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Joseph J. EllisA modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
The third chapter is about the drafting and adoption of the US Constitution in 1787 and 1788. Soon after winning the war for independence, it became clear that the government set up by the Articles of Confederation was not working. George Washington found this to be a pressing issue that needed addressing, lest the country devolve into “anarchy & confusion” (91). His experiences as commander of the Continental Army had taught him the value of a central authority. Now he saw states making their own policy and often ignoring the weak national government.
By 1786, there was talk of a convention to amend the Articles. There were three camps among the government leaders: those who wanted no change, those who wanted to keep the Articles but amend them, and those who wanted to discard the Articles and start fresh with a new system. The general population mostly fell into the first camp, because they believed the revolution was fought to preserve state sovereignty and because they lacked a national identity (their loyalties were local).
Joining Washington in arguing for radical change was the Virginian James Madison. He had come to this conclusion from serving in the Virginia legislature and the Continental Congress, seeing firsthand the problems of decentralization. Madison worked hard to convince Washington to attend the convention. Having retired from public life, the former general was reluctant to return, nor was he eager to risk his reputation for an uncertain cause. Madison was dogged, however, knowing that only someone of Washington’s gravitas could convince enough delegates to join their side. Finally, Washington relented in March 1787.
Madison conferred with his fellow Virginian delegates to come up with what became known as the Virginian Plan—an “ultra-nationalist” set of reforms. They included three main ideas: following the states’ model of dividing government into three branches, having a bicameral legislature with both houses chosen proportionally based on population, and federal veto power over state laws. When federal veto power was rejected and the “Great Compromise” resulted in only one house of Congress being proportionate to population, “the Madisonian project of radical reform was essentially dead” (110).
When states voted on ratification later in the year, the shy, retiring Madison found himself debating the fiery Patrick Henry at the Virginia ratifying convention. Henry sought to claim the mantle of the real “Spirit of ’76” and retain state sovereignty. Madison, however, used the Great Compromise to his advantage, turning it from a failure to a formidable advantage. By making the composition of Congress based half on equal state representation and half on population, sovereignty was split between the individual states and the nation as a whole, refuting Henry’s claim of federal consolidation. In a close vote, Virginia voted to ratify, as eventually did all the states.
This chapter illustrates Ellis’s idea of an “evolutionary revolution.” More than a decade after making revolution by declaring independence, the founders successfully managed it by tweaking the framework by which the revolution could continue into the future. They were able to “redefine ‘the spirit of ’76’” as “the spirit of ’87” (89). Washington’s experience in Valley Forge, described in the last chapter, returned to influence the direction of the ongoing revolution. Because he and others could see that the Confederation was not working, they feared anarchy if the national government was not centralized.
James Madison yoked the seemingly opposite ideas of centralized authority and state sovereignty together. On the one hand, he extended the legislature from a unicameral body to a bicameral one, but on the other hand, he proposed electing representatives proportionally to population. This “[shifted] the core definition of representation from states to the citizenry itself” (108). Then Madison turned conventional wisdom on its head. Smaller republics had always been thought to work best, but he asserted that the large size of the United States would create a more stable republic. Many small republics had failed, but the many disparate voices of the US would prevent a small number of strong factional divisions from tearing it apart.
The key venue for Madison’s ideas being accepted, Ellis argues, was not the Constitutional Convention in 1787, but rather the Virginia Ratifying Convention a year later. Madison’s debate there with Patrick Henry was instrumental in the vote to ratify the new constitution. Playing to the fear of a consolidated national government (echoing arguments against England during the Revolution), Henry asserted that the new constitution would give the national government too much power. Madison replied by pointing to “the Great Compromise,” which divided and balanced sovereignty between the states (represented by the Senate) and national government (represented by the House). What’s more, this framework left open-ended the exact balancing of this, “an ongoing negotiation for supremacy, thereby making the Constitution, like history itself, an argument without end” (91).
By Joseph J. Ellis