48 pages • 1 hour read
Tom StandageAn Edible History of Humanity
Nonfiction | Book | Adult | Published in 2008A modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
Part 5Chapter Summaries & Analyses
Part 5: “Food as a Weapon”
Part 5, Chapter 9 Summary: “The Fuel of War”
In this chapter, Standage details the role of food in warfare. Weaponizing food is a technique that military strategists have used for centuries: “For most of human history, food was literally the fuel of war” (145). Roman writer Vegetius wrote in the fourth century A.D. that food was essential to success during battle. Armies required vast stores of food that were often transported by cart. The animals carrying these carts also required fodder. Military leaders who could solve the problem of food transport were more likely to be successful. Alexander the Great helped to streamline transport for his armies by requiring soldiers to carry their own supplies and limit what they packed. Foraging for food made up for their depleted stores.
However, this system prevented armies from venturing too far from rivers and coasts, where emergency supplies of food could be delivered. The Roman army therefore developed rules about sourcing food: soldiers would demand food from local communities in enemy territory, leaving the areas depleted and susceptible to takeover. During the American Revolutionary War of 1775-1783, British armies failed to consider the importance of food. They expected that loyalists would supply them with what they needed, but their reliance on loyalists caused their allies to turn against them. British armies had to stay close to ports to be fed and were, as a result, unable to advance into the countryside.
Napoleon Bonaparte developed complex theories about managing food during battle, and his practices led to his success. He instructed soldiers on foraging and pillaging, and he set up food stores within safe regions of the countries they invaded. However, when Napoleon invaded Russia in 1812, he failed to account for the unique challenges he would face there. Russian soldiers depleted their own villages, leaving nothing behind for Napoleon’s armies.
Military leaders were eager to find better ways to feed soldiers and keep them moving. The invention of canned food by a cook named Nicolas Appert transformed warfare by providing shelf-stable, nutritious food that could be easily stored and carried. The development of the steam locomotive also changed how food was delivered to armies, contributing to the outcome of the American Civil War. The locomotive and the American Civil War marked a shift from ancient battle techniques to industrialized fighting. The Second World War was unlike any other war in history, and food played a significant role in the success of the Allies’ forces.
Part 5, Chapter 10 Summary: “Food Fight”
As food transport and production became more streamlined, food began to play a different role in warfare. Standage explains that food was not an ideological weapon. The Cold War illustrates this idea. After World War II, Berlin was occupied by four Western allies: Britain, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Three years after the war, the first three countries were ready to relinquish control of the area and allow Germany to move forward as a democratic society, but the Soviet Union was eager to see Germany become a communist state: “What happens to Berlin, happens to Germany; what happens to Germany, happens to Europe” (172). If Germany submitted to a communist government, then the rest of Europe might follow.
The Soviet Union used food as a weapon of ideological warfare, blocking Berlin from access to food. Rather than surrendering, the United States developed a plan that would enable aircraft to carry enough food and coal into Berlin to feed the city. While the Soviets attempted to derail this mission, they were unwilling to directly attack the planes and start a war with the most powerful nations in the world. The aircraft carried more than 6,000 tons of food and coal per day.
Joseph Stalin, the Soviet leader, understood how food could be used to achieve a goal. In an attempt to industrialize Russia in a similar manner to Britain’s Industrial Revolution, Stalin seized control of farmers and utilized collectivization. Stalin hoped that collectivization would lead to greater yields, but farmers produced less under Stalin’s plan. Some areas, such as Ukraine, experienced extreme starvation, but Stalin insisted that the failure of his plan was on the shoulders of saboteurs.
Mao Zedong of China attempted to utilize Stalin’s ideas in his own country in an effort to usher in a new age of industrialization. Mao collectivized farms and created a grain monopoly. Predictably, production waned, and people began to starve. In 1961, Mao agreed to allow farmers to operate their own fields but was unwilling to yield that collectivism was a failure. In 1991, the Soviet Union abandoned communism, largely because it was not able to feed its population. Nobel prize-winning economist Amartya Sen explained that famines do not occur in countries that practice democracy and free press: “When such disasters strike democracies politicians are more likely to act, if only to maintain the support of voters” (192). In democratic countries, food is also less likely to be used as an ideological weapon.
Part 5 Analysis
Part 5 stands in contrast to the first two chapters of the work, illuminating how food evolved from sustenance for hunter-gatherer societies to a weapon of war and ideology. Once more, Standage exhibits the social complexity resulting from The Coevolution of Humans and Plants. Part 5 shows how food, rather than providing nutrition alone, has served as a mechanism for control. Those who could find innovative ways to manage the difficulty of providing and transporting food for large armies were ensured victory in battle. Alexander the Great and Napoleon Bonaparte both sought innovative answers, while others—such as Britain during the American Revolution—failed to account for the importance of food in military success.
However, the creative strategies of military leaders like Napoleon had major humanitarian effects, contributing to Standage’s view of Agriculture as a Destructive Force. Armies pillaged local villages, often leaving already struggling communities with no food to support themselves. They ravaged the countryside, tearing up mills and farms. Later, attempts to industrialize Russia and China treated food as an ideological weapon. Farmers were denied the rights to their land or food production, giving them little incentive to produce a surplus. Many starved as they watched their year’s crops shipped away to the management of the state. Both Stalin and Mao insisted that the failure of their agricultural endeavors were due to their enemies rather than to their lack of knowledge about agricultural processes.
Both Stalin and Mao understood that there was a relationship between Agriculture and Power, but they were unable to find a system that would enable them to use their fertile land to expand their influence and control. Standage suggests that this failure is related to their deviation from democratic societies. In dictatorships, leaders are not motivated to change when people complain or experience starvation. Democratic leaders, however, understand that their power is dependent on public perception.
Standage explains that it is important to understand the profound role that food still plays in power today. Even democracies must be cognizant of how agriculture and power interact with one another. Though the types of foods that shoppers buy represent the casting of votes on what matters to consumers, Standage suggests that this is no replacement for political voting.
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