptions.

Macro and Micro

Nozick discusses Rawls’s idea that principles formulated for a society’s macrostructure cannot be countered through examples of specific situations. Nozick argues that principles of justice should apply universally—not just to a society’s overall structure but also to its micro parts. Nozick suggests that understanding justice in general schemes is challenging and that judgments about justice should include micro-level analysis.

Natural Assets and Arbitrariness

In this section, Nozick discusses Rawls’s rejection of the natural liberty system. For Rawls, distributive shares are influenced by natural talent and social circumstances, which are arbitrary from a moral point of view. Rawls’s focus is on countering accidents of natural endowment and social contingencies. This approach shapes his idea that distributions should not be affected by unfair, arbitrary factors. However, Nozick questions why distributions should not partially depend on natural endowments and asks whether it is fair to invalidate natural capabilities.

The Positive Argument

Further on, Nozick examines Rawls’s rejection of holdings dependent on natural endowments. Nozick challenges the presumption of social equality in the absence of moral reasons for inequality, arguing that it is unclear why equality should be the default distributional state. He suggests that equality is assumed as a norm only in contexts where there is a centralized system of distribution, which is not consistent with how distribution works in a free society. This leads him to ask whether it is necessary to justify inequalities.

The Negative Argument

Nozick challenges the connection between undeserved natural assets and unjust holdings, examining counterarguments to Rawls’s theory. He questions Rawls’s assumption that people do not deserve their natural assets, suggesting that individuals might be entitled to them and the resulting holdings. Further, Nozick argues that entitlements to natural assets might prevent extreme applications of the difference principle. He notes that many human attributes, including rationality, arise from morally arbitrary facts but have moral significance.

Collective Assets

Nozick discusses Rawls’s view that natural talents are a collective asset, suggesting that their distribution should benefit the poorest. Nozick questions whether treating talents as common resources for the profit of others is justifiable. He states that natural talents do benefit others as it is, but this does not justify putting them to work toward a leveling of assets.