A Theory of Justice

The definition of good has three stages. First, something is a good thing if it has the properties rational to want in that type of thing, given what it is used for or expected to do. Next, something is a good thing for a particular person if and only if it has the properties rational for that person to want in a thing of that type, given what they intend to do with the thing. Finally, something is a good thing for a particular person if and only if that thing has the properties rational for that person to want in a thing of that type, given what they intend to do with the thing, and if what they intend to do with the thing is rational. A human good is a good that satisfies this definition for persons generally.

The issue of meaning concerns whether judgments of value represent a descriptive or prescriptive use of language: “The terms ‘good’ and ‘bad’ and the like are typically used in giving advice and counsel, and to praise and extol” (355).

However, the criteria for extolling such terms on a thing vary depending on the kind of thing: “A satisfactory definition of the goodness must fit these two facts” (355). The term “good” has a consistent meaning, despite variations in criteria for things to which it is applied. The consistent meaning permits an understanding of why and how the criteria for evaluation vary: “There is no necessity to assign ‘good’ a special kind of meaning which is not already explained by its constant descriptive sense and the general theory of speech acts” (356).

A person’s rational plan of life determines that person’s good. If the person’s plan of life is rational, then their conception of the good is rational, regardless of what that plan is. A person’s plan of life is rational if it is consistent with the principles of rational choice applied to that person’s unique situation, and would be chosen by that person after deliberation, and fully aware of the relevant facts.

Every plan of life conforming to this definition is equally as rational; none is superior or inferior to any other, but all are superior to all plans not conforming to these principles. A person’s rational plan of life is the plan “belonging to the maximal class which he would choose with full deliberative rationality” (359). A person is happy when successfully executing a rational plan of life, and reasonably confident that the plan can be carried through. A rational plan is not a detailed blueprint detailing an entire life; rather, “it consists of a hierarchy of plans, the more specific subplans being filled in at the appropriate time” (360). Goods are activities and relationships that occupy a major place in rational plans. Primary goods are those that are necessary for successfully carrying out rational plans.

The principle of effective means holds that persons are to use the rational plan that realizes their ends in the best way: “More fully: given the objective, one is to achieve it with the least expenditure of means; or given the means, one is to fulfill the objective to the fullest possible extent” (361).

The principle of inclusiveness holds that one plan is preferred over another if it achieves every desired aim and one or more further aims. Often, though, neither plan is more inclusive; rather, each achieves an aim the other does not. In this case, another principle is required. The principle of greater likelihood addresses this issue by stating that when aims may be achieved by multiple plans, a person should choose the plan that presents a greater likelihood of achieving those aims. The three principles together state that a rational plan is one that offers “the greater means for realizing our aims, and the development of wider and more varied interests assuming that these aspirations can be carried through” (363).

Choice is derived from both what we want and how much we want it. For this, rationality does not always suffice, as “the principle to adopt that plan which maximizes the expected net balance of satisfaction” is required (365). This principle simply dictates that a person should make the choice most likely to realize their most important objectives. The notion of deliberative rationality specifies that a deliberatively rational plan is one that would be chosen upon careful reflection considering all the relevant facts to best realize that person’s fundamental desires.

So far, the definition of the good does not state what ends a person’s plans should encourage. Such ends must account for the broad features of human desires and needs, human capacities and abilities, and the general facts of social dependency, and have a grounding in socially interdependent values that enhance the good both of those who enjoy them and of others. The Aristotelian principle, which states that “other things equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of their realized capacities, and this enjoyment increases the more the capacity is realized, or the greater its complexity,” provides good criteria for determining appropriate ends (374).

The principle simply states that as a person’s abilities in a certain subject increase through the developing of capacities, they will over time prefer the more complex activities in which they have acquired the ability to engage through their training. The principle does not state a preference for any kind of activity, but rather states the conditions leading persons to choose particular ends rather than others. Thus, in choosing one’s ends, a person selects a pattern of activities and advances in the performing of their chosen activities, until no further improvement results from their efforts.

The full theory of goodness as rationality, when including the principles of right and justice, can account for goodness as morality. A good person possesses more of the broadly-based characteristics that rational persons desire in each other than the average person. The desirable characteristics include basic virtues, particularly a sense of justice, and to a more limited extent natural assets, such as intelligence and strength. A good act is an act that the actor is at liberty to undertake or to refrain from, and which is intended to advance another’s good. A good action is “a good act performed for the sake of the other person’s good” (385).

The full theory of the good also distinguishes between different varieties of persons lacking moral worth:

[T]he unjust man seeks dominion for the sake of aims such as wealth and security which when appropriately limited are legitimate. The bad man desires arbitrary power because he enjoys the sense of master which its exercise gives to him and he seeks social acclaim. […] [T]he evil man aspires to unjust rule precisely because it violates what independent persons would consent to in an original position of equality, and therefore its possession and display manifest his superiority and affront the self-respect of others (385).

The full theory of the good, created by joining the theory of justice with the theory of the good, leads to these distinctions. 

Self-respect has two aspects. First, self-respect includes a person’s sense of their own value. Second, self-respect is a confidence in a person’s ability to fulfill their intentions.

Parties to the original position would avoid any conditions undermining self-respect, and because justice as fairness supports self-respect more than other conceptions of justice, it would likely be adopted. The conception of goodness as rationality supports a person’s sense of value by allowing them to fully realize their abilities to a satisfactory level of complexity: “[T]hey call upon their educated endowments and arouse in each a sense of mastery, and they fit together into one scheme of activity that all can appreciate and enjoy” (387).

Associative ties further strengthen self-respect under justice as fairness by reducing the likelihood of failure and supporting persons when mishaps occur. For this reason, the good of all activities that fulfill the Aristotelian Principle are recognized and each person should belong to at least one community of shared interests in which their endeavors are socially confirmed.

Shame is “the feeling that someone has when [they] experience an injury to [their] self-respect or suffer a blow to [their] self-esteem” (388), while “[r]egret is the general feeling aroused by the loss or absence of what we think good for us, whereas shame is the emotion evoked by shocks to our self-respect, a special kind of good” (388).

The excellences are personal characteristics and abilities rational for every person to want every other person to have. Natural shame is an intimate, moral feeling that arises from an injury to our self-respect caused by a failure to exercise certain excellences. Moral shame occurs when someone betrays virtues their plan-of-life requires. Shame is distinguished from guilt by the perspective from which it is felt. Shame involves a loss of one’s own self-respect, while guilt focuses on injury to others and their probable resentment upon discovery.

The right and the good are the two fundamental concepts of the theory of moral worth. In the original position, the principles of justice would be chosen, but the principles of rational choice and the criteria of deliberative rationality are not yet addressed. Another distinction between the right and the good is that persons’ conceptions of their good should differ, while a conception of justice should not allow for differing conceptions of right.

Further, the principles of justice are applied through the restricted perspective of the veil of ignorance, while evaluations of a person’s good are made in full light of all relevant facts. Put more succinctly, the right is determined to a definite, broadly applicable value in the original position, while the good is a variable concept addressed later in the process, with the aid of all relevant facts.